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Abstract 
This dissertation examines states and their motivations in contributing troops to UN 
peacekeeping operations through the three primary International Relations 
approaches of realism, liberalism and constructivism. Current literature and 
research provide minimal application of IR approaches and their explanations of 
peacekeeping. Examining peacekeeping operations from 1991-2007, state 
contributions are measured for the overall time period and for each individual 
peacekeeping operation through a number of independent variables that represent 
each approach. Regression analysis combined with table and graphical analyses 
provide results that develop a deeper understanding of peacekeeping and IR 
approaches. The geographic relationship a state maintains from the host 
peacekeeping state is suggested to have the most significant relationship with troop 
contributions in this analysis. For the permanent five members of the UN Security 
Council there have been significant changes in their pattern of troop contributions 
to UN peacekeeping operations over time compared to overall contribution 
patterns. These discoveries provide a deeper understanding of peacekeeping as a 
tool for mitigating conflict in the international system through international 
relations approaches. 
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Introduction 
 
The global dynamic that has emerged since the end of the Cold War has 
created a new world environment with a multitude of and unique opportunities to 
view international relations and state behavior. While the threat or possibility of 
World War should never be completely ignored, security topics such as nuclear 
proliferation, piracy, terrorism, resource wars and human rights violations are 
considered major pieces of a new security dilemma that has emerged for states. In 
addition, what makes these topics unique and challenging is that the vast majority 
of them are not strictly contained within the borders of one particular state, and 
solutions to these topics often require collaboration and development of policies 
that encompass transnational discussion. The emergence of these new “cross-
border” security topics has created a world where states must collaborate 
economically, militarily and diplomatically with much more frequency to secure 
their own borders, policies and people. 
Traditional theoretical explanations of security concerns, cooperation and 
state behavior have been championed to be “realistic” in nature reflecting self 
interested states that only cooperate when the situation or outcome can best be 
determined to secure their individual policy proclivities with little concern for 
international enhancement of other states.  Yet, as the aforementioned security 
concerns have emerged, the possibility of diminished singular state behavior has 
become a topic of international debate, creating different policies and organizations 
that have been formed to help deal with such concerns and provide the opportunity 
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for new theoretical lenses to emerge that move away from “self interested” state 
behavior.  
The Department of Peacekeeping Operations was developed within the 
United Nations apparatus to provide states an avenue to use international 
cooperation, international legitimacy and international policies to help alleviate 
some of the these security concerns for states and groups of states. Since 1946, 
U.N. peacekeeping has become a common practice of international intervention for 
individual states and U.N. members to use for mediation and prevention of security 
threats to states and their people. Peacekeeping operations are important tools for 
the international community as they represent the only security apparatus available 
to an international organization that is inclusive of all states in the international 
community.  Although organizations such as NATO and the African Union pursue 
military solutions to international crises, they are not inclusive of the majority of 
states in the international system. Peacekeeping operations have maintained 
legitimacy in the international arena as they are perceived as representing the 
interests of the international community as a whole. While there is not consensus to 
their use at all times, peacekeeping operations have shown over time to be the most 
effective tool in collective international intervention.  If international intervention is 
a condition to help mitigate violent behavior or war, UN peacekeeping operations 
are often the only solution that can be collectively approved through the 
international community. 
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Yet from a theoretical perspective the motives for individual state 
participation in peacekeeping operations are not well researched and there is little 
understanding if these peacekeeping operations and interventions are altruistic or 
simply the continual adherence to “self interested” practice among states.  The 
development of cooperation in security matters and the continued progress in 
peacekeeping operations depends on discovering the motives or perspectives that 
states possess with respect to peacekeeping operations.   
The chief question for examination is why do states participate in UN 
peacekeeping operations? This question lies at the center of how peacekeeping 
operations can continue to be successful from an operational perspective and how 
the international community can implement policies that can be managed 
politically. Naturally, corollaries to the primary question of interest will contribute 
to the overall understanding of this analysis. What are the motivations for states to 
use personal resources to support multilateral peacekeeping operations? Do states 
only use these missions as an extension of their foreign policy? Are peacekeeping 
operations at the mercy of the large, dominant powers or is there a role to be played 
for all U.N. member states? Do states only contribute personnel and support 
operations due to financial opportunities they may experience? These questions and 
their analysis may provide new insights to peacekeeping operations theoretically 
and practically.     
This analysis is valuable for two primary reasons. Studying this 
phenomenon may contribute to our theoretical understanding of international 
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politics by uncovering current international dynamics of states and their 
behavior/perceptions of international peacekeeping. Understanding perceptions of 
peacekeeping and state commitments to their success and implementation can 
provide important insight into security and state concerns for an international 
relations political theorist. International peacekeeping practitioners will benefit 
from a better understanding of individual state behavior and collective security 
which can provide important foundations for the continued development and 
policies of peacekeeping operations.  
The purpose of this study is to further develop our theoretical and practical 
knowledge with respect to individual state motives and perspectives on 
international cooperation in relation to United Nations Peacekeeping development 
and practice.  Using current statistical and research methods, it is expected that a 
better understanding of what motivates individual states to participate in U.N. 
Peacekeeping operations can be developed. We can also study whether traditional 
IR approaches and their explanations of security continue to be a reflection of self 
interested states or a greater advancement towards international cooperation for 
more international altruistic means. 
The plan of this dissertation is as follows. In Chapter 1 a thorough review of 
the peacekeeping literature and the relation that the literature currently maintains 
with international relations approaches will be explored. The literature review will 
serve to recognize the deficiency of current peacekeeping literature and the 
application of peacekeeping studies to international relations approaches.  
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International relations literature will also be explored to assist in developing a 
synthesis of the two literatures and what potential outcomes could be reasonable to 
expect when examining theoretical assumptions of international relations 
approaches to peacekeeping operations. A detailed review of these subjects will aid 
in the development of states’ interest in the international community, particularly in 
security matters, and how this may influence participation in peacekeeping 
operations. 
 In Chapter 2 the methodology will be developed and presented to examine 
peacekeeping operations from 1991-2007. Standard stepwise regression and basic 
table and graphical examinations will be used for this research. The dependent 
variable for analysis will be a percentage developed by dividing the troops a state 
contributes by the total number of military personnel a state maintains at the 
inception of the peacekeeping operation.  The total number of troops divided by a 
states total military personnel during this same time period will also be used for a 
single regression analysis to measure state participation during the overall time 
period. Characteristics of each state during the individual peacekeeping operation 
will be used to measure theoretical claims to achieve some descriptive 
understanding of international relations approaches and the application of these 
approaches to state participation in peacekeeping operations. The independent 
characteristics used for this analysis will consist of regime type, economic 
indicators, military strength, international integration and geographic measures.  
Standard tables and graphing techniques will be used to test individual variables 
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over the selected time period. The standard stepwise regression model results in 
combination with table and graphical results will be used to determine the 
aforementioned independent variables and their potential explanatory power. SPSS 
software will be used to operate the regression model. Each case will be examined 
individually and then the data from the individual cases will be pooled to measure 
the included variables over time.  
 Chapter 3 will present the results from the regression models, tables and 
graphical analysis. The results from these methods will then be examined to 
observe if any of the included independent variables show any level of variance, 
positive or negative in each individual case or in the combination of cases over 
time. This chapter will be used to report the findings of the methods in their 
entirety before applying the findings to the theoretical approaches. 
 Chapter 4 will determine the confirmation or rejection of the presented 
hypothesis. The provided results will assist in verifying or rejecting noteworthy 
claims of each approach and their appropriate application to peacekeeping 
operations and state behavior. The results from the regression models, tables and 
graphs will be examined and applied in combination to develop the most 
appropriate explanation for the confirmation or rejection of the hypotheses.  
 Chapter 5, the final chapter, will apply the results to understand in more 
detail state motives, policy prescriptions and future research opportunities. 
Developing policy recommendations that could broaden our understanding of 
peacekeeping and the future potential of peacekeeping is vital to the long term 
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success of peacekeeping and the mitigation of conflict. Recognizing why and when 
states participate in UN peacekeeping operations can assist in developing policies 
that recognize state motivations and enable policy developers and the UN the 
opportunity to create processes that can be successful logistically and politically. 
Recognizing the future research opportunities that emerge from this research has 
the potential to add more depth and breadth to continued theoretical and practical 
discussions.   
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Chapter 1 - Peacekeeping and International Relations: The Literature 
 
 Hans Morganthau once commented that social science often resembles “a 
deaf man answering questions which no one has asked him” and that academics 
often hide in the “trivial, the formal, the methodological, the purely theoretical, the 
remotely historical – in short, the politically irrelevant.”1 Despite the attempts of 
theorists to provide thoughtful and comprehensive work, practitioners are all too 
often inclined to dismiss the work of theorists as purely academic, with little value 
to real world practice. While issues and events of the day often influence their 
research agendas, theorists frequently regard practitioners as being too concerned 
with the immediate, short term future, rather than long term trends and analysis. 
This has created a gap where the two sides of generalized approaches and real 
world practice rarely meet, let alone inform one another.  
The research on UN peacekeeping is not immune to this phenomenon. 
There is an obvious gap between policy development and implementation, and the 
application of international relations approaches. A thorough review of the 
literature on peacekeeping reflects this disjoint and encourages the pursuit of 
research that places peacekeeping in the broader themes of international relations 
approaches. 
When the United Nations (UN) formally approved the first UN 
peacekeeping mission, the UN Truce Supervision Organization in 1948, a new 
global security dynamic began. The post World War II environment that emerged 
                                                 
1 Van Evera, Stephen. 1997. Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science. London: Cornell 
University Press. Van Evera discusses Hans Morgenthau’s preference for research that answers real 
questions relevant to the real world. 
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was different than any previous international environment and international 
stability was a primary objective of the UN and the international community. The 
UN was created to save the world “from the scourge of war”2 and peacekeeping, 
while developed after the inception of the UN, was intended to be a tool for the 
organization to mitigate violence in the international community. 
 Sixty years later and over 60 UN peacekeeping operations later, the practice 
of international intervention through peacekeeping is still a viable and useful 
apparatus of the United Nations and the international community. While the 
practice of UN peacekeeping operations has continued for over half a century, the 
sustained presence of their use in the international system has allowed the academic 
community to weigh the numerous topics of interest from differing perspectives. 
These pursuits have created a body of literature that ranges from speculative 
investigations, historical analysis, individual case studies and policy prescriptions 
for the future of UN peacekeeping. This literature has substantive breadth and 
depth and has taught the academic community and the world much about the 
phenomenon of peacekeeping. 
 Yet there are some important gaps that exist within the literature that fail to 
take account of broad theoretical applications and practical knowledge of 
peacekeeping operations. Of particular interest in this area is why over time do 
states contribute troops and resources to peacekeeping operation? Such support 
being voluntary by current UN standards, recognizing and understanding the 
                                                 
2 The United Nations Charter can be found at 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/preamble.shtml.  
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motivations behind continued support for UN peacekeeping missions offers the 
potential to inform international relations approaches and state behavior in the 
international system. And while there are attempts to bridge this gap of state 
practice to inform theory, more work and understanding of this behavior is needed. 
 The literature on peacekeeping has seen an exponential increase in the past 
20 years. It has been widely cited that peacekeeping articles in academic journals 
have increased by approximately 350 percent from the 1980s to the 1990s. Several 
journals now regularly include articles on peacekeeping to include International 
Security and World Politics while new journals focus strictly on this issue – 
International Peacekeeping being one example.3 A quick look at the online 
database www.scholar.google.com reveals 347 articles, books, reports, and 
hearings from 1980-1989, 4,130 from 1990-1999 and 12,000 from 2000-2009 on 
the topic of U.N. peacekeeping.  Analysis of United Nations peacekeeping is 
clearly a topic of academic interest.  And while examinations concerning United 
Nations peacekeeping have clearly expanded over time there are serious issues 
within the literature that offer opportunities for further examination and can move 
the literature further than the traditional descriptive and historical approaches. To 
find these opportunities it is important to note the chronological nature of the U.N. 
peacekeeping literature and how it has developed. 
 
 
                                                 
3 Paris, Roland. 2000. ”Broadening the Study of Peace Operations.” International Studies Review, 
Vol. 2, No. 3. p. 27-44. 
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Early Approaches 
Before the end of the Cold War the amount of literature on United Nations 
peacekeeping was minimal at best. Fortna and Howard note that “a few classics 
works on peacekeeping were written during the Cold War, but one could hardly 
call the body of work a “literature” until the explosion of interest in the 1990’s.”4 
Peacekeeping studies according to their research “focused on the prospects for 
improving or developing peacekeeping as an effective tool of conflict resolution…. 
most of these classics primarily consist of detailed case histories.”5  
 Works before and during the Cold War time period (1960-1990) were 
informative, but relatively atheoretical.  Highlighting 1946-1967 peacekeeping 
operations Higgins includes a multitude of historical commentary and documents 
that are case specific, laying out the details of descriptive information for each 
specific case. David Wainhouse also provides a thorough compendium of 
peacekeeping, but again looks strictly at each peacekeeping case and the minutiae 
associated with each case.6 Providing analysis from a former military officer 
perspective Harbottle provides two works that highlight the challenges that 
peacekeeping will experience in terms of functionality and development and also 
lessons learned from the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East.7 
                                                 
4 Fortna, Virginia Page and Lise Morje Howard. 2008. “Pitfalls and Prospects in the Peacekeeping 
Literature.” The Annual Review of Political Science. Vol. 11. p. 284. 
5 Fortna, Virginia Page and Lise Morje Howard. 2008. “Pitfalls and Prospects in the Peacekeeping 
Literature.” The Annual Review of Political Science. Vol. 11. p. 283-301. 
6 Higgins, R. 1969-1981. United Nations Peacekeeeping: Documents and Commentary. Oxford, 
UK. Oxford University Press and Wainhouse, David. 1966.  International Peace Observations: a 
History and Forecast. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
7 Harbottle, Michael. 1972. The Blue Berets. Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books and 1974 “Lessons in 
UN  
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Recognizing that peacekeeping will continue to be relevant to international 
security after the World Wars, Cox presents an examination of peacekeeping 
history from an American perspective and how American policy should embrace 
peacekeeping from a policy standpoint.8 In this work he provides policy 
recommendations but they are American centric and offer no theoretical 
applications. Reviewing the first ten years of peacekeeping, Bloomfield discusses 
the viability of peacekeeping through concerns of financing and decision making.9 
Presenting an early analysis of host state consent and the role that host state consent 
will play in future peacekeeping operations, Garner provides an investigation with 
respect to the continued developed and approval of future peacekeeping 
operations.10 His analysis is constructed chiefly through the lens of international 
law and the opportunity for peacekeeping’s consistent application over time. 
 Some works during this period approached the theoretical possibilities of 
peacekeeping analysis but fell relatively short in the application of peacekeeping to 
theoretical assumptions.  While the title of Rikhye’s Theory and Practice of 
Peacekeeping gives one the assumption that theoretical developments or 
assumptions may be examined his work offers insight into the managerial aspects 
of peacekeeping operations. He again follows the route of previous authors by 
providing thorough analysis of the included case studies and how effective or 
                                                 
8 Cox, Arthur. 1967. Prospects for Peacekeeping. Washington D.C. The Brookings Institution. 
9 Bloomfield, Lincoln. 1966. “Peacekeeping and Peacemaking.” Foreign Affairs. Vol. 44, No. 4. p. 
671-682. 
10 Garvey, Jack. 1970. “United Nations Peacekeeping and Host State Consent.” The American 
Journal of International Law. Vol. 64, No. 2. p. 241-269. 
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ineffective peacekeeping operations were at keeping peace. 11 The Peacekeeper’s 
Handbook, written by the International Peace Academy, has been used by 
numerous states as a guide to peacekeeping and related operations.12 While this 
work does espouse some theoretical application, the definition provided of theory 
in this case is more closely related to principles or guidelines for peacekeeping. 
Though this handbook achieves the chief goal of creating foundational 
recommendations for peacekeeping operations, the handbook falls significantly 
short of any strong theoretical premises. 
 After the Cold War and through today peacekeeping literature has expanded 
significantly but has not moved too far from the traditional descriptive purpose 
since 1990. The literature continued to represent an inductive approach concerned 
more with informing policy and developing lessons that were arrived from 
examining past practices. The vast majority of peacekeeping studies were 
concerned with three primary subjects: case studies, regional or state specific 
approaches and functions/viability of peacekeeping operations that include 
discussions of high profile failures and pessimistic outlooks on peacekeeping 
operations.  Peacekeeping’s place in greater international relations approaches was 
and continues to maintain a relatively minimal place in the academic literature. 
  
 
 
                                                 
11 Rikhye, I.J. 1984. The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping. London: C. Hurst. 
12 Harbottle, Michael. 1978. Peacekeeper’s Handbook. International Peace Academy. 
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Peacekeeping Operations/Case Studies 
 United Nations peacekeeping case studies come in two forms. Individual 
case studies concerning particular missions or states and edited or comparative 
works that aggregate missions by typology, time periods, successes, failures and 
regions. Edited and comparative works during this time offer a rich anthology of 
cases and how particular unique characteristics of each case plays into a larger 
understanding of peacekeeping operations. These characteristics can be particularly 
important when attempting to produce valuable insights into the understanding of 
peacekeeping operations across cases. Durch provides an excellent edited volume 
that includes a lessons learned section (based on past historical observations) and 
then includes descriptive analysis on over 20 individual case studies.13 He divides 
the analysis into peacekeeping operations undertaken in the Mediterranean/Middle 
East, in South and Southeast Asia, Africa and the Western Hemisphere. Also using 
multiple case studies and lessons learned from these past peacekeeping 
experiences, Thakur and Schnabel offer another edited volume that highlights cases 
from Africa, Kosovo, Timor and Cambodia and offers insights into the challenges 
that peacekeeping may experience as mandates evolve and how peace can be 
properly maintained.14 Using cases from Haiti, Somalia, Cambodia, Bosnia and El 
Salvador, Cousens and Kumar examine each individual operation and connect each 
case to challenges or particular subjects associated with peacekeeping 
                                                 
13 Durch, William J. 1993. The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping. New York: St. Martin’s Press. 
14 Thakur, Ramesh and Albrecht Schnabel, eds. 2001. United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Ad 
Hoc Mission, Permament Engagement.  New York: United Nations Press. 
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development.15 The topics included are the sovereignty of states in relation to 
peacekeeping, the legitimacy of peacekeeping, the power of the UN in relation to 
individual states and its peacekeeping actions and if sustainable peace can be the 
norm or an uncommon occurrence. 
 Individual case studies include a multitude of examinations from past and 
current operations. Case study analysis has been provided on Angola, Cambodia, 
The Democratic Republic of Congo, East Timor, El Salvador, Kosovo, Lebanon, 
Namibia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and The Solomon Islands.16 This list is 
not all inclusive, but represents what makes up the large majority of the literature 
on peacekeeping after the Cold War. Single case study approaches attempt to 
examine one case in its entirety and consistently offer remarkable details on 
specific cases from their inception to conclusion. Most offer historical insights as to 
                                                 
15 Cousens, Elizabeth and Chetan Kumar. 2001. Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in 
Fragile Societies. Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner. 
16 Dzinesa, Gwinyayi. 2004. “A Comparative Perspective of UN Peacekeeping in Angola and 
Namibia.” International Peacekeeping. Vol. 11, No. 4. p. 644-663; Peou, Sorpong. 2005. 
“Collaborative Human Security? The UN and other Actors in Cambodia.” International 
Peacekeeping. Vol. 12, No. 1. p. 105-124; Doyle, MW. 1995. UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: 
UNTAC’s Civil Mandate. Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner; Ginifer, J. 2002. “Eyewitness: 
Peacebuilding in the Congo: Mission Impossible?” International Peacekeeping. Vol. 9, No. 3. p. 
121-128; Chesterman, Simon. 2002. “East Timor in Transition: Self Determination, State Building 
and the United Nations.” International Peacekeeping. Vol. 9, No. 1. p. 45; Martin, Ian and 
Alexander Mayer-Rieckh. 2005. “The United Nations and East Timor: from self determination to 
state building.” International Peacekeeping. Vol. 12, No. 1. p. 125-145; Johnstone, Ian. 1995. 
Rights and Reconciliation: UN Strategies in El Salvador. Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner; Naarden, 
Gregory and Jeffrey Locke. 2004. “Peacekeeping and Prosecutorial Policy: Lessons from Kosovo.” 
American Journal of International Law. Vol. 98, No. 4. p. 727-743; Murphy, Ray. 2003. “UN 
Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia and the Use of Force.” Journal of Conflict and Security Law. 
Vol. 8, No. 2. p. 71-99; Howard, LM. 2002. “UN Peace Implementation in Namibia: The Causes of 
Success.” International Peacekeeping. Vol. 9, No. 1. p. 99-132; Barnett, M. 2002. Eyewitness to a 
Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press; Samuels, Kirsti. 2003. 
“jus Ad Bellum and Civil Conflicts: A Case Study of the International Community’s Approach to 
Violence in the Conflict of Sierra Leone.” Journal of Conflict and Security Law. Vol. 8, No. 2. p. 
315-338; Clark, W. and J. Herbst, eds. 1997. Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed 
Humanitarian Intervention. Boulder, CO: Westview; Ponzio, Richard. 2005. “The Solomon Islands: 
The UN Intervention by Coalitions of the Willing.” International Peacekeeping. Vol. 12, No. 2. p. 
173-188. 
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the viability of these missions, where failures emerged or how success was 
achieved.  The topic of “lessons learned” much like the edited and comparative 
works, is the crux of the vast majority of these examinations and from a historical 
perspective, contributes significantly to our understanding of logistical and policy 
concerns of peacekeeping. 
 
Regional and State Centric Approaches 
 Regional and state centric peacekeeping studies are also prevalent within 
the growth of peacekeeping studies. The majority of these examinations deal with 
larger developed states and what role these states play in peacekeeping operations, 
funding, and development and how peacekeeping operations assimilate to 
particular states’ interests. Studies in this area have focused on individual states 
such as the United States, Japan, China, Canada, The United Kingdom, Pakistan, 
and Russia. These studies have also provided significant analysis on particular 
regions that include Africa, Europe, Nordic States, and other various pairings of 
states, some with no regional association yet often share other characteristics such 
as government type/regime. These examinations provide a vast amount of 
information, policy and assumptions about peacekeeping operations and the 
application, or lack thereof, to individual states. 
 Analysis concerning the United States has been the most extensive in 
number and subject. Examining American interests in peacekeeping and the role 
that traditional American idealism plays in shaping these interests, Ruggie 
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concludes that  as peacekeeping moves forward, the United States must continue to 
respect idealistic tendencies, but with a cautious eye to the realities of the 
international community.17 Presenting an argument that the United States 
squandered an opportunity to expand and promote national interests abroad after 
the Cold War, Fleitz examines failed peacekeeping operations (fiascoes in his 
terms) and recommends that the US encourage scaled back peacekeeping 
operations that reflect national interests.18 Recently International Peacekeeping 
devoted an entire journal to the United States perspective, role and history in 
peacekeeping operations.19 Subjects that are covered include U.S. doctrine, 
historical analysis from Middle Eastern, European, Latin America and Africa 
peacekeeping operations, the evolving nature of American support and a theoretical 
cut at US participation after 9/11. MacKinnon examines American peacekeeping 
policy from Bush Sr.  through the Clinton years and discusses the decrease in 
support from the United States towards the end of the Clinton Administration that 
he claims reflects an environment of caution after several recent failed missions.20 
 Studies examining Japan’s position in peacekeeping have been offered by 
Dobson and Mulgan.  Mulgan notes that Japan’s involvement in peacekeeping 
creates a policy dilemma and opportunity.  Noting the constitutional constraints 
that limit Japan militarily, Mulgan recognizes the unique balance of military and 
                                                 
17 Ruggie, Jon. 1994. “Peacekeeping and U.S. Interests.” Washington Quarterly. Vol.. 17, No. 4. p. 
175-184. 
18 Fleitz, Frederick. 2002. Peacekeeping Fiascoes of the 1990’s: Causes, Solutions and US Interests. 
Westport, CO: Praeger. 
19 See International Peacekeeping. Vol. 15, No. 1. 2008. 
20 MacKinnon, Michael. 1999. The Evolution of Peacekeeping Policy Under Clinton: A Fairweather 
Fan? London: Frank Cass. 
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non-military support that Japan can contribute understanding that militarily 
speaking, Japan may be limited until the international community is ready to see an 
increase in Japan’s military reach.21 Dobson looks at Japan’s involvement in 
peacekeeping operations as an opportunity for Japan to integrate into the 
international community following World War II and the government’s ability to 
use “international norms” during this period to convince the public of the value of 
peacekeeping.22 
 Chinese attitudes towards peacekeeping are provided by Gill and Reilly and 
Zhongying. Gill and Reilly present an analysis of the Chinese perspective on 
sovereignty, intervention and peacekeeping. The authors inspect the changing 
nature of Chinese willingness to move towards more liberal definitions of state 
sovereignty and intervention, and how change in these areas creates more 
opportunity for the Chinese to be involved in peacekeeping.23 Zhongying presents 
further contribution to this idea of a greater role for the Chinese in peacekeeping as 
more flexibility has entered Chinese foreign policy and how leaders perceive that 
increased involvement in peacekeeping operations as one way to increase a more 
pluralist approach to international intervention and policies.24 
                                                 
21 Mulgan, Aurelia. 1995. “International Peacekeeping and Japan’s Role: Catalyst or Cautionary 
Tale?” Asian Survey. Vol. 35, No. 12. p. 1102-1117. 
22 Dobson, Hugo. 2003.  Japan and United Nations Peacekeeping: New Pressures, New Resources. 
London: Routledge. 
23 Bates, Gill and James Reilly. 2000. “Sovereignty, Intervention and Peacekeeping: The View from 
Beijing.” Survival. Vol. 42, No. 3. p. 41-59. 
24 Bates, Gill and James Reilly. 2000. “Sovereignty, Intervention and Peacekeeping: The View from 
Beijing.” Survival. Vol. 42, No. 3. p. 41-59. 
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 Russia’s experience in peacekeeping operations is covered in rich detail in 
an edited volume by Mackinlay and Cross.25 This volume is divided into several 
peacekeeping operations, with chapters on UN mandated operations and 
peacekeeping operations the Russian Federation developed among former 
territories of the Soviet Union. The authors examine Russian peacekeeping policy 
and how legally and constitutionally Russia has developed into a supporter of 
peacekeeping operations. MacKinlay and Cross conclude that while Russian 
support for peacekeeping may have initially been developed with regional and 
strategic interests at the core, as international peacekeeping has developed, the 
opportunity to further Russian strategic gains through this endeavor has diminished. 
 Writing about Pakistan and India and the large role that they each play with 
respect to troop contribution, Krishnasamy comes to the conclusion that while both 
these states have consistently contributed a significant number of troops to 
peacekeeping operations, each has a minimal role in higher level decision making 
and policy developmental matters.26 Support from an operational perspective has 
not translated to a larger role in peacekeeping decision making for India and 
Pakistan. Krishnamasy also examines Pakistan and the motivations that have led 
Pakistan to the current role of a substantive contributor. While he mentions that 
economics may play a role, he notes that this would not recognize the political 
                                                 
25 MacKinlay, John and Peter Cross, eds. 2003. Regional Peacekeepers: The Paradox of Russian 
Peacekeeping. Tokyo: United Nations Press. 
26 Krishnasamy, Kabilan. 2001. “ ‘Recognition’ for Third World Peacekeepers: India and Pakistan.” 
International Peacekeeping. Vol. 8, No. 4. p. 56-76. 
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interests that Pakistan also maintains that have aided in developing the optimistic 
attitude of Pakistan towards peacekeeping.27  
Examining historical Nordic (Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Norway) 
contributions, Jakobsen recognizes the longstanding tradition that this region has 
played in providing support for peacekeeping operations from a logistical and troop 
perspective and how they could continue to perform in this role through a 
recommendation of deploying civil-military groups.28 Berman reviews lethal 
material contributions from the United States, the United Kingdom and France to 
African states that are intended to support ongoing peacekeeping operations or the 
immediate to moderate time after operations conclusions.29 Berman reports that it is 
more important for regulation of these lethal materials in these regions due to the 
possibility of these materials ending up in unexpected regions and/or the hands of 
unintended groups. If stricter regulations are not in place and viable, then the 
exchange of these materials may decrease due to security concerns of the donor 
states with respect to management of these materials and threats to the stability of 
the region. 
Africa serves as an important reference point in peacekeeping literature due 
to the number of operations that take place in this continent.  Providing a 
substantive analysis of where African peacekeeping has been, where African 
                                                 
27 Krishnasamy, Kabilan. 2002. “Pakistan’s Peacekeeping Experience.” International Peacekeeping. 
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peacekeeping is now and where African peacekeeping can be, Berman and Sams 
consider peacekeeping as vital to African stability and recommend that outside or 
Western nations provide more timely support and that outdated policies and 
practices by the UN must be updated in order to create more lasting relationships 
and commitments.30 Supplying a scathing view of Western peacekeeping practices 
after 9/11, Cilliers makes note of Africa’s importance concerning the war on terror 
and other security concerns, but recognizes that the former colonial states have 
decreased their commitment and only commit when such commitment is minimal 
and unobtrusive to individual security concerns.31 
It is again important to note that these state and regional specific studies are 
not all inclusive, but represent one area of peacekeeping studies that continues to be 
well researched, documented and analyzed. These examinations offer immense 
historical depth and breadth but much like operational case studies they do little to 
place peacekeeping in the larger field of international relations approaches and 
practice. While these works at times move closer to theoretical application, they are 
individually state specific and do not offer broad theoretical approaches. 
 
Peacekeeping Functions, Failures and Future 
 The third area that contributes to the peacekeeping literature consists of 
studies of the functions of peacekeeping, the future viability of peacekeeping 
                                                 
30 Eric Berman and K. Sams. 2000. Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities. United 
Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. 
31 Cilliers, Jakkie. 2003. “Peacekeeping, Africa and The Emerging Global Security Architecture.” 
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operations and failures of peacekeeping operations and policies. The function and 
characteristics of peacekeeping operations is a topic that consists of several 
subtopics that deal with specific characteristics of peacekeeping. The subjects for 
consideration are considerable and research is derived on subjects such as the 
sovereignty of individual states, the constraints that exist within the international 
community and the UN and other options as alternatives to peacekeeping and 
evaluation. 
Widely regarded as the most important work during the post Cold War 
period on the topic of peacekeeping functions, the future of peacekeeping and 
policies of peacekeeping is the Brahimi Report. Lakhdar Brahimi led a team of UN 
officials at the request of then Secretary General Kofi Annan to examine UN 
peacekeeping practices and activities to include post conflict peace building, 
peacekeeping and enforcement. The report that followed in 2000 covered wide 
ranging peacekeeping aspects and was the first serious step towards achieving 
reforms in UN peacekeeping operations. The report covered the following 
foundational subjects with respect to peacekeeping: 
1. Responds to the concern that the UN does not have adequate 
management and financial systems to support the sharply 
increased number of peacekeeping operations and peacekeepers 
now deployed. To alleviate this concern the report promotes the 
importance of member state willingness to provide political, 
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personnel, material, and financial support to UN peacekeeping 
missions 
2. Takes an historical look at past peacekeeping activities to improve 
the structure and management of UN response. Clarifies what UN 
peacekeeping is trying to accomplish, what kinds of forces are 
required, and what conditions might necessitate different kinds of 
missions. 
3. Makes recommendations to enhance the UN Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations' (DPKO) capacity for completing its 
core mission of performing integrated civilian and military 
planning and management of multi-dimensional peace operations. 
4.  Aims to improve the UN's rapid deployment posture; strengthens 
the surge capacity for planning, preparing and deploying 
missions.32 
As the UN continued to increase the number of peacekeeping operations in 
the late 1990s UN administrators and world leaders recognized that change needed 
to be made pertaining to their operational capacity and reach.  The Brahimi report 
served the purpose of recognition and recommendation and did so without moving 
significantly away from past practices and beliefs to incur substantive political 
opposition.   
Providing an overarching examination of the capacity and function of UN 
peacekeeping operations and their development post Brahimi report, Durch, Holt, 
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Earle and Shanahan provide a thorough and complete analysis of how the seminal 
report has influenced peacekeeping operations. They divide the progress of 
peacekeeping into three categories: doctrine and strategy, capacity for peace 
operations and rapid and effective deployment.33 The authors find mixed results 
when analyzing some of the key recommendations of the report three years later, 
yet are quick to note that the organization has moved forward with positive results 
with respect to operational challenges where the organization holds the most 
influence. The key challenges that continue to exist arise chiefly from member 
states’ desires and commitment to support more vigorous missions that need more 
personnel and logistical requirements. Diehl discusses the mixed results of 
peacekeeping operations and that the entire process is a value laden decision for the 
international community and the UN should decide on the merits of each 
situation.34 He continues when recognizing that peacekeeping must become more 
creative, inclusive and effectively managed to determine the long term success of 
currently successful development.35 
Personnel needs and the gap that exists in supply and demand are covered 
by O’Hanlan and Singer.36 The primary concern for the authors is that even though 
the world is experiencing the war in Iraq and terrorism, the needs for humanitarian 
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intervention in failed states and the ability of the global community to respond are 
miles apart. The authors note that estimates of military expenditures and personnel 
in the world are $800 billion on spending and over 20 million individuals in 
military service. The needs for peacekeeping to be successful would be 
approximately 200,000 new personnel to add to the current 180,000-200,000 in the 
field. The authors conclude that solutions to peacekeeping operational needs for 
financial support and personnel are available, but this would require shifts in 
military resources from member states, a practice that would be very challenging to 
achieve. 
Expressly related to personnel, logistical and financial concerns, literature 
on the use of private military groups or companies for peacekeeping purposes has 
been widely examined. Looking toward the future with respect to private security 
(PSCs) or military companies (PMCs) and their role in peacekeeping, Brooks 
makes note of the substantial reduced costs of using private military companies, the 
importance of perception of these groups (legitimate operations versus mercenary 
activities) and the current demand for their services.  While Brooks sees an 
important role for PSCs and PMCs in the future, he does recognize the short history 
of private security and military companies in peacekeeping operations and the 
challenges that these groups will face if states and international organizations see 
them as viable options for peacekeeping.37 Supporting the development and use of 
PMCs, Bures promotes the use of these groups as alternative options to 
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peacekeeping, especially when the other option is to do nothing as in the cases of 
Rwanda and Darfur.  He admits that there exist numerous concerns related to legal 
issues, regulation and moral hazards for private companies to alleviate, but the 
international community should minimally engage this option as a plausible 
alternative in situations that may call for this type of action. Bures does recommend 
that policies on peacekeeping and private companies by ameliorated before turning 
operations over to private enterprise.38 A final and significant point concerning 
“incorporating” peacekeeping operations when needed is made by Singer. He 
mentions two fronts that are important to recognize and make private firms 
attractive. The first is that the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping and the future of 
UN peacekeeping have been under debate for the greater part of the 1990’s and 
2000’s and in order to serve the needs of the world and enhance operations to the 
degree of internal recommendations, then private companies may be the best 
alternative, financially and logistically. If peacekeeping is to be a goal of the UN, 
then actions must be taken to enhance this goal. Secondly, if the UN fails to act in 
cases of gross acts of human rights violations and genocide, which Singer believes 
is next to impossible with current media outlets, then finding solutions prior to 
these concerns and events must be developed, instead of consistent use of ad hoc 
missions during points of crisis.39 
Ideas on sovereignty and the role that the UN plays within states borders 
have also been at the center of peacekeeping operational and functional discussions. 
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Concerns by member states over sovereignty were a key point in the Brahimi report 
with respect to fact finding missions and other early methods of investigation used 
by the UN for discovering potential problematic situations. Traditional views of 
Westphalian sovereignty have been at the center of the debate of peacekeeping 
operations and whether the UN has any authority to intervene with little or no state 
consent. Yet these traditional views of state sovereignty have come into question as 
peacekeeping has continued to develop, especially in failed states or states with 
consistent intra-state conflict. Helman and Ratner write that “The traditional view 
of sovereignty has so decayed that all should recognize the appropriateness of U.N. 
measures inside member states to save them from self-destruction. At the same 
time, though, the United Nations cannot simply begin to involve itself in the affairs 
of member states as if they were suddenly part of the trusteeship system. The 
irreducible minimum of sovereignty requires some form of consent from the host 
state. Whether that consent must be a formal invitation or simply the absence of 
opposition would seem to depend upon the circumstances. The only exception to 
the principle ought to be rare situations involving major violations of human rights 
or the prospect of regional conflict where warring factions oppose an international 
presence.”40 This idea of diminished sovereignty, despite being a principle of early 
UN foundations, is paramount on the debate to the functionality of peacekeeping 
operations. 
Other scholars have echoed the importance of some level of diminished 
sovereignty as important to successful multilateral peacekeeping operations and the 
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importance of the idea of shared sovereignty between states and international 
organizations such as the UN. Also recognizing that the the principle of sovereignty 
is eroding due to the new generation of peacekeeping operations, Bertram discusses 
the opportunities that this presents for mitigating violence and ongoing conflicts but 
that it is not always evident when this is necessary.41 Marginalizing state 
sovereignty by the UN for peacekeeping operations must be perceived as unbiased 
and in situations where gross human rights violations are occurring or in the 
absence of recognizable government.   Continuing on the subject of failed and 
collapsing states, Krasner develops the idea of shared sovereignty further, 
concluding that an acceptance of transcending rules of shared sovereignty by states, 
international organizations like the UN or coalitions led by stronger states is the 
most effective managerial option for these states.42 The recommendations Krasner 
advocates, trusteeships, protectorates and diminished adherence to Westphalian 
ideals of sovereignty have helped move the debate forward on exactly the role 
sovereignty plays in peacekeeping and how the UN can effectively navigate this 
delicate balance of state’s rights and intervention. While the debate on sovereignty 
is not concluded, these works continue to support the legitimacy and manner in 
how peacekeeping can and may operate. 
Evaluating peacekeeping operations in order to measure success, failure, 
meeting objectives and other various administrative goals also serves as an 
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important topic of peacekeeping operations literature. While there is no consensus 
on evaluating peacekeeping operations the discussion on what indicators to 
measure and how evaluation policies should be developed is a divided issue in the 
literature.  The different perspectives that scholars maintain in this area are evident 
in Druckman and Stern’s work highlighting five prominent peacekeeping authors: 
Paul Diehl, A. Fetherston, Robert Johansen, William Durch and Steven Ratner.  All 
the authors agree that evaluation and competent research designs should be 
developed but how to go about evaluation and what benchmarks research designs 
should examine are points of contention.  Druckman and Stern develop a few key 
themes that are consistent by all the contributors that highlight the challenges that 
exist in creating foundational evaluative practices: the types of peacekeeping 
operations, setting reasonable expectations, setting short term and long term 
objectives (recognizing long term objectives pose more challenges), developing 
some level of baseline principles and recognizing that context matters for 
peacekeeping operations.43  And while there is no one way to go about evaluating 
success or failure, this academic pursuit has been pursued consistently.     
The topic of peacekeeping failure and the causes of such failures have been 
widely examined since the mid 1990’s to today. Examinations of failures of 
peacekeeping operations are policy and operationally laden works with significant 
emphasis on learning from these past failures where UN mandates and operations 
have not succeeded. Comparing two peacekeeping operations, Jett presents a case 
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of success, ONUMEZ, and a case of failure, UNAVEM II, to look at particular 
characteristics that made these operations a success or a failure.44 In hindsight, Jett 
believes that causes of failed operations can be identified and separates the two 
cases by particular variables that assist in recognizing why missions turned out as 
they did. His conclusion as to why peacekeeping fails ultimately falls on a premise 
of situational analysis – sometimes factors out of control for all parties can make or 
break the success of the operation. 
Providing a significant achievement of the overarching conditions for 
failure Shawcross discusses the permanent members of the Security Council as the 
main offenders to allowing peacekeeping operations to expand into the necessary 
operations for success.45  While also recognizing the administrative and 
bureaucratic failures of UN personnel, he concludes that in order for UN 
peacekeeping to continue as a viable endeavor, the dominant, powerful states must 
play a large role, potentially even at times unilaterally since the UN has proven to 
be lethargic and difficult to manage when responding to security concerns and 
conflicts. While he maintains faith in the UN, he recognizes the weakness the 
organization has politically and militarily. 
Analysis on failures also comes from operational specific analysis as well. 
This is the case in two works on the Congo and Sierra Leone. Presenting an 
investigation into the peacekeeping operation UNAMIR in the Congo, Emizet notes 
the massive failure that the UN experienced with respect to the displaced peoples in 
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the Great Lakes region.46 Delayed response and action towards warnings from 
humanitarian groups and the UN’s own administrators combined with a failed 
commitment to protecting human rights caused Emizet to encourage the UN to be 
firm in the response to the ideals that the organization champions as foundational 
principles in order to achieve some semblance of success in protecting displace and 
affected peoples. With respect to Sierra Leone, Reno recognizes the difficulties that 
UN peacekeeping forces and separate British forces experienced with local militia 
groups in enforcing cease fire agreements and achieving victory in the region.47 
Reno argues that without better administration, occupation and the ability to use 
force at levels that are prohibited by current international law then success is 
marginalized. 
 Advocating the “virtures of war” Luttak encourages the UN and other states 
to allow for the process of war to fully exhaust itself and to intervene in situations 
that call for supporting displaced refugees, not in multilateral interventions.48 By 
allowing war to run its course conflict is not prolonged, a victor eventually emerges 
and war and loss of life eventually diminishes. Peacekeeping should be directed 
towards managing post conflict environments and not mitigating violence. 
 While scholarly research on peacekeeping failures is well documented, 
studies concerned with the success of peacekeeping operations emerged in the early 
2000s and moved away from the considerable pessimistic mood associated with 
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UN peacekeeping.  Fortna has provided significant analysis on the subject with 
several works during this time. Observing peacekeeping operations in both 
interstate and civil wars, Fortna develops a hazard ratio that shows that 
peacekeeping is just as effective in civil conflicts as interstate conflicts. 
Furthermore, peacekeeping has had at least the same impact as efforts absent of UN 
peacekeeping. She states that in general, “peace lasts longer when peacekeepers are 
present than when belligerents are left to their own devices.”49 Fortna also 
examines how peacekeeping keeps peace by measuring the duration of peace in 
conflicts where UN peacekeeping was present, and in conflicts where peacekeeping 
was absent. The results are positive, particularly after the Cold War, when some of 
the most difficult tasks of peacekeeping have been undertaken. Fortna reports that 
peacekeeping tends to make peace last, and last longer.50 Most recently, Fortna 
looks at how peacekeeping can help sustain and improve peace after civil wars. She 
notes four ways that the presence of peacekeepers can help to prolong peace: 
1. Change the incentive for parties to abide by peace, 
2. Reduce uncertainty for all parties, 
3. Prevent accidental return to war, 
4. Prevent political abuse. 
Through these measures, peacekeeping is an effective policy according to Fortna, 
reducing the likelihood of a return to violence, conflict and war. 
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 The short and long term success of peacekeeping operations has also been 
examined by Doyle and Sambanis.  Providing a rigorous qualitative approach 
intended to discover broad factors that apply to success in peacekeeping, Doyle and 
Sambanis determine that multilateral UN peacekeeping has a positive effect on the 
democratization process and mitigating violence.  By examining over 124 civil 
wars post World War II, the authors determine that when peacekeeping operations 
are strategically designed for higher order peacekeeping, or peacekeeping that 
facilitates treaties, post conflict development and limiting local capacities, the 
operations are successful in achieving significant peace, especially in short term 
periods.51 Using this analysis as a springboard for further research, Sambanis finds 
that participatory peacekeeping, peacekeeping that enhances economic 
development, assists in creating institutions and commits to long term troop 
presence, maintains significant influence on short term peace. While his findings do 
not provide significant positive results for peacekeeping operations in the long 
term, the analysis provided by Sambinis shows that economics is one of the key 
components of post-conflict peacekeeping operations in combination with 
mandates to monitor cease fires and rebuild infrastructure.52 
 The historical development of the UN and peacekeeping, and the various 
functions that it maintains, has also been thoroughly examined. Among the 
historical works that provide thorough analysis of internal UN development in 
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peacekeeping includes Ziring, Riggs and Plano, Fasulo, Ryan, Hoopes and 
Brinkley and the U.N. Department of Public Information webpage and annual 
Basic Facts About the U.N. publication.53 These works provide the important 
backdrop of the creation of the U.N. in response to state security concerns and the 
development of peacekeeping operations from the institution. The United Nations 
website has also proved to be a valuable resource for information regarding 
resolutions, documents and other sources pertinent for understanding peacekeeping 
from an institutional development perspective (www.un.org).  
 
The Role of International Relations Approaches and Peacekeeping Research 
 The breadth and depth of peacekeeping analysis has clearly expanded since 
the Cold War to provide substantive analysis on the vast majority of topics and 
challenges to peacekeeping. Scholars, policy makers and students understand a 
significant amount of the history of UN peacekeeping operations and the challenges 
that exist for peacekeeping in the international community. Yet through all the 
growth and expansion of peacekeeping studies, the substantive grievance regarding 
work on peacekeeping studies comes from several sources that note the lack of 
coherent theoretical analysis and the missing connection concerning international 
relations approaches and peacekeeping. One of the earliest complaints of the lack 
of theoretical development comes from Galtung in his research on peace studies. 
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He claims “the theory of peace, the concept of peace, are both relatively rich, and 
empirical glimpses here and there will tend to give too special images of more 
complex conceptualizations. One cannot build a general theory of peace for the 
world on relations between Nordic countries alone, or a theory of disarmament on 
the basis of Costa Rica.”54 20 years after Galtung’s comments Paris reports that 
“apparently preoccupied with the practical problem of improving the effectiveness 
of future missions, we have neglected broader macro theoretical questions about the 
nature and significance of these operations for our understanding of international 
politics.”55 Featherston also observes that “in essence, we are still largely in the 
dark in terms of improving analysis effectiveness and successes of peacekeeping. 
This can be attributed directly to the lack of theoretical underpinnings for the 
field.”56 Diehl, Druckman and Wall report that peacekeeping literature has 
primarily been a pursuit “of a single case study, in which description is the primary 
goal.”57 Sorenson and Wood continue this theme by noting that peacekeeping 
literature has focused on unorganized case studies that describe only the 
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“operational aspects of PKOs, specific PKOs and lessons learned, and/or 
discussions of broader themes, such as humanitarian intervention.”58 
 Bures mentions that in light of the growth in literature one would “expect 
that there now would exist a well-developed theory of international 
peacekeeping.”59 Yet this endeavor may be one step too early for the theoretical 
debate. This literature represents not only a dearth of theoretical attempts to 
understand peacekeeping, but lacks “a serious effort to engage the central 
theoretical debates of IR.”60 While Bures calls for a mid-range theory of 
international peacekeeping the first step should be to place peacekeeping in the 
broader themes of international relations approaches, chiefly how states interact 
and participate in this phenomenon and if particulate trends can be discovered from 
their involvement. 
 The aforementioned perspectives display the need and desire to look at UN 
peacekeeping through a broad theoretical lens. Placing peacekeeping in the greater 
volume of international relations theory and why states interact in this practice can 
offer insights that may help to develop our understanding of state motivations with 
respect to security and multilateralism and can inform policy makers how best to 
create operations and policies that reflect needs of security concerns, but are 
supported politically and logistically. Previous research attempting to bridge the 
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gap in peacekeeping operations and theoretical assumptions has been pursued but 
fallen relatively short in provided overarching application. Shortcomings of 
literature concerning peacekeeping and approaches suffer from small sample sizes 
(focusing on large, middle or small powers), limited variable inclusion, reduced 
timeframes of examination and prescriptive abilities 
 A large number of studies that approach theoretical topics focus 
significantly on the characteristics of contributor states but the application to 
international relations approaches and literature are under developed. Interested in 
UN peacekeeping operations contributions and regime type, Andersson looks at 
UN peacekeeping from 1990-1996 to determine if the type of regime influences 
participation. She concludes that strong democracies represent the most consistent 
contributors to peacekeeping operations. Andersson adds that most recipients of 
UN peacekeeping operations are non-democratic states and are experiencing 
conflicts that deal with governmental change or chaos.61 She supports this finding 
as important to the theoretical debate of state participation in peacekeeping, 
offering an alternative to realpolitik assumptions of national interests, reflecting 
greater representative of liberal notions of democratic peace theory. Yet Andersson 
notes that greater inclusion of variables of interest that apply a more comprehensive 
analysis than regime type offers would prove valuable. Her examination is meant to 
provide “observations for discussion and further research” and only looks at one 
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primary topic of interests for states, type of regime.62 Examining peacekeeping 
operations from 2001-2004, Daniel and Caraher, discover that “democratic, rich 
and middle income, stable and highly and lesser developed states constitute the 
majority profile of the peace operations community.”63 This sheds some light on 
the potential motivations of states (democracies building new democracies) much 
in the same manner as Andersson, but does not consider any theoretical 
underpinnings or applications. In the defense of the authors, this is not a goal of 
their research. Daniel and Caraher do note that for peacekeeping operations to grow 
in contributions, states already contributing will be the most appropriate avenues 
for more personnel as there are few non-contributing states that fit their profile. 
 Recognizing the growth of contributors since the end of the Cold War, 
Bobrow and Boyer examine peacekeeping support through public goods, which 
have significantly increased after the Cold War, but recognize that consistent and 
new contributors may be experience monetary private goods in the form of net 
revenues for the dispatch of forces. The authors also recognize that the 
comprehensive group of contributors continues to be “a small band of 
overwhelming politically and economically Western and Northern Countries” 
which mirrors previous analysis of Andersson, Daniel and Caraher.64 The 
theoretical aspect of Bobrow and Boyer’s approach relates to hegemonic stability 
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theory and whether there would be a decline in public goods upon US withdrawal 
of personnel and finances. In the unlikely occurrence that the US would withdrawal 
all personnel and finances, due to the dominant position that it maintained during 
the late 80’s and early 90’s, the authors conclude that the system would remain 
stable due to recent declines in financial and personnel support where the UN 
continued to operate peacekeeping operations, even at a operational disadvantage. 
Bobrow and Boyer’s work, recognizes the importance of measuring financial, 
personnel and logistical as support for peacekeeping operations but is relatively 
void of traditional international relations approaches. 
 Providing one of the most overt theoretical treatments of peacekeeping, 
Neack looks at UN peacekeeping and whether this practice is in the interest of the 
international community or selfish state interests.  Supporting the self interested, 
realist paradigm, Neack concludes that Western states participate due to their 
interest in maintaining the status quo and the few non-Western states that 
participate due so in order to gain the international prestige that comes with 
participation. Canada provides an excellent example for Neack, arriving at their 
support for peacekeeping as a middle power that desires to increase Canadian 
influence in the international arena which reflects a self interested perspective.65 
The primary problem with the analysis that Neack provides is the time period she 
used for analysis, 1948-1990. This time period represents peacekeeping during the 
Cold War era, which is widely cited to be foundationally separate from post Cold 
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War peacekeeping, when peacekeeping expanded significantly and more states 
began participating.66 Applying her work to future and current peacekeeping 
operations is thus relatively difficult. 
 Shimizu and Sandler offer analysis on the economic motivations and costs 
states incur by contributing to UN and NATO peacekeeping operations. 
Developing a model that measures the correlation between peacekeeping burdens 
and GDP for UN peacekeeping missions the authors recognize indications of a 
return to hegemony by the US and other wealthy European states.67 The authors’ 
conclusions that there is a disproportionate burden for rich states in peacekeeping 
contributions and that rich states may be taken advantage of by poor states to 
provide this public good is arrived at with some qualifiers.  Shimizu and Sandler, 
while accurate in the assumption that richer nations do contribute more financially, 
will always find some relative discrepancies in spending from rich states to poor 
states. Due to the manner in which states are assessed by the UN for peacekeeping 
operations is one important aspect. While change may be needed, under the current 
method of payment and the foundational fact that some states have larger 
economies than others, there will always be the potential for public goods to be 
guaranteed by the developed states in the international system. Where the 
conclusions do offer some potential theoretical implications is if these contributing 
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states are motivated to participate in peacekeeping operations that benefit their 
interests militarily and economically in the long term.  
 Recognizing the growth of new peacekeeping contributors after the Cold 
War and new challenges that exist for peacekeeping, Findlay presents an edited 
volume that examines motivations for participation, understanding that new 
motivations may have emerged with the influx of contributors. In Chapter 1 of the 
volume, he provides one of the most distinct lists of potential motivations that may 
exist for states. Altruism is important to the states like Canada, Sweden and 
Norway. Peacekeeping can maintain some level of international prestige, particular 
when humanitarian concerns are involved. Other states that may be considered for 
permanent membership to the Security Council may see participation as mandatory 
to be considered for the prestigious opportunity of permanent member.  Some states 
may see peacekeeping in their national security interests or even see participation 
as a “down payment” for when they may need peacekeeping intervention. From a 
military perspective, states could use peacekeeping operations as opportunities to 
enhance their militaries perspective and experience overseas and gain training that 
domestic institutions cannot provide. A final reason for Findlay is the economic 
incentive for troops who would receive greater financial reward for service to the 
UN versus domestic service. He finds this an unlikely sole contributor for 
motivation, due to the slow nature of payments from the UN and that only poorer 
states can take advantage of economic incentives.68 While the motivations Findlay 
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provides are legitimate assumptions that are made concerning state participation in 
peacekeeping operations, his analysis of these motivations stops there. These issues 
clearly have the opportunity to be analyzed through international relations lenses 
but this analysis is not provided by Findlay or the chapter authors. 
 Advocating critical theory as the appropriate lens to examine peacekeeping 
operations Pugh and Bellamy provide two of the more theoretical approaches to 
peacekeeping. While both studies do not explicitly examine motivations for states 
to contribute to these operations, they are both grounded in placing peacekeeping 
operations in the broader theme of international relations approaches. Pugh 
advocates the use of critical theory as the most advantageous theory for application 
to peacekeeping, noting that “structural transformation based on the social struggles 
immanent in globalization processes will introduce new forms of democratic 
peacekeeping in the short term, if not rendering it largely obsolete in the long 
run.”69 Pugh believes that adherence to liberal and realist frameworks have 
promulgated the current international structure, to their advantage, rather than 
allowing nature to run its course. Bellamy echoes this perspective, also supporting 
the use of critical approaches to understanding peacekeeping, discounting realist 
assumptions concerning national interests and desiring to move away from problem 
solving theory. Bellamy deems critical theory as the only theory that can “broaden 
and deepen the theory and practice of peace operations.”70 These studies again 
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approach theoretical challenges and potential directions, but do not attempt to 
measure state behavior in peacekeeping operations. 
 Upon review of these attempts to help situate peacekeeping in broader 
theoretical themes, the literature falls significantly short. Past research provides 
some basic assumptions of potential theoretical motivations that may play a 
significant role in states deciding to support peacekeeping operations: economics, 
prestige, shared norms of behavior, military self interest, international pressure and 
regime type. These potential explanatory variables have not been examined in 
combination significantly nor have they been applied to international relations 
approaches and the foundational tenants that theory espouses. Thus, the important 
question still to be pursued is why do states choose to participate or not to 
participate in peacekeeping operations? What are the key motivations for states, 
states that differ economically, militarily, domestically, in governmental structure 
and in individual interests, and are there consistent motivations across time and 
operations that provide some reasonable explanation, theoretically, to continued 
support of multilateral UN operations.  To develop testable hypothesis concerning 
the application of participation in peacekeeping operations, the literature on 
international relations theory must also be examined. 
 
International Relations Approaches 
In order to test the assumptions of international relations approaches, each 
approach must be clearly understood conceptually and in application. This provides 
a substantive challenge when attempting to apply particular theoretical tenants to 
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real world events and/or circumstances. Different theoretical frameworks offer very 
different explanations of cooperation internationally, peacekeeping 
notwithstanding, and each can offer perspectives as to the development of policy 
and practices. Understanding the different theoretical treatments of peacekeeping 
can help develop better practices and policies to best represent current state 
preferences and motives.  
 The field of international relations covers a significant number of subjects 
to include economics, human rights and governmental structure. Yet historically, 
security is the paramount subject of interest. “International war is among the direst 
of the perennial problems that plague world affairs. With respect to the central issue 
of international security, then, it is legitimate to ask how and why international 
organizations respond to war and threats of war.”71 The underpinnings of 
international relations initially focused its analysis on security issues with respect to 
the individual state.72 Yet even in this initial analysis the formation of states to 
strengthen coalitions and individual states was apparent. As international relations 
approaches have evolved, the recognition of the role international collaboration 
plays is highly debated. This movement away from states as individual actors now 
includes analysis with respect to international organizations (IOs), non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and also domestic policies and their influence 
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on state relations vis-à-vis another.73 The breadth and scope of international 
relations approaches also have much to contribute in other areas of concern, such as 
environment, economics and human rights, but to deny the primary role that 
security issues play in international relations theory and application is to omit its 
historical and primary function or purpose.  Thus it is possible to find a substantial 
amount of discussion and debate as to the role of international organizations and 
the peacekeeping mechanism from previous approaches, and how we can explain 
the potential reasons for states participation in these collective activities. 
 The history and tradition of realism in international relations reaches further 
than other traditions or approaches.  realism has traditionally dominated the 
international relations landscape from the first signs of international interaction 
though strong alternatives have been developed since its rise to prominence. 
realism is derived historically from Thucydides’s History of the Peloponneisan 
War, in particular his “Melian Dialogue,” Niccoli Machiavelli’s The Prince and 
Thomas Hobbes Leviathan, but in its contemporary form is best attributed to Hans 
Morganthau. Perhaps no more famous description exists to place historical realism 
among state behavior then Thucydides account of the discussion between the 
Athenians and the Melians when the Athenians noted that “the standard of justice 
depends on the equality of power to compel and that in fact the strong do what they 
have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept”.74 His account 
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of power as the basis for political action and will is the foundation of historical 
realism. Machiavelli further contributes to the early development of this power 
based, self interested tendency noting in Book 17 of The Prince, that it is better to 
be feared than loved, as men love of their own free will but fear by the will of the 
Prince. The Prince must then rely on what he can control, and this is to rule with 
fear.75 Hobbes contribution to the realist paradigm relates to his description of 
nature being “continued fear and danger of violent death...the life of man solitary, 
poor, nasty, brutish and short.”76 This description of human nature adheres to the 
realist notion that the international system is anarchic, with no higher government, 
institution or collective that has the ability to insist states behave in a particular 
manner or curb aggression. Hobbesian philosophy purports that the lack of a 
leviathan, or grand authority, requires states to act in a self interested manner as 
relations between states are ones of conflict and war. The state is a reflection of 
man’s self interest. Clausewitz’s “just war” principles continue this belief that 
nature is inherently conflictual and war is the continuation of policy by other 
means.77 For Clausewitz, war is governance. States wielding power and force use 
these to govern policy, manage disputes over governing policy, and secure interests 
domestically and abroad.  
Contemporary realism is best defined by Hans Morganthau and his Politics 
Among Nations. His six principles of political realism help to develop realism into 
the modern international theoretical landscape. 
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1. Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is 
governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature. 
2. The main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the 
landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in 
terms of power. 
3. Realism assumes that its key concept of interest defined as power is an 
objective category which is universally valid, but it does not endow that 
concept with a meaning that is fixed once and for all. 
4. Political realism is aware of the moral significance of political action. 
5. Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular 
nation with the moral laws that govern the universe. 
6. The difference, then, between political realism and other schools of 
thought is real, and it is profound. The political realist is not unaware of 
the existence and relevance of standards of thought other than political 
ones. He cannot but subordinate these other standards to those of 
politics.78 
For Morgenthau, politics are an extension of human nature – selfish and aggressive. 
States reflect this human condition since states are products of human creation. 
This is a constant in international relations. States must always be aware the 
aggression is not only a possibility but a probability in an anarchic system with 
respect to which states hold the power relative to one another. Aron echoes this 
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sentiment, particularly in the idea that states are competitive creatures and will 
pursue national self interest militarily and diplomatically, but chiefly through 
military means to ensure the avoidance of war, or the means to be victorious if war 
is unavoidable.79 Since states are autonomous creations, their individual security 
and success is of the utmost importance, with little to no deference to the security 
and development of other states. 
In summary, the authors that have contributed to the development of 
realism see human nature as essentially evil, power seeking, selfish and 
antagonistic. This human nature is constant, and very difficult to change, creating a 
consistent environment. The main actors in the international system are states and 
regimes or international organizations are negligible at best. The state, operating as 
the reflection of man is power seeking, autonomous and pursues only national self 
interest. The international system is anarchic, with an uneven balance of power. 
This causes inevitable conflict between states since the focus is on a states relative 
gain vis-à-vis other states. Power is at a premium for the realist tradition and 
foreign policy must always take into account security concerns above all other state 
concerns. 
 The primary theoretical development fromr includes the structural realist, or 
neorealist paradigm. While neorealism espouses a significant portion of realism’s 
tenants there are a few important differences to note. Neorealism deemphasizes the 
role of human nature and contends that the anarchic structure of the international 
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environment is most responsible for the self interested behavior and action of 
states.  Kenneth Waltz, the preeminent neorealist, notes that this anarchic 
environment influences all states to be self interested with respect to their security 
interests. This is the case whether human nature is inherently self interested or not. 
All state leaders must recognize that they must always balance power vis-à-vis 
another state in order to maintain power in the international system or gain power 
relative to other states.80 There is a constant balance of power struggle occurring in 
the international system. Walt, another prominent neorealist argues that there is not 
a balance of power struggle, but a balance of threat so that states are not always 
balancing against the strong but whomever is perceived to be the strongest threat to 
the state at the time.81  
A key difference between neorealism and realist thought is that association 
among states or cooperation is at times preferred, but only when the cooperation 
benefits the participating states relative to others.  Yet this international cooperation 
for neorealism is cooperation that is sporadic and can change frequently.  Gilpin 
speaks to this as well, noting that “a global community of common values and 
outlook has yet to displace international anarchy. The fundamental problem of 
international relations in the contemporary world is the problem of peaceful 
adjustment to the consequences of the uneven growth of power among states, just 
as it was in the past.”82  For Gilpin, as with Waltz, international cooperation occurs, 
but not as the substitute of longstanding power politics. Gilpin also examines the 
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slow change that occurs in the international system. There is a cost imposed by the 
system of any behavior that attempts to change the status quo which also influences 
the existing order among the states that support the status quo. Thus, states prefer 
the status quo as expectations of the system and the stability of the system remain 
more constant. Jervis recognizes this characteristic of the international system and 
cooperation as well. He notes that “because there are no institutions or authorities 
that can make and enforce international laws, the policies of cooperation that will 
bring mutual rewards if others cooperate may bring disaster if they do not. Because 
states are aware of this, anarchy encourages behavior that leaves all concerned 
worse off than they could be, even in the extreme case in which states would like to 
freeze the status quo.”83 Analyzing the stag hunt game theory matrix he effectively 
shows that even though a clear choice may be present that would benefit each state 
involved, the fear that a nation may choose a different path encourages states to act 
individually to ensure their individual safety instead of choosing the most benefit 
for the collective. The fear of another state not participating outweighs the good 
that could be achieved if all states involved chose to do so. 
Mearsheimer’s critic of traditional realism reflects the same beliefs as other 
neorealist authors who discount the role of human nature and the influence human 
nature has on state behavior and the international system. His theory of offensive 
realism contends that what drives great power motives and behavior is the desire 
for states to survive. For Mearsheimer, the system is still anarchic but "Great 
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powers behave aggressively not because they want to or because they possess some 
inner drive to dominate, but because they have to seek more power if they want to 
maximize their odds of survival."84 
The neorealist approach sees human nature as potentially evil, but 
deemphasizes the role of human nature. There exists slow structural change in 
human nature but the anarchic environment is continual. The state is a rational, 
unitary apparatus that is power seeking where outcomes are constrained by the 
system structure.  States are the main actors in this approach but the system as a 
structure also plays a role.  International institutions and participation in regimes 
are used only to promote state interests. Neorealism, much like realism sees the 
international system as possessing an uneven balance of power that creates a 
security dilemma of relative gains, but neorealism recognized that while conflict is 
inevitable, deterrence can potentially limit conflict or war. An equal distribution of 
power can then aid in conflict prevention as a state is “checked” vis-à-vis another.  
 The liberal tradition in international relations emerged from historical works 
during the 16th and 17th centuries. Locke’s Second Treatise on Government is by 
most accounts the first influential liberal political work and has since been 
extended to the international political realm. Locke was not expressly discussing 
international relations in his work but his beliefs concerning human nature and the 
opportunities for cooperation in the international system are key components of the 
liberal theoretical tradition. Locke believed that the individual was a key 
component to political society and that human nature was not conflictual, but 
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cooperative. He emphasized the democratic principles of participation by citizens 
and limited government intervention.85 These principles are the basis for 
recognizing state sovereignty in the international system. 
 While Locke’s contributions to the liberal tradition are significant, Hugo 
Grotius wrote directly on the subject of international relations and international law 
and is credited with the early developments of liberal international relations theory. 
Grotius asserts that states interacting in the international system develop norms, 
practices and rules of behavior.86 This creates a level of cooperation where states 
recognize the formal and informal norms that enhances a states ability to predict 
how other states will act in the international system.  One of the most important 
tenants of Grotius’s work is his recognition of the international system being 
anarchic, but that cooperation can and does exist in this environment. This 
cooperation is a direct result of the formal and informal norms that states have 
created and expected from each other through historical and current interaction. 
This idea is key to the liberal tradition. Change can occur in the system and is 
preferred. 
 Immanuel Kant’s three definitive articles in Perpetual Peace continue the 
development of liberalism and describe his conditions for peace between states.87 
His first article addresses the need for governments to be republic in their creation. 
This republic would guarantee the equality of all citizens legally.  The second 
article presents the idea of a treaty among nations that agree to the republican 
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principles. These liberal nations would steadily expand, eliminating war between 
liberal states, and gradually reduce war between non-liberal and liberal states to the 
point where non-liberal states would fade away.  The third article calls for a 
cosmopolitan law, or universal hospitality towards all foreigners while in another 
country. This article does not guarantee the right to citizenship or the right for long 
term settlement, but would protect foreigners who would risk death or execution if 
returned to their home countries. Liberal states that adhere to these three articles 
maintain peace between each other through interaction and continued development 
of relations among each other; each state develops mutual respect for each other 
through these practices.  
 Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points helped to contribute to the modern 
development of liberalism and stems from Kantian beliefs.  While the fourteen 
points was given in the context of the post World War I environment and covered 
several specifics of the current international situation, 6 key points of the fourteen 
relate specific to liberal theoretical principles (points 1-5 and 14). 
1. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there s ball be 
no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall 
proceed always frankly and in the public view. 
2. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, 
alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or 
in part by international action for the enforcement of international 
covenants. 
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3. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the 
establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations 
consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance. 
4. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be 
reduced to the lowest points consistent with domestic safety. 
5. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial 
claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in 
determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the 
populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims 
of the government whose title is to be determined. 
6. A general association of nations must be formed under specific 
covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political 
independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike. In 
regard to these essential rectifications of wrong and assertions of right 
we feel ourselves to be intimate partners of all the governments and 
peoples associated together against the imperialists. We cannot be 
separated in interest or divided in purpose. We stand together until the 
end.88 
Wilson’s beliefs echo those of previous liberal thinkers and contribute to the 
foundational assumptions of liberalism with respect to cooperation among states, 
the importance of international institutions and the maintenance of peace. 
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 In The End of History and the Last Man Fukuyama develops a key 
component of the liberalism, particularly the development of liberal democracies. 
Reflecting a strong relation to Kantian beliefs and tenants Francis Fukuyama 
supports the idea that liberal democratic states do not fight one another. Due to the 
development of democratic ideals in these states and the influence that these states 
place on human rights and the rule of law, there are few points of disagreements 
between these like-minded liberal states.89 This political liberalism is a preeminent 
political achievement and has and perhaps, will always, supplant any other form or 
construct of government. Fukuyama supports the Kantian theory that nations that 
agree to republican, or democratic principles, will foster cooperation, both 
economically and politically. This would reduce war and conflict between these 
states as they would interact more consistently, develop an understanding and 
recognition of some foundational legal precedence and develop further 
opportunities for international interaction and association. 
 Overall, liberalism departs from realism and neorealism as it views human 
nature as essentially good, capable of learning, changing and cooperating. Change 
is desirable as it is seen as developing towards peace and makes cooperation 
possible. States are still central actors but it non-governmental organization 
(NGOs) and international organizations (IGOs) also play viable roles. Regimes 
create norms of behavior such as democracy and liberal economics. The state is not 
autonomous and but can be constrained by the interest of domestic politics.  Thus, 
liberalism views the international system as anarchic, but changeable through its 
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environment, through interdependence and international society. There exists the 
opportunity of cooperation because of certain shared norms thus states do not focus 
on relative gains, rather absolute gains. Conflict is preventable through the idea of 
collective security due to the assumptions that war is bad, aggression or 
imperialism is wrong, and morality is shared from states democratic or economic 
ties.  
 Neo-liberalism departs from classical liberalism by recognizing that there 
are multiple channels, domestic and foreign that influence states and their ability to 
cooperate. Karl Deutsch was an early contributor to this line of political thought in 
Political community and the North Atlantic area: international organization in the 
light of historical experience.90 Deutsch and others developed the idea of a 
“pluralistic security community” which describes the international community as 
being more interested in solving disputes through negotiation, diplomacy and other 
means instead of aggression and/or physical means. Keohane describes this 
succinctly by noting how states achieve mutual gains through international 
agreements and institutions. Mutual gains for states diminish the cost of doing 
business and often provide greater opportunity for success or growth.91 Conflict can 
be avoided not through moral obligation or shared values, but through institutions 
that constrain those outside this shared system. Keohane and Nye describe this 
concept of “complex interdependence” in their 2001 work Power and 
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Interdependence.92 When states are connected through multiple channels and 
collaboration is high, norms are developed and individual states behavior becomes 
more predictable and consistent with the common set of values most prevalent in 
the international community. Economic agreements, international institutions, 
military agreements and even social phenomena are all channels that encourage 
states to act within these developed norms and move towards greater collaboration. 
Rosecrance continues with the neo-liberal tradition, particularly economic 
interdependence and the effects that economic interdependence between states has 
on diminishing conflict, in both The Rise of the Trading State and The Rise of the 
Virtual State.93 Rosecrance focuses on one of the most important theoretical tenants 
of neo-liberalism – that economic integration and cooperation trumps classic 
territorial aggression and expansion. States that are perceived as being open 
economically will be trusted in the international community and like minded states 
will continue to form economic coalitions to gain mutually. For Rosecrance 
conflict will surface in the international community, but will be between states that 
are outside the economic associations, and the states that maintain the economic 
and political order will form coalitions to constrict rogue states. This allows like 
minded states to create associations and agreements that then encourages particular 
norms and standards of behavior.  
                                                 
92 Keohane, Robert and Joseph Nye. 2001. Power and Interdependence, 3rd Ed. New York: 
Longman. 
93 Rosecrance, Richard. 1986. The Rise of the Trading State. New York. Basic Books and Richard 
Rosecrance. 199. The Rise of the Virtual State. New York. Basic books. 
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An important addition to neo-liberal theory is provided by Charles 
Kindleberger and his hegemonic stability theory (HST).  Kindleberger’s HST 
centers on large powerful states and their ability to provide an open and stable 
economic environment. The hegemon has the ability to govern, or create rules and 
norms of practices for other states in an open economy that eventually encourages 
these individual states to practice and standardize these rules and norms due to the 
security, both militarily and economically that the hegemon provides.94  
Incentivizing economic cooperation allows a hegemon to provide relative stable 
environments that promote a liberalization of individual states economic pursuits, if 
this is the goal of the hegemon. 
Thus the overall neo-liberal framework describes the international system as 
anarchic, but it can provide the opportunity of cooperation and interdependence that 
allows states to be joint maximizers. This inevitably leads to less conflict as 
previous realist assumptions. Regimes and IOs are large actors in this approach and 
their presence confirms that cooperation and collaboration exist in the international 
community. Regimes and IOs help to mitigate violence and help to create norms 
that these states follow and encourage others to follow. This focus allows states to 
constrain one another due to the process of interaction being more important than 
the cost. A primary and key difference for Neo-liberalism is the emphasis placed on 
the economic exchange between states and the functionalism of these economic 
                                                 
94 Kindleberger, Charles. 1973. “The Benefits of International Money.” Journal of International 
Economics.  Vol. 2. p. 425-442. 
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agreements and other institutions such as mail and phone services. Cooperation on 
these issues can represent cooperation on other issues in the future.  
 Social constructivist theory, builds on the recognition of the English school 
traditions and carries the ideas of common rules and shared norms further. One of 
the first applications of constructivism to international relations is credited to 
Friedrich Kratochwil in his Rules, Norms and Decisions, On the Conditions of 
Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Society.  
Kratochwil is concerned with how norms work in the international system. His 
most valuable assertion comes from the idea that norms often precede the decision 
making process of a state – he is particularly interested in the separate styles of 
decision making that accompany norms in diverse international areas.95 This is an 
important foundational assumption of constructivism. Norms and interests that 
have developed over time influence the decisions of states currently and in the 
future. Alexander Wendt takes the constructivist argument and applies the 
theoretical tenants in response to what he sees as weaknesses in current 
international approaches.96 While recognizing that the international community is 
anarchic, his distinction for constructivism is that this anarchic environment is 
determined by what the state makes of it. Identity and interests are not necessarily 
given – the anarchic international environment can influence identity and interests. 
                                                 
95 Kratochwil, Friedrich. 1991. Rules, Norms and Decisions, On the Conditions of Practical and 
Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Society. England. Cambridge University 
Press. 
96 See Wendt, Alexander. 1992. “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of 
Power in Politics.” International Organization. Vol. 46, No. 2. p. 391-425. 
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  Other key distinctions of constructivism are also offered by John Ruggie. 
He explains that constructivist theory ascertains that the “building blocks of 
international reality are ideational as well as material…that they express not only 
individual but collective intentionality.”97 He notes that constitutive rules exist that 
have been developed by states in the international system. And while these rules 
can be associated with security or cooperation, and could be weak or strong in their 
application, they can constrict or loosen state action. Keck and Sikkink continue 
with this idea in their work concerning transnational advocacy networks. These 
networks, which share norms, values and information, serve as important vehicles 
to shape and determine state actions.  Transnational advocacy networks can then 
“carry and reframe ideas, insert them into policy debates, pressure for regime 
formation, and enforce existing international norms and rules, at the same time that 
they try to influence particular domestic political issues.”98 The networks then have 
the ability to shape the perspectives, beliefs and understanding of states not only 
inside the networks, but also those outside the network to determine what is 
acceptable or unacceptable practice in the international community. 
 Barnett and Finnemore also address the issue of the socialization of 
international organizations, referring to them as bureaucracies that create norms of 
behavior and how business will be done at the international level.99 This aids to 
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explain how the diffusion of these norms and behavior help to institutionalize IO’s 
in the international arena, but also how they support and guide the practices of 
states internationally.     
Constructivists argue that ideas, norms and identities are created through 
social interaction. It is the inter-subjective ideas that influence behavior, not just the 
material aspects of structures and institutions. The state is thus interconnected to 
other states and states’ interactions can create a set of institutions and agreements 
that the participating states can agree on or model for themselves. Ideals such as 
sovereignty, economic agreements, human rights, culture and war/conflict are all 
determined by the interactions that a state has within the international system or 
institutions.100 One states experience must be shared among other states 
participating in the system.  
 Each of these approaches describes and accounts for international 
cooperation and state behavior and arrives at the aforementioned, separate 
outcomes. While these approaches address the important functions and role of 
international organizations and their functions, realism, liberalism and 
constructivism have each been applied distinctly to international organizations and 
regimes by Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger.101 While their typology is slightly 
different in name the principles are relatively the same. They divide theoretical 
descriptions of international organizations and regimes as power-based (realism or 
                                                 
100 See Fierke, and Jorgensen. 2001. Constructing International Relations: The Next Generation. 
London. M.E. Sharp. 
101 While previously mentioned authors writing on  international relations theory place their own 
individual value on IO’s these authors develop application to international organizations from the 
three distinct approaches of Realism, liberalism and constructivism. 
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neorealism), interest based (liberalism or neoliberalism) and knowledge based 
(cognitivism or constructivism).  Applying these three schools of thoughts towards 
international regimes supports the previous theoretical assumptions of realism, 
liberalism and constructivism.  For Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger the central 
variable of note for realism is power, for liberalism it is interests and for 
cognitivism it is knowledge. Institutionalism is weak for realism, medium for 
liberalism and strong for cognitivism. Realism is again concerned with relative 
gains, liberalism is concerned with absolute gains and cognitivism concerns itself 
with role-players.  The meta-theoretical orientation is rationalistic for realism and 
liberalism and sociological for cognitivism.102 The application the authors provide 
to international regimes contributes to a greater understanding of how broad 
theoretical tenants in international relations approaches can describe international 
associations and relationships. While the authors are examining primarily the 
institutions and regimes individually, states still make up these institutions and 
regimes and can provide a very thorough understanding of how international 
relations approaches explain application. The analysis of the authors also provides 
a valid and important dichotomy of the three primary international relations 
approaches that will be the basis for the methodology of this research. While 
international relations approaches have developed significantly through years of 
research, there are distinct and clear boundaries with realism, liberalism and 
constructivism. For this reason the three approaches of realism, liberalism and 
                                                 
102 This is reproduced from Hasenclever, Andreas, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger. 1997. 
Theories of International Regimes. Cambridge University Press. p. 6. 
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constructivism will be used as the theoretical lenses to look at peacekeeping 
operations and branches of each, such as neoliberalism and neorealism, will be 
excluded.  Table 1 offers a synopsis of the aforementioned approaches and an 
explanation of particular facets of international relations.
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Table 1 – International Relations Theoretical Tenants 
 Realism Neorealism Liberalism Neoliberalism Constructivism 
Human Nature 
 
      
 
      Change 
 
Essentially Evil, power 
seeking, selfish, 
antagonistic, conflict-
prone (immutable) 
 
Change is minor/slow 
Possibly evil, importance of 
human nature deemphasized 
 
 
Slow Structural change, but 
anarchy is unchanging 
Essentially good, capable of 
learning, changing and 
cooperating 
 
Desirable as development 
toward peace/cooperation 
Essentially good, capable of 
learning, changing and 
cooperating 
 
Possible via institutions 
 
Emphasis on 
constructed identities 
 
 
Result of change in 
social norms, identities 
Main Actors 
 
      
     Institutional Role 
States 
 
 
Negligible at best 
States, system as a structure 
 
 
Promote state self interest 
States, NGO’s, IGO’s, 
Supranationals 
 
Central 
States, IGO’s, NGO’s, 
Supranationals 
 
Central 
Individuals, collective 
identities 
 
Socially Constructed 
The State 
 
     
Autonomous, power 
seeking, national 
interest, reflection of 
man 
Autonomous, power 
seeking, national interest, 
reflection of man 
Not autonomous, interests 
determined by domestic 
politics 
Not autonomous, interests 
determined by domestic, 
international politics 
Behavior shaped by 
elite beliefs, collective 
norms, social identity 
International System 
 
     
 
 
   Interstate Relations 
 
     
      
    
   Conflict    
Anarchic, with uneven 
distribution of 
resources. Balance of 
power. 
 
 
Conflictual because of 
the security dilemma, 
focus on relative gains 
 
 
Inevitable (human 
nature) 
Anarchic, with uneven 
distribution of resources. 
Balance of power 
 
 
Conflictual because of the 
security dilemma, focus on 
relative gains 
 
 
Inevitable (human nature) 
Anarchy as changeable 
environment: via 
interdependence, 
international society 
 
Potentially cooperative 
because of shared norms or 
liberal ties, thus focus is on 
absolute gains 
 
Preventable (liberal ties) 
Anarchy, but mediated by 
international institutions 
 
 
 
Potentially cooperative 
because of shared norms or 
liberal ties, thus focus is on 
absolute gains 
 
 
Preventable (institutions) 
System itself 
(including anarchy) is 
social construct 
 
 
Defined by social 
constructivism 
 
 
 
Caused by social 
constructs 
Conflict Prevention 
 
     
     Preventative 
     Force 
Balance of Power 
 
 
Equal Distribution of 
Power 
Balance of Power or 
Deterrence 
 
Equal Distribution of Power 
Collective Security 
 
 
Morality, shared democracy, 
economic ties 
Collective Security 
 
 
Institutional constraints 
Socially Constructed 
 
 
Belief therein 
Political Economy 
 
        
 
Economics – low 
politics. Subordinate 
to/function of power 
accumulation 
 
Economics – low politics, 
subordinate to/function of 
constraints imposed by 
system 
Economics can motivate 
politics, promote peace, 
particularly via liberal 
economic ties 
Utility maximization, 
Economics can motivate 
politics, promote peace and 
stability via institutions 
Socially constructed 
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Synthesizing Peacekeeping and IR Literature and Shaping State Interests 
The purpose of this research is to test current international relations 
approaches and its application to state participation in peacekeeping operations to 
answer “Why do states participate in UN peacekeeping operations?” Testing 
international relations approaches in this manner can provide potential insights into 
current security concerns and state perspectives on international peacekeeping and 
cooperation. Reviewing current peacekeeping and international relations literature 
provides a thorough backdrop for analysis.  
The peacekeeping literature clearly has experienced unprecedented attention 
in the past 15 years. While this attention has brought much needed conversation 
and debate concerning the viability and development of operations there does exist 
a significant area that needs more analysis. Peacekeeping literature maintains a 
substantive weakness in the application of approaches, not only to the development 
and presence of peacekeeping, but in other theoretical topics, to include the topic of 
interest concerning why states choose to participate in peacekeeping operations. 
States have no obligation to offer services, troops or support of any manner to 
peacekeeping operations. How does this participation, or lack thereof, help inform 
the world concerning theoretical descriptions of the current international 
environment?  
One of the more unique aspects of peacekeeping operations is that research 
can measure and observe support for these operations from a troop contribution and 
frequency perspective. Data and information concerning peacekeeping operations 
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exists for a significant number of peacekeeping operations and can be used in a 
much deeper and meaningful direction then case study or operational reports or 
studies. The ability to measure certain aspects of peacekeeping as a direct or 
indirect action of states can allow some level of measurement of how states are 
behaving in the international arena and how these actions can reflect their 
perception and understanding of the international environment. The most 
meaningful direction in which to take peacekeeping studies is within the greater 
context of international relations. International relations approaches have not been 
significantly engaged by peacekeeping scholars and the opportunity is ripe for 
analysis. 
International relations approaches have also experienced significant 
development since the first theoretical debates concerning state behavior in the 
international system. The theoretical lenses to examine state participation in 
peacekeeping operations that will be used for this analysis are realism, liberalism, 
and constructivism. These three approaches make up the primary traditions of 
international relations and constitute the starting point for any international 
relations research or study. The study of international relations has revolved around 
the separate theoretical tenants of realism, idealism and constructivism as evident 
through an examination of international relations readers or texts.103  This is not to 
discount other theoretical endeavors, branches or directions concerning 
international relations. This recognizes the deepest research traditions and 
                                                 
103 See Jackson and Sorenson’s Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches, 
Brown and Ainsley’s Understanding International Relations, 3rd Ed., Griffith’s Fifty Key Thinkers 
in International Relations, and Mingst’s Essentials of International Relations. 
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foundational understanding of international relations approaches that is currently 
available.   Realism and liberalism are the traditional, positivist approaches in 
international relations and until the early to mid nineties, were the dominant 
approaches to studying international relations. Realism and liberalism offer very 
different explanations of state behavior, international cooperation and security. 
Constructivism offers a critical, post-positivist approach that moves away from the 
traditional approaches and offers new rationale to how states interact and learn 
behavior in the international community. Thus, these three approaches will be the 
frameworks that are used for examining state participation in UN peacekeeping 
operations and in developing testable hypotheses. 
 
What Shapes State Peacekeeping Interests? 
 A small amount of literature exists that is concerned with this gap of 
international relations approaches and peacekeeping.  Examining the peacekeeping 
and international relations literature that does exist allows some level of 
understanding of what interests exist for states with relation to their commitment to 
peacekeeping and the international community. 
Abbott and Snidal discuss state commitments to international organizations 
through an examination of the theoretical underpinnings of the Gulf War and the 
role of the Security Council, the UN and member states. Examining the Gulf War 
the authors conclude that we can describe the interests of states in this instance as 
realist, constructivist and rational-regime (liberal leaning description) in nature. 
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One can apply these approaches in different manners according to the “eye of the 
beholder” and there may not be a significant winner.104 Interests then may be 
individual for each state and the context may be the most important factor for states 
for determining their level of participation globally 
 Finnemore argues that state perceptions come from socialization of 
international organizations and that they accept new norms and values through 
interaction in these international organizations.  She even goes as far as to note that 
states do not always know what they want.105 Thus involvement in peacekeeping 
for a state through an international organization, the UN, is a series of interactions 
that are learned from the organization and other states that are involved in this 
organization or system. A state could potentially participate in peacekeeping based 
on their individual definition of the international environment or a developed 
interest the state holds individually or collectively. 
 Paris examines the practice, participation and development of peacekeeping 
operations as a reflection of two major international phenomena. The first is the 
role of key parties, primarily states and other international organizations and the 
influence that each carries in preventing or restricting peacekeeping operations 
development. Choosing not to support or participate in peacekeeping operations 
can limit effectiveness and possible success. His second tenant is that the norms 
held in global culture and the international environment can also restrict 
                                                 
104 Abbott, Kenneth and Duncan Snidal. 1998. “Why States Act Through Formal International 
Institutions.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution. Vol. 42, No.1. p. 3-32. 
105  Finnemore, Martha. 1996. National Interests in International Society. Cornell University Press, 
New York. 
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peacekeeping operations and productivity by limiting what is consider appropriate 
actions by peacekeeping operations. These values have been developed over time 
by states interacting in the system and developing these norms which actually may 
hinder the ability for peacekeeping operations to be successful.106 These 
conclusions arrive at different motivations of states and how interests differ. The 
first brings light to individual self interest. A state could limit participation in 
peacekeeping operations if there were no relative gain for their interests vis-à-vis 
another state in the international system. This reflects a substantive realist approach 
with respect to state participation. The second tenant reflects a significant 
adherence to the theoretical assumptions of constructivism. Learned behavior is 
prevalent for states and their commitment to international peace and order but that 
learned behavior may also potentially detract from states and the UN’s ability to 
create lasting and effective peacekeeping operations. 
 This snapshot of current conversations and research offers a starting point 
for what motivations may drive states to participate in peacekeeping while others 
do not. This research also provides some idea to why further analysis is still needed 
in this area. The current literature with respect to defining state interest in the 
peacekeeping arena and the greater arena of international relations is a small, 
disparate and competing literature. There is no clear determination of the 
motivations of states in international peacekeeping and while it would be naïve to 
assume a panacea exists for this topic, peacekeeping operations and state support 
                                                 
106 Paris, Roland. 2003. “Peacekeeping and the Constraints of Global Culture.” European Journal of 
International Relations. Vol. 9, 441.  
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for these operations continues to need further development analytically and 
anecdotally. The possibility may be that developing strong theoretical tenants from 
a singular perspective cannot fully define the nature of state interest in the 
international community with respect to peacekeeping. 
 The international relations literature can provide significant insight with 
respect to state interest concerning peacekeeping operations and what motivations 
would and should exist when examining this phenomenon. Understanding the key 
arguments of the three approaches of realism, liberalism and constructivism and 
their application to state perspectives on peacekeeping internationally allows 
relevant and testable hypotheses to be developed to potentially gain more 
understanding of how and why states participate in peacekeeping operations. 
 Realism, liberalism and constructivism differ significantly in their 
description of states and their viewpoints concerning the international system, state 
collaboration and security. This allows this research to develop significant areas for 
examination that would reflect interest’s related to each of the theoretical 
paradigms presented and what expectations exist for each of these paradigms 
concerning peacekeeping. 
 Realism 
Describing the motivations of a state with respect to international 
peacekeeping from the theoretical perspective of realism requires recognition of a 
self-interested state and relative gains. What would motivate a state to participate in 
international peacekeeping if the state is most concerned with self-preservation, its 
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relative power among other nations and views international institutions as 
negligible?  
The realist description of peacekeeping would center on the idea that states 
would only participate if there was a way to increase their individual sphere of 
influence or power relative to other states in the international system.  A realist 
state would thus participate in peacekeeping if by doing so; it would protect or 
serve the state’s interest. Yet while participation could potentially only serve as an 
extension of a state’s foreign policy or interests, states do participate in 
peacekeeping operations. Even if this participation in peacekeeping is participation 
based on self-interest, it is still participation.  
Participation in peacekeeping for a realist state is concerned with several 
theoretical assumptions. The first and primary reason would be for security. 
Security maintains primacy for a state in the realist tradition. Does a conflict 
threaten the security of the state and is peacekeeping an option to diminish or 
eliminate this conflict?  Does this conflict also threaten a close ally of an individual 
state, both militarily and economically? If a state contributes personnel to a 
peacekeeping operation, does it weaken their military capabilities domestically and 
abroad? Does contributing personnel to peacekeeping operations provide stronger 
and more developed training than an individual state can provide on their own – 
does a state contribute just to have access to more developed military practices? 
A state with significant military capabilities could possible provide more 
personnel to peacekeeping as their military is further developed and they could 
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continue to maintain a strong military presence outside of UN peacekeeping 
operations. The expectation could be that only states that have significant military 
resources and capabilities would contribute to ensure that their individual security 
is not marginalized through the contribution of troops to peacekeeping. Overall 
military strength and capacity would need to be measured over time to ascertain to 
whether only militarily well-developed states, minimally developed states or a 
confluence of both contributed more frequently and in greater number. 
Member states with fewer military resources would be less likely to 
contribute as it would potentially diminish their individual security and capacity. 
Yet if states with limited military and economic resources had little to no domestic 
military threats then it is possible to ascertain that UN peacekeeping training could 
potentially provide further developed training and support to states military 
personnel than the individual state could perform them. Thus the expectation could 
also be that states with severely limited military resources and capabilities would 
contribute troops more readily to gain much needed training and development to 
provide greater security when troops return to their native states. This would most 
likely need to be measured as an additive term of military strength and economic 
strength. 
Security concerns could also center on the geography of peacekeeping 
operations. Any conflict that has the potential to “spill” into a surrounding state or 
an area of strategic significance would be cause for intervention, if this intervention 
can create stability. If a conflict existed that threatened the border or immediate 
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geographic stability for a state, then intervention would be expected from the 
concerned state to protect their individual borders, or perhaps the borders of allied 
or neighboring states. Using geographic location of states that donate troops to a 
particular peacekeeping operation would measure whether states that are close 
geographically are donating at a higher level. 
Overall economic strength would be a concern for states in the realist 
paradigm, although secondary to security. For states with more robust economies, 
the ability to contribute troops more readily, without losing relative power to other 
states would remain an important realist assumption. States with fewer resources 
would be less likely to contribute as concerns over these resources would 
potentially harm power and influence internationally and domestically while more 
developed nations could use the troops as extensions of foreign policy and goodwill 
more readily without risk to these concerns. Analyzing economic indicators and 
troop contributions from individual states could be used to understand the role of 
stronger and weaker economies. 
Liberalism 
The motivations for state participation in peacekeeping from the liberal 
tradition are developed from a perspective of an increased value on international 
institutions, norms of behavior, cooperation and economic integration. First and 
foremost, the existence of international institutions and organizations lends the 
liberal framework to potentially maintain primacy in describing collective 
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international action. Extending this framework to conflict and conflict mitigation 
through international organizations becomes less clear. 
One primary expectation for a liberal state would be related to integration 
into the international system. A state that was integrated into the international 
system through a larger number of international organizations could be assumed to 
support larger global views that are shared by a number of states. This includes 
security, economic/trade, human rights and environmental associations that 
promote shared governance and cooperation. States more integrated and committed 
to global principles could be assumed to support peacekeeping operations more 
frequently and with larger personnel support. Using international memberships as a 
variable of interest could help to determine if states that are more integrated are 
contributing to peacekeeping operations more frequently and with larger number of 
troops. 
States that have traditionally supported the development and protection of 
democratic principles and human rights could be hypothesized to support 
peacekeeping more consistently. The practice of peacekeeping reflects the shared 
principles of the UN and a vast majority of basic human rights and norms that 
represents a liberal approach to international relations. These shared norms through 
international institutions are central to the liberal framework. If states that 
contribute more often possess governments that rank as more open and  transparent 
with a commitment to human rights and democratic norms then some level of 
dedication to liberal principles and practice could be present. 
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Economics plays a more vital role in the liberal framework. If a conflict 
upset the economic balance between two states, a state could intervene to ensure 
long term economic relationships stayed consistent. If significant trade existed 
between states then the potential donor state would have a strategic interest in 
supporting peacekeeping operations that could move towards stability for the state 
affected by the conflict. Economic relationships are foundational for the liberal 
paradigm in promoting peace and security. This could be measured by examining 
bi-lateral trade between the host peacekeeping state and contributing and non-
contributing states. 
Constructivism 
 The constructivist application would apply mostly to interaction in the 
international system over time for states and if there exist any development or 
change in norms for states as behavior is modified. States could modify behavior 
through interaction in the international system and the United Nations as this 
interaction could modify what states see as important. The entire structure of 
peacekeeping operations could be a reflection of what states see as important in the 
international system and what norms exist to guide the development and 
continuation of peacekeeping operations. 
 States that have the longest tenured memberships in the U. N. could desire 
to contribute troops at a higher incidence and number. As states interact within the 
institution the expectation to participate more frequently and contribute more 
resources to peacekeeping could be a learned or constructed behavior. The 
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developed identity of “peacekeeping supporter” and sharing like interests with 
other member states through interaction in the U.N. system serves the constructivist 
framework well. Examining a state’s length of membership and contribution levels 
could explain the presence of learned behavior for member states. 
 It is also possible to look over time to measure if significant or gradual 
changes exist in states patterns of contribution. If the process of contributing to 
peacekeeping is a potentially learned behavior then variations in giving patterns 
could also reflect learned behavior during membership.  Recognizing a state’s 
pattern of giving compared to individual states and the overall pattern of 
contributions collectively could help to develop the idea that states are potentially 
developing or changing their individual perspectives on peacekeeping 
contributions, or even peacekeeping as a whole. 
 Economically speaking, states that have limited ability to offer military 
training and development could contribute troops more frequently and in higher 
numbers as they use the training these troops are offered through the U.N. to 
develop their individual forces. If there are no significant threats to a state’s 
individual interest domestically then states that have smaller economies and 
military forces could use this collective opportunity to enhance their individual 
military capacities at little to no cost to the state. They could also use this as a 
“paying it forward” opportunity recognizing that the collective identity of 
peacekeepers in the international system could help to illicit support from other 
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states if ever needed, providing greater security than they could individually 
provide on their own.   
 A thorough understanding of the peacekeeping and international relations 
literature and a synthesis of this literature serves as the starting point to 
understanding state motivations with respect peacekeeping operations. Developing 
a research design and methodology that is appropriate begins with historical 
assumptions concerning state behavior and international institutions. Developing 
testable hypothesis and methods to measure and report findings that can support or 
detract from previous provided theoretical explanations is the next step. 
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Chapter 2 – Hypothesis Development, Data and Methods 
 
 Developing testable hypotheses for this analysis must examine state 
behavior, or actions, in response to the peacekeeping operational needs and 
mandates. To arrive at any substantive theoretical conclusions, the development of 
hypotheses must be concerned with the individual state actions and how these 
actions could be applied to assumptions of international relations approaches. The 
individual state will be the unit of measurement for hypothesis development with a 
number of independent variables that can measure the theoretical assumptions. 
Hypotheses for each approach will be developed to test for the application of 
realism, idealism and constructivism.  
 The assumptions of realism within international relations are that states are 
power seeking, selfish and are concerned with relative gains and the balance of 
power in the international system. One would assume that a state would contribute 
to peacekeeping with personnel only if the state was able to gain power relative to 
other states or if a strategic, self-interest for the individual state exists. Economies 
would play a minimal role in the states’ behavior and participation would be 
inconsistent over time and operation. States would be more interested in 
participating in peacekeeping operations if conflicts could potentially threaten their 
individual assets, borders or power relative to other states.  Cooperation only exists 
if it serves the state interests. From these basic tenants, a hypothesis can be 
developed for testing the realist framework: 
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REALISM – UN Members states that contribute to peacekeeping 
operations would maintain a geographic interest in the peacekeeping 
operation, states would sustain a stronger commitment to military 
expenditures and capabilities, and states would possess larger 
economies that would enable more consistent and greater contributions.    
 Liberalism maintains that international organizations play a vital role in the 
international system and that regimes can promote a particular set of norms such as 
democracy and liberal economies. Cooperation is possible due to the states’ interest 
in absolute gains versus relative gains and collective security can help to mitigate 
conflicts and violence in the international system. The economic exchange between 
states also plays a vital role as cooperation on issues like economics and 
telecommunications can help to develop cooperation in other areas such as security.  
The hypothesis that can then be developed to test liberalism’s assumptions is as 
follows: 
LIBERALISM - UN member states that contribute to peacekeeping 
operations will maintain a larger number of international associations, 
have similar government systems (primarily democracies) and possess 
larger amounts of bi-lateral trade between the host state and 
contributors. 
The assumptions of constructivism are that states learn behavior, norms and ideas 
from interaction in the system and maintain the opportunity to use the anarchic 
international environment in their own image. This allows for states interacting in 
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the international system to create institutions and practices that states can agree on 
such as sovereignty, human rights, culture and security. The experience of one state 
is contingent and influenced by the experience and interaction of other states in the 
international system.  Hypothesis for testing constructivism is as follows: 
CONSTRUCTIVISM - UN member states that contribute to 
peacekeeping operations will have longer tenured membership in the 
United Nations, could experience variance over time of their individual 
peacekeeping commitments, and maintain limited economic and 
military capabilities. 
 To measure the aforementioned hypotheses I will apply statistical methods 
to analyze state participation in peacekeeping operations to determine how these 
findings can be best be applied to international relations approaches. Since this 
study is an empirical study that researches empirical experiences or phenomena 
concerning states contributions to UN peacekeeping operations, post quantitative 
assessment will be required in the form of theoretical assessment of the results.  
To empirically test state behavior two quantitative methods will be used. 
Standard tables and graphing techniques will be used to test individual variables 
over the selected time period and the frequency that states contribute to 
peacekeeping operations. Standard stepwise regression models will also be 
developed with the state’s contribution levels as a percentage of their total military 
capacity as the dependent variable that will test multiple independent variables and 
their potential explanatory power. Stepwise regression is best suited for discovering 
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the variables most influential in a model within data sets that are multi-
dimensional. In testing hypotheses, stepwise regression is beneficial if the research 
has already determined specific independent variables that have the potential to 
explain variance on the dependent variable. Challenges that exist with stepwise 
regression include a tendency to over fit the model and some diminished capacity 
to consider all interactions. SPSS software will be used to operate the regression 
models. This software is appropriate for testing a large number of variables across a 
large number of cases. I will first explain the selection of the peacekeeping cases 
that will be used for this analysis followed by a discussion of the development of 
the regression model, the dependent variable, the independent variables for 
inclusion and the sources of these data. I will conclude the section with a 
description of the table and graphical analysis that will be combined with the 
regression analysis to finalize all of the included research. 
    
Case Selection 
 Peacekeeping operations, mandates and practices have changed 
significantly during the course of their history. A large majority of scholars 
distinguish UN peacekeeping operations into two primary categories: peacekeeping 
before the Cold War and peacekeeping after the Cold War. Diehl observes that 
there is considerable evidence that the end of the Cold War ushered in a new era for 
international organizations and provided an opportunity for the UN to re-emerge as 
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a force for international peace.107 Dedicating an entire chapter to peacekeeping 
after the Cold War, Fetherston notes that peacekeeping has increased in number, 
dimensions, and functions and that the underlying question for peacekeeping 
scholars is what can be done to improve the UN’s capacity to effectively manage 
the post Cold War environment.108 Durch believes that the UN could not do the job 
that it was created for during the Cold War but also identifies that a new era has 
arrived in the international community that will significantly change peacekeeping 
development, contributions and mandates.109 Peacekeeping after the Cold War is 
widely considered the peacekeeping model for the future and the complexity of 
these missions are considered to be the rule of thumb versus the exception. Mingst 
and Karns recognize three generations of peacekeeping history: Cold War/First 
Generation, Transition Period/Second Generation and Post Cold War/Third 
Generation.110 Peacekeeping after the Cold War grew significantly in scope, 
number and contributors and represented a more consistent representation of 
multilateral operations. Recognizing the  key differences that these authors note in 
UN peacekeeping evolution, the peacekeeping operations that will be used for this 
analysis will be operations that have been undertaken after the Cold War 
concluded. The peacekeeping operations since this time provide the multilateral, 
                                                 
107 Diehl, Paul. 1993. International Peacekeeping. Baltimore: John Hopkins Press. p. 1-3. 
108 See chapter 2 in Fetherston, AB. 1994. Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping. New 
York: St. Martin’s Press.  
109 Durch, William, ed. 1993. The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping. New York: St. Martin’s Press. p. 
1-12. 
110 Mingst, Karen and Margaret Karns. 2000. The United Nations in the Post-Cold War Era. 
Boulder, CO: Westview Press. p. 84-91. 
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multi-dimensional operations that are most representative of the current and future 
type of peacekeeping operations. 
 In order to accurately measure troop commitments from states, operations 
also should be completed and measured for correct reporting post conclusion of the 
operation or mandate.  Operations that have not been completed, or are ongoing, 
would not provide the full scope and duration of state peacekeeping commitments 
and would not offer an entire explanation of the level of support from states. 
 Examining the total number of completed UN peacekeeping operations 
(missions) from 1991 to 2007 provides a total number of 35 peacekeeping 
operations available for analysis.  Examining these operations for their overall 
scope and measure is also necessary to ensure the selection of operations that 
provide appropriate and complete data and are substantive operations in scope and 
mandates. Peacekeeping operations have three primary components for personnel 
contributions: military personnel, military observers and civilian/UN police forces. 
Operations that maintain only military observers and civilian or UN police forces 
typically represent operations that are scaled back in size, are used for observation 
of truce or treaty compliance and verification of election processes and results. 
There are 15 operations that fit the observer, verification or civilian/UN police 
force description. Of those 15 operations, only one operation, UNAVEM III, 
mandated the use of military support personnel.  The other 14 operations used only 
military observers and civilian/UN police personnel. Due to the limited scope and 
mandate of these operations, they will be excluded for this analysis. UNAVEM III 
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will be included due to the unique characteristic that it possesses as a verification 
operation, the use of military personnel. The UNTMIH operation will also be 
excluded due to the low number of military personnel that were approved for 
support, 50. The total number of personnel mandated for UNTMIH is far below the 
typical operational request and approval, which ranges from 893 to 37,122 in other 
UN peacekeeping operations.   
 By excluding peacekeeping operations that were developed before the end 
of the Cold War, operations that are ongoing, all observer and verification 
operations (excluded UNAVEM III) and removing UNTMIH, the final number of 
UN peacekeeping operations is reduced to 20 operations. Yet of the twenty 
operations, viable troop contributions for each individual state during the 
peacekeeping operation exist only for 11 of these operations, with one operation 
(UNCRO) of the 20 absent of any data available for use regarding state 
participation. That leaves 19 peacekeeping operations available for analysis 
concerning frequency of participation and total number of troop contributions by 
state and 11 operations that maintain the appropriate data (state troop contributions) 
for use in a regression model. These 11 operations will be used to examine state 
participation in peacekeeping operations by examining troop contributions to each 
operation.   
Each peacekeeping operations selected maintains a unique capacity and 
function.  UNIKOM was established in 1991 following the forced withdrawal of 
Iraqi forces from Kuwait. UNIKOM’s task was to monitor the demilitarized zone 
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along the Iraq-Kuwait border, deter border violations and report any hostile action. 
UNPROFOR was initially established in Croatia to ensure demilitarization of 
designated areas. The mandate was later extended to Bosnia and Herzegovina to 
support the delivery of humanitarian aid, monitor no-fly zones and safe areas.  
Table 2 lists the operations, their timeline, the number of personnel contributed to 
the operations and the overall financial cost for each peacekeeping operation. They 
are ordered sequentially from the initial date of approval. ONUMOZ was 
established to help implement the peace agreement, signed by the President of the 
Republic of Mozambique and the President of the Resistência Nacional 
Moçambicana. The mandate included facilitating the implementation of the 
agreement; monitoring the ceasefire; monitoring the withdrawal of foreign forces 
and providing security in the transport corridors; providing technical assistance and 
monitoring the entire electoral process. UNOSOM II was established in March 
1993 to take appropriate action, including enforcement measures, to establish 
throughout Somalia a secure environment for humanitarian assistance. UNOSOM 
II was to complete, through disarmament and reconciliation, the task begun by the 
Unified Task Force for the restoration of peace, stability, law and order. UNAVEM 
III was established to assist the Government of Angola and the União Nacional 
para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) in restoring peace and achieving 
national reconciliation on the basis of the Peace Accords for Angola, signed on 31 
May 1991, the Lusaka Protocol signed on 20 November 1994, and relevant 
Security Council resolutions. UNPREDEP was established on 31 March 1995 to 
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replace UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The mandate 
of UNPREDEP remained essentially the same: to monitor and report any 
developments in the border areas which could undermine confidence and stability 
in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and threaten its territory. 
UNAMSIL was created to develop cooperative efforts with the government and the 
other parties in implementing the Lome Peace Agreement and to assist in the 
implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan in Sierra 
Leone. UNTAET was established on 25 October 1999 to administer the territory of 
East Timor, exercise legislative and executive authority during the transition period 
and support capacity-building for self-government. UNMEE was created to 
maintain liaison with the parties and establish a mechanism for verifying the 
ceasefire in Ethiopia and Eritrea. In September 2000, the Council authorized 
UNMEE to monitor the cessation of hostilities and to help ensure the observance of 
security commitments. UMISET provided assistance to East Timor over a period of 
two years until all operational responsibilities were fully devolved to the East 
Timor authorities. Subsequently, the Council extended mission's mandate for 
another year to permit the new nation, which had changed its name to Timor-Leste, 
to attain self-sufficiency. ONUB was established to support and help to implement 
the efforts undertaken by Burundians to restore lasting peace and bring about 
national reconciliation, as provided under the Arusha Agreement.111 
                                                 
111 The description provided of each peacekeeping operation was taken directly from the UN 
peacekeeping website. See http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/past.shtml.  
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The operations included have a significant range of function, location and 
total personnel. Table 2 includes the peacekeeping operations title (abbreviated and 
expanded), the start and closing date, the total personnel contributed and the total 
cost of the operation. The personnel numbers are divided as military support 
personnel (MSP), military observers (MO) and civilian police officers (CPO). 
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Table 2 - UN Peacekeeping Operations for Analysis 
Acronym Mission name  Start Date Closing Date  Personnel  Cost (mil) 
 
UNIKOM 
 
United Nations Iraq-Kuwait 
Observation Mission 
 
Apr-91 
 
Oct-03 
 
933  (MSP), 254 (MO) = 1187 Tot 
  
$        600.00  
 
UNPROFOR 
 
United Nations Protection 
Force 
 
Feb-92 
 
Mar-95 
 
37,122 (MSP), 684 (MO), 803 (CPO) = 38,599 Tot 
 
 $     4,616.73  
 
ONUMOZ 
 
United Nations Operation in 
Mozambique 
 
Dec-92 
 
Dec-94 
 
6576 (MSP), 1087 (CPO) = 7,663 
 
 $        486.70  
 
UNOSOM II  
 
United Nations Operation in 
Somalia II  
 
Mar-93 
 
Mar-95 
 
28,000 (MSP) = 28,000 Tot 
 
 $     1,600.00  
 
UNAVEM III 
 
United Nations Angola 
Verification Mission III 
 
Feb-95 
 
Jun-97 
 
3649 (MSP), 283 (MO), 288 (CPO) = 4220 Tot 
 
 $        134.98  
 
UNPREDEP 
 
United Nations Preventive 
Deployment Force 
 
Mar-95 
 
Feb-99 
 
1049 (MSP), 35 (MO), 26 (CPO) = 1110 Tot 
 
 $        147.50  
 
UNAMSIL 
 
United Nations Mission in 
Sierra Leone 
 
Oct-99 
 
Dec-05 
 
17,368 (MSP), 87 (CPO) = 17455 Tot 
 
 $     2,800.00  
 
UNTAET 
 
United Nations Transitional 
Administration in East Timor 
 
Oct-99 
 
May-02 
 
6281 (MSP), 118 (MO), 1288 (CPO) = 7687 Tot 
 
 $        476.80  
 
UNMEE 
 
United Nations Mission in 
Ethiopia and Eritrea 
 
Jul-00 
 
Jul-08 
 
3940 (MSP), 214 (CPO) = 4154 Tot 
 
 $     1,320.00  
 
UNMISET 
 
United Nations Mission of 
Support in East Timor 
 
May-02 
 
May-05 
 
4776 (MSP), 771 (CP0) = 5547 Tot 
 
 $        565.50  
 
ONUB 
 
United Nations Operation in 
Burundi 
 
Jun-04 
 
Dec-06 
 
5400 (MSP), 168 (MO), 97 (CPO) = 5665 Tot 
 
 $        678.30  
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Regression Analysis/Models 
 
 For this analysis, standard OLS stepwise regression models will be used for 
each of the peacekeeping operations included in the case selection section. The unit 
of analysis will be the state. An overall regression model will be used to measure 
contributions from member states for the entire time period from 1991-2007. This 
will contribute an aggregate analysis from the selected time period. For each 
individual peacekeeping operation, two regression models will be developed. This 
will produce 22 additional regression outputs, totaling 23 total regressions for the 
entire analysis. The two regression models for each peacekeeping operation will 
differ only in the number of states that are included for each peacekeeping 
operation. For both models the dependent variable will be the same. The first model 
will include only the states that contributed to the peacekeeping operation through 
the peacekeeping operations entirety. The second model will include every UN 
member state that was fully recognized as a member state at the inception of the 
peacekeeping operation, even if the state did not contribute to the peacekeeping 
operation. The two models will test the variations between contributing states for 
each peacekeeping operation while also testing the variance between all member 
states of the UN. Each of the regression models will be designated a and b, for each 
peacekeeping operation, and will be labeled by the abbreviated name of the 
operation and the corresponding letter (ONUBa, ONUBb).112 
                                                 
112 For each of the regression models, a number of states have been removed due to absence of 
reliable data. These states are listed in Appendix A, for each peacekeeping operation. 
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The dependent variable that will be included for analysis is a calculation 
that measures a percentage of a state’s troop contributions as a portion of the total 
military personnel a state maintains at the inception of each peacekeeping 
operation.  This dependent variable will measure the overall military personnel a 
state contributes as a portion of their overall military capacity concerning troops. 
This will allow for a deeper understanding and provide results that measure state’s 
capacity versus a raw number.  In the overall model the number will be calculated 
by dividing the total of all personnel contributed from 1991-2007 by the total troop 
capacity for each state during the same time period. For the additional 
peacekeeping operations the dependent variable will be the total number of 
personnel contributed for the duration of the peacekeeping operation divided by the 
total personnel a state maintains during the year of the peacekeeping operations 
creation. The value for this number in the overall model and individual 
peacekeeping operations model can range from 0 to .99 (0 or 99%). The creation of 
a percentage, or index value, provides a much more thorough understanding of a 
state’s capacity and commitment to peacekeeping operations. With approximately 
165 to 190 state contributions being measured, the total number of troops 
contributed over time and in each peacekeeping operation provides an appropriate 
value to examine through the regression analysis. Yet recognizing the state’s 
capacity and how much the state is providing as a percentage of their total capacity 
is appropriate for this analysis. This provides a more fitting description than other 
options which could include a raw number. A raw number does not give context 
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with respect to how much a state is willing to contribute as a percent of their total 
military personnel.  If state A provides more troops than state B, but state A’s 
contribution is a lower percentage of their overall military troop capacity versus 
state B, then a raw number is misleading in this analysis. A dependent variable 
based on this percentage provides a deeper value for comparative purposes. 
There will be a total of 9 independent variables included in the overall 
regression model for each peacekeeping operation. The variables first will be tested 
for correlation and entered stepwise into the regression to test for validity and 
variance. Variables will be removed from the equation if high levels of correlation 
are discovered through the regression models. The first independent variable for 
inclusion will be a regional variable that delineates the location of the peacekeeping 
operations with respect to the host state or state where the peacekeeping operation 
takes place. Regional stability is a primary concern for states and their allies and 
participating in peacekeeping operations where the spillover effect of civil and 
intrastate wars is possible can represent a self interested concern of intervention if 
doing so diminishes threats to your security.  These are available through the COW 
(Correlates of War) direct contiguity database and are categorical data that is 
divided into five categories. This variable will be abbreviated as CONTIGUITY. 
 The second variable for analysis will be the GDP/capita of each state during 
the onset of the peacekeeping operation. The measure of the economy of states can 
provide significant results to determine whether states choose to send troops to 
peacekeeping operations and if the economic situation of states provides any 
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indication of economic differences of contributors. These data will be obtained 
from the Earthtrends database. This variable will be named GDP. 
 The third independent variable that will be included is the amount of bi-
lateral trade between member states and the host state of the peacekeeping 
operation takes place the year prior to the approval of the mandate for the 
peacekeeping operation. The measure of bi-lateral trade can offer explanations of 
economic ties which can potentially explain peacekeeping support for the state 
experiencing the conflict if UN member states have an economic interest or 
previous historical economic relationships with the state in need. The date for this 
variable will be taken from the COW bi-lateral trade database. This variable will be 
designated as TRADE. 
 The fourth variable of interest is the length of time that a UN member state 
has been a recognized member of the UN at the time of the mandated peacekeeping 
operation. Do states contribute more readily as they become more integrated into 
the UN system? If contributing states commit at a greater incidence and give more 
personnel and financial support as their length of service increases, then states may 
be experiencing learning or sharing of norms and ideas by interacting in the system. 
The length of membership at the onset of a peacekeeping operation will be taken 
from the UN website and historical research databases. This variable will be 
abbreviated as UNMEMBERSHIP. 
 The number of international memberships maintained at the onset of the 
peacekeeping operation by a contributing state is the fifth independent variable of 
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interest. If a contributing state maintains a greater number of international 
memberships in comparison to other states then commitment to international order 
and the idea of international associations and organization may offer explanations 
to concerns of international security and conflict as well. States that are more 
integrated may be more supportive of international security concerns than ones that 
are less integrated. The data for this variable will be obtained through the 
Earthtrends database. This variable will be abbreviated as INTMEMBERSHIPS. 
 The sixth and seventh independent variables of interest will measure the 
regime type and the recognition of basic human rights of the peoples of the 
contributing member state and the host state.  If some variations are discovered for 
contributions that reflect a particular type of government, whether, democratic or 
authoritarian, and the incidence of participation increases for that type, then state 
motivations may reflect a need to “spread” their governmental model to states that 
are experiencing these conflicts (which typically have diminished government 
institutions or are being challenged). This may also reflect a desire to respect and 
promote human rights abroad. The data for this variable will be collected from the 
Freedom House database and the CIRI Human Rights Project. The Freedom House 
measure ranges from 1 to 7, with 1 representing free and 7 representing not free for 
each state. The CIRI Human Rights Project ranks each state from 0, no respect of 
their aggregate human rights indicator, to 14, a premiere respect for the human 
rights of a state’s citizens. These variables will be abbreviated as FREEDOM and 
HUMANRIGHTS respectively. 
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 The eighth variable for analysis is the military expenditures as a percent of 
GDP for each UN member state. This variable will help to determine if 
contributing states that spend more or less on military expenditures as a percent of 
their total GDP contribute at a greater incidence or lower incidence. These data will 
also be obtained through the databases provided by Earthtrends. This variable will 
be abbreviated as MILITARYGDP. 
 The national material capabilities of member states will be the ninth and 
final independent variable of interest. This variable, provided by the Correlates of 
War database, is an aggregate measure that combines military expenditure, military 
personnel, energy consumption, iron and steel production, urban population and 
total population in one measurable term. This variable will assist in developing an 
understanding of the types of states that contribute to operations – only states of 
particularly strong military capabilities, limited capabilities or a wide range of both. 
This variable will be abbreviated as TOTALMILITARY. 
 Using one case, UNAMIC, I will provide one example of the regression 
analysis which will be repeated for each analysis. UNAMIC was mandated in 1991 
by Security Council resolution 717. At the time of the UN mandate there were 164 
states that the UN recognized as member states and 24 states that contributed 
personnel to the peacekeeping operation. The first regression model will include 
the 24 states that contributed personnel to the peacekeeping operation. The second 
regression model will include all 164 UN member states. The dependent variable 
for both regressions will then include the percentage of personnel contributions 
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each state contributed divided by their current levels of military personnel to the 
total peacekeeping operation. There were a total number of 1090 military personnel 
deployed for this operation from 24 states. The data for each of the independent 
variables will then be developed and mined for the year 1991 to include in the 
analysis of the peacekeeping operation and if variance in contributions can be 
explained by the independent variables. This will produce two regression models, 
one for contributing states, and one for all member states.  
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Table 3 – Independent Variables 
 
Variable 
Abbreviation 
Variable Theoretical Approach  Source 
 
CONTIGUITY 
Regional Variables 
 State location, Relations to Host State  
 
Realism  
Correlates of War Direct  
Contiguity Database 
 
GDP 
TRADE 
Economic Variables 
 GDP 
 Bi-Lateral Trade 
 
Realism, Constructivism 
Liberalism 
Correlates of War Bi-Lateral Trade 
Database, Earthtrends 
 
UNMEMBERSHIP 
INTMEMBERSHIP 
Level of International Integration 
 Length of membership in United Nations 
 Number of memberships in international orgs 
 
Constructivism 
Liberalism 
United Nations Website, Database, 
Correlates of War Intergovernmental 
Organizations Database, Earthtrends 
 
FREEDOM 
HUMANRIGHTS 
Regime Type 
 Type of governmental structure  
 Political Rights  
 
Liberalism 
Liberalism 
Freedom House,  
CIRI Human Rights Project 
 
MILTARYGDP 
TOTALMILITARY 
Troop/Military Indicators 
 National Material Capabilities  
 Military Expenditures as a Percent of GDP 
 
Realism, Constructivism 
Realism, Constructivism 
 
Correlates of War National Material 
Capabilities Database, Earthtrends 
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Table and Graphical Analysis 
 
 Basic tables and graphical analysis can also offer a significant 
understanding of the variables of interest and potential explanations related to the 
developed hypotheses and will add further layers of description in addition to the 
regression models findings and results. Tables and graphs will examine the 
incidence of participation and total contributions during 1991-2007 and for each 
year of the same time period for individual states. This will include personnel 
contributions and the level of frequency of participation for each state delineated by 
the independent variables. 
 The first table included will look at the frequency of state participation in 
the total number of peacekeeping operations for the UN during the 1991-2007 time 
period. During this time period the total number of operations for analysis is 19. 
The total number of operations that a state participated in will be aggregated from 
the 19 peacekeeping operations. The total number of peacekeeping operations that a 
state participated in will be divided by the overall total number of 19 to create a 
percentage value to measure the incidence of participations. Each state that reported 
an incidence value over 50% of total participation will be measured to provide 
averages for independent variable analysis. Measures for states that were below the 
50% threshold will also be examined for independent variable comparisons. 
Selecting the over/under 50% threshold is intended to represent a dichotomy of 
states that contributed to over half of the peacekeeping operations versus those that 
did not. It is important to note that certain states in the over 50% frequency group 
may only differ in one case versus certain states in the under 50% frequency group, 
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it is common practice to delineate groupings for frequency studies at the over/under 
50% dichotomy. 
The total number of troops that a state has committed during 1991-2007 
will also be included in table and graph format to examine total contributions over 
time. The total number of troops contributed over time will serve as a dichotomy to 
measure the independent variable values of states that contributed over 6,500 
troops during this time period and for states that contributed fewer than 6,500 for 
the same time period. A mean was calculated for all member states that were 
current members of the UN during this the 1991-2007 time period and the value 
calculated was slightly over 6,500. Each of these two categories and the 
independent variable values will also be examined for comparative purposes.  
The number of troops contributed on a yearly basis will also be included on 
a state by state basis. This will be a graphical analysis that will represent individual 
state contributions over the 1991-2007 time period. Comparisons of contributions 
by each individual state versus other states and the overall troop levels contributed 
to all UN peacekeeping operations will provide analysis of contribution patterns 
from each state. This will allow the research to measure contributions over time for 
each state to note any significant change in giving patterns.  
The final two tables will measure the incidence and total troop contributions 
data in their respective categories (over/under 50% and over/under 6,500 troops) to 
measure the difference of the independent variables over the average of states in 
each category. The average values for each independent variable in the incidence 
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and total troop allocations data allows a percent difference to be calculated between 
the states with higher incidence and troop contributions and the states with lower 
incidence and troop contributions.  This analysis will measure if there are any 
significant differences between states that contribute at a higher incidence than 
those that do not and if significant differences exist between those states that 
contribute more personnel than those with lower contributions.  
 
Results Expectations and Testing Approaches 
The potential findings and acceptance or rejection of proposed hypotheses 
for this research have theoretical and policy implications. Theoretically, 
recognizing why states participate in peacekeeping operations could potentially 
offer new insights on security concerns and international cooperation. As security 
concerns have moved away from World War to topics like genocide, human rights, 
nuclear proliferation and resource wars/conflicts, state perceptions and interest’s 
may also have changed. The potential for more international cooperation and fewer 
adherences to strict self interested motives could arise.  Interaction in the system 
over time could also reflect changes in state behavior that is reflective off “learned 
behavior” in the international system. It is the hope of the author that the graphical 
and regression analysis can provide further understanding of state participation in 
peacekeeping operations and some answers as to why states do participate can be 
explained further. The previous hypotheses offered for examination are the 
following: 
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REALISM – UN member states that contribute to peacekeeping operations 
 would  maintain a geographic interest in the peacekeeping operation, states 
 would  sustain a stronger commitment to military expenditures and  
 capabilities, and states would possess larger economies that would enable 
 more consistent and greater contributions.    
LIBERALISM - UN member states that contribute to peacekeeping 
operations will maintain a larger number of international associations, have 
similar government systems (primarily democracies) and possess larger 
amounts of bi-lateral trade between the host state and contributors. 
 CONSTRUCTIVISM - UN member states that contribute to peacekeeping 
 operations will have longer tenured membership in the United Nations, 
 would  maintain smaller economic and military capabilities and would 
 experience significant change over time of their individual peacekeeping 
 commitments.  
 
Each independent variable in the regression model relates to one or more of the 
proposed hypotheses and will be accepted or rejected based on the results and data. 
The included tables will also examine each independent variable for additional 
analysis.  
 The implications for accepting or rejecting each hypothesis could help 
develop our understanding of theoretical motivations for states in UN peacekeeping 
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operations. The regression models, graphs and tables should help to develop our 
understanding of these motivations. 
 The regression models could have significant influence on the hypotheses 
developed from the three theoretical paradigms and an overall understanding of 
states characteristics that contribute to peacekeeping operations and their 
motivations. Expected direction of each independent variable and significance will 
allow the research to reject or confirm previous hypotheses. Overall, if the 
regression models are underspecified then it may support the notion that 
peacekeeping operations are extremely contextual in nature and are difficult to 
examine as a wide selection of cases. The potential milieu that exists for each 
operation may be significantly unique and operations may not be able to be 
quantified to understand the foundational motivations for peacekeeping operations. 
 The individual variables from the regression model could inform the 
understanding of state motivations significantly. The chief variables of interest for 
the hypothesis realism are TOTALMILITARY, MILITARYGDP, GDP and 
CONTIGUITY.  For realism, if TOTALMILITARY shows a positive relationship 
and significance then it can be confirmed that states with stronger material 
capabilities are contributing more troops. Likewise, a positive relationship and 
significance for the independent variable MILITARYGDP would confirm states 
that spend a greater percentage of their GDP on their militaries contribute troops in 
greater number and incidence. Both of these premises center on the tenant of 
realism of power and security. GDP is expected to maintain a positive relationship 
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as stronger economies have more power and resources to participate in 
peacekeeping if so desired. Independent variable CONTIGUITY relates to 
geographic concerns and threats to their individual security.  For states further 
away, a negative relationship would be expected as threats are diminished for the 
participating state. 
 For the liberal hypothesis the independent variables INTMEMBERSHIPS, 
FREEDOM, HUMANRIGHTS and TRADE are of chief interest. 
INTMEMBERSHIPS is the number of international organizations of which a state 
is a member. This relationship should be positive as the more organizational 
memberships, the more committed to liberal ideals. FREEDOM and 
HUMANRIGHTS represent regime types. For FREEDOM, the relationship should 
be negative as a smaller number represents more democratic societies. 
HUMANRIGHTS is expected to show a positive relationship as the value for this 
variable increases for more democratic societies. Liberal approaches posit that like- 
minded democratic societies would be more likely to contribute. TRADE measures 
bi-lateral trade, an economic relationship that represents the connectedness of the 
host peacekeeping state and the contributing state. This relationship is expected to 
be positive as more trade represents greater economic ties, a premise of liberal 
thought. Significance for this variable could suggest that states are contributing to 
peacekeeping operations in the interest of economic relationships. 
 Constructivism will be tested through the independent variables 
UNMEMBERSHIP, GDP, MILITARYGDP and TOTALMILITARY. 
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UNMEMBERSHIP is expected to represent a positive relationship; the longer a 
state has been a member of the United Nations, the higher the frequency and 
number of contributions. Learned behavior through association would confirm 
identity development. A negative relationship with GDP would confirm that states 
that were less developed economically could be using peacekeeping as an 
economic option to increase viability locally and globally. Under the authority of 
the U.N. these states are protected and enjoy continued payment of their troops. 
MILITARYGDP and TOTALMILITARY would also be expected to maintain 
negative relationships to confirm constructivism theoretically. States less developed 
militarily could contribute more often and in greater number to develop, enhance 
and support their own military personnel and capabilities. Using peacekeeping in 
this manner provides support to the idea of learning through the system for personal 
development, particularly if it has changed over time.  
Table 4 – Independent Variable Regression Expectations 
Independent Variable Expected Direction Theoretical Assumption 
TOTALMILITARY Positive or Negative Realism  
Constructivism  
MILITARYGDP Positive or Negative Realism  
Constructivism  
INTMEMBERSHIPS Positive  Liberalism  
GDP Positive or Negative  Realism  
Constructivism  
FREEDOM Negative  Liberalism  
HUMANRIGHTS Positive  Liberalism  
TRADE Positive  Liberalism  
UNMEMBERSHIP Positive  Constructivism  
CONTIGUITY Negative  Realism  
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In addition to the regression results, the graphical analysis can support or 
detract from potential theoretical assumptions and application. Each graph, 
frequency of contributions and total contributions is looking at state characteristics 
with respect to frequency of participation, total troop contributions over time and 
troop contributions for each year during the 1991-2007 time period. By examining 
the frequency and the total number of peacekeeping contributions by each state, 
averages can be examined of those states that participate more frequently and in 
greater number. If we look at states that have contributed to greater than 50% of the 
operations during this time period and compare those states to the states that have 
lower incidence levels, then a comparative analysis of each independent variable is 
possible that is related to the same theoretical claims as the regression models. 
To compare the states that contributed more frequently and in greater 
number a percent difference of the averages for each independent variable will be 
calculated. The average value for each independent variable for states that 
contributed to over 50% of the peacekeeping operations will be used to calculate 
the percent difference of each independent variable from the states that contributed 
to less than 50% of the peacekeeping operations.  This will be repeated for states 
that contributed over 6,500 troops versus those that contributed less than 6,500. The 
calculated percent difference will report whether there exist a significance 
difference between the two groups of contributing states and non contributing 
states. Calculating a percent difference for each group will report if there are any 
substantial numerical differences in the values of the independent variables for each 
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group. This numerical value will help to delineate any differences between the state 
groupings for frequency of contributions and total contributions. 
For instance, if the higher incidence states report significantly greater values 
for GDP, then it can be possible to predict that states with significantly stronger 
economies are more likely to contribute to peacekeeping operations. At the very 
least it would be possible to describe these contributing states as maintaining 
stronger economies as a whole than those states with lower incidences. This can be 
accomplished with all of the independent variables and can provide further depth 
and analysis of each independent variable. In the same manner that the independent 
variables have an expected direction, positive or negative, the higher or lower the 
aggregate values of the independent variables from the graphical analysis will 
provide further findings that could contribute to our theoretical analysis of state 
peacekeeping contributions. 
For each independent variable there is any expectation of value for each 
statistical average that is related to the theoretical approach. Theoretically, they 
assume the same directional value as the regression results in Table 4. With respect 
to states that provide troops more frequently and in greater number the reported 
values will be averages of those states versus those states that contribute less 
frequently and in smaller numbers.  TOTALMILITARY and MILITARYGDP are 
independent variables that measure military strength and spending. To confirm a 
realist approach, the expectation would be that troop contributors would maintain a 
higher average for the independent variables TOTALMILITARY and 
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MILITARYGDP versus those that contribute less. To confirm the constructivist 
argument, the inverse would be expected.  GDP is also related to realist 
explanations, with contributing states expected to report higher averages with 
respect to their GDP versus those states that contribute troops less frequently and in 
smaller numbers. Again, the inverse is expected to confirm constructivist 
descriptions.  
The expectation of FREEDOM and HUMANRIGHTS will report different 
directional values from each other due to the nature of their measurements but 
represent the same liberal assumption. To support the liberal framework, 
FREEDOM will report lower averages for contributors and HUMANRIGHTS will 
report higher averages for contributors versus those states that are non-contributors. 
INTEMEMBERSHIPS would be expected to report a higher average for 
contributing states versus the less frequent contributing states to confirm liberal 
explanations. The independent variable UNMEMBERSHIPS is expected to report 
higher averages for troop contributing states than for those states that do not to 
confirm constructivist descriptions. Table 5 reports the expected results for each 
independent variable and the assumed statistical average to confirm or reject the 
theoretical approaches and their descriptions.113 
 
 
 
                                                 
113 CONTIGUITY and TRADE will not be included in statistical average expectation analysis due 
to the characteristics of their data. CONTIGUITY can only be calculated from two points in each 
individual case and TRADE can only be measured between two states during one time period. 
 107 
 
Table 5 – Independent Variable Statistical Average Expectations 
Independent Variable Expected Statistical Values Theoretical Assumption 
TOTALMILITARY Higher or Lower Average Realism 
Constructivism 
MILITARYGDP Higher or Lower  Average Realism  
Constructivism  
INTMEMBERSHIPS Higher Average Liberalism  
GDP Higher or Lower Average Realism  
Constructivism  
FREEDOM Lower Average Liberalism  
HUMANRIGHTS Higher Average Liberalism  
UNMEMBERSHIP Higher Average Constructivism  
 
Individual state contributions can also provide analysis of behavior over 
time for state contributions. Do patterns emerge for multiple states? If we can 
compare overall troop levels in peacekeeping operations to individual state 
contribution levels, do particular states follow those patterns? Particular states may 
be responsible for the overall patterns of peacekeeping contributions and total 
numbers contributed to the UN. Individual state analysis will allow snapshots of 
contributions over the 1991-2007 time period and enable the analysis to focus on 
contributions at the individual state level. This will contribute to the understanding 
of the theoretical assumption that interaction over time can change contributions 
patterns and state’s interests.  
The overall scope of the provided analysis could provide significant depth 
of current practical understanding of the theoretical motives of states with respect 
to international peacekeeping. It is plainly obvious the international environment 
has changed significantly since the end of the Cold War. The examination of how 
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individual states support international peacekeeping efforts offers perhaps a more 
thorough understanding of how security related goals of states in the international 
system are developed and when, or if, cooperation is inherent, self-interested or 
learned. While this analysis is no way can offer a complete assumptive analysis of 
state security goals in the international system, it can offer a more nuanced 
knowledge of the theoretical approaches of international relations, and if states 
adhere to the traditional realist paradigms, or more dynamic explanations are more 
appropriate. 
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Chapter 3 - Regression Models, Tables and Graphical Results 
 
 The results of each regression model and the independent variables that 
reported significant values are included in Table 6 in this chapter. Table 6 provides 
the adjusted r square values, the independent variables that were included in each 
stepwise model, the unstandardized coefficient for each independent variable 
included, if the expected direction for each independent variable coincides with the 
predicted direction, the t values for the included independent variables and the 
significance value for each independent variable. Appendix B includes the 
descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation) and correlation tables for each 
regression model. Appendix B also includes the unstandardized coefficients, t 
values, significance values for all of the excluded variables in the regression 
models that reported findings. 
 Before reporting the results from the regression models it is important to 
note that the independent variable HUMANRIGHTS was correlated with 
FREEDOM at a range of -.766 to -.868 in each Pearson correlation matrix. In each 
case HUMANRIGHTS was removed from the equation to measure the interactive 
effects it potentially possessed with the FREEDOM variable. In each case the 
adjusted R² value remained constant or increased due to the removal of 
HUMANRIGHTS.  FREEDOM was then removed from the regression models 
while HUMANRIGHTS remained and the adjusted R² value remained constant or 
decreased.  Through this analysis, it was determined that HUMANRIGHTS should 
be removed from the regression models and the FREEDOM variable would remain.  
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This was the only independent variable that reported significant correlation values. 
 Several of the regression models exclude all of the independent variables, 
including the overall model. The overall model reported included 0 of the 
independent variables in the regression analysis.  The following peacekeeping 
regression models reported 0 independent variables as significant as well: 
ONUMOZ(a), ONUMOZ(b), UNMISET(a), UNMISET(b), UNOSOM II(a), 
UNOSOM II(b), UNTAET(a), UNTAET(b), ONUB(a), ONUB(b). Two models 
reported significant variable results in the total contribution models(b), but not in 
the state participation models. These peacekeeping models were UNIKOM(b) and 
UNPROFOR(b). Four of the models reported significant variable results in both the 
state participation and total contribution models. These peacekeeping models were 
UNAVEM III(a), UNAVEM III(b), UNMEE(a), UNMEE(b), UNAMSIL(a), 
UNAMSIL(b) UNPREDEP(a) and UNPREDEP(b). Of the nine independent 
variables, three were not reported significant in any of the regression models.114  
GDP, TOTALMILITARY and UNMEMBERSHIP were not included in the 
overall, state participation or total contributions models.    
   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
114The inclusion of HUMANRIGHTS would have increased this number to four but was removed 
due to high correlation. 
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Table 6 – Stepwise Regression Model Results 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Model Name Independent  Expected Adj. R²     b     t sig  
  Variable (s)  Direction 
 
OVERALL None   -   - - - - 
 
ONUMOZ(a) None   -  - - - - 
ONUMOZ(b) None   -  - - - - 
 
UNAVEM III(a) CONTIGUITY  Yes  .952 -.004 - 23.563 .000 
  MILITARYGDP  Yes    .001       6.532 .000 
  FREEDOM  Yes   -.001 - 5.026 .000 
UNAVEM III(b) CONTIGUITY  Yes  .742  .003 - 18.802 .000 
.  MILITARYGDP  Yes    .000 - 4.245   .000 
  FREEDOM  Yes    .000   3.412 .000  
     
UNIKOM(a) None   -  - - - - 
UNIKOM(b) CONTIGUITY  Yes  .032 -.002 - 2.114   .037 
 
UNMEE(a) CONTIGUITY  Yes  .711 -.003 - 10.087 .000 
UNMEE(b) CONTIGUITY  Yes  .212 -.001 - 6.021 .000 
  
UNMISET(a) None   -  - - - - 
UNMISET(b) None   -  - - - - 
 
UNAMSIL(a) CONTIGUITY  Yes  .158 -.009 - 2.747 .010 
UNAMSIL(b) CONTIGUITY  Yes  .127 -.007 - 4.460 .000 
 
UNOSOM II(a) None   -  - - - - 
UNOSOM II(b) None   -  - - - -  
 
UNPREDEP(a) CONTIGUITY  Yes  .266 -.002 - 2.937 .008 
UNPREDEP(b) INTMEMBERSHIPS Yes  .075  1.9E-7   3.274 .001 
 
UNPROFOR(a) None   -  - - - - 
UNPROFOR(b) INTMEMBERSHIPS Yes  .191  4.2E-6   4.363 .000 
  TRADE   No   -2.9E-6 - 2.965   .004 
 
UNTAET(a) None   -  - - - - 
UNTAET(b) None   -  - - - - 
 
ONUB(a) None   -  - - - - 
ONUB(b) None   -  - - - - 
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 Table 6 presents the stepwise regression model results for the overall model 
(1991-2007), state participation and total contribution peacekeeping operations. 
The model fit (adjusted R²) for the regression models reports a significant range.  
The lowest reported adjusted R² value is UNIKOM(b) at .032 and the highest 
reported adjusted R² values is UNACEM III(a) at .952. While there is no accepted 
baseline for adjusted R² values in social science pursuits, the results from these 
models represent a large range of results, but inconsistent. Significant findings and 
non-findings in one or more model could assist in determining differences that exist 
within each peacekeeping operation that could affect the descriptive and theoretical 
applications presented in this analysis.  Explanations for the lower model fits and 
non-findings could be attributed to a small number of independent variables 
included for analysis. Recognizing that a large number of interactive terms and 
variables may be at play internationally, inclusion of 9 independent variables may 
not represent a deep enough examination of potential interactive variables. Yet this 
was the goal of the design - to minimize variable inclusion to examine some of the 
principled pieces of traditional theoretical claims in international relations 
approaches with respect to peacekeeping. This wide range of values does create 
inconsistent results in the models overall fit across all of the peacekeeping 
operations, but still allows the individual independent variables to be examined for 
significance.  
 In all of the regression models that report significance, the adjusted R² 
values decrease in the total contribution models(b) versus the contributing states 
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models(a). This decrease is expected as a greater number of states are included in 
the analysis of the overall models. As the number of cases in the dependent 
variables expands, yet the independent variables stay constant, the values are 
expected to decrease.  This is typical of regression analysis. As more cases are 
entered into each peacekeeping operation, the potential for the same number of 
independent variables to explore the variance decreases.  
  The positive and/or negative directions of all but one of the independent 
variables reported in each model were in the anticipated direction. In the regression 
model UNPROFOR(b), TRADE is the only instance were a negative coefficient is 
reported when the predicted direction is positive. 
 
Overall Model Results 
The overall model measures the total number of troop contributions divided 
by the total military personnel contributed by each state for all of the peacekeeping 
operations included during the 1991-2007 time period. This model reports no 
significant findings for any of the independent variables. There can be no verifiable 
theoretical claims developed from the overall model in this analysis concerning the 
time period from 1991-2007 through the regression analysis. 
       
State Participation Model Results (a) 
The state participation models, a, measure only the states that contributed to 
the peacekeeping operations. This analysis allows for the distinction of states that 
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contribute, but at different levels in each peacekeeping operation. Examining the 
results from the regression models from the contributions model produces a wide 
range of results and independent variable significance. There are 11 total regression 
models for this analysis, with 7 models reporting no significant findings; 
ONUMOZ, UNIKOM, UNMISET, UNOSOM II, UNPROFOR, UNTAET and 
ONUB. The adjusted R² values range from .158 (UNAMSIL) to .952 (UNAVEM 
III). The fit for these models is higher than the overall results for the 1991-2007 
time period and the total contribution models (b). The state participation results for 
UNAVEM III reports a high adjusted R² in comparison to other state participation 
model.        
 The independent variable CONTIGUITY is significant in four of the eleven 
models (36%). FREEDOM and MILITARYGDP are each significant in one of the 
eleven models (9%). No other independent variables report any level of 
significance in any of the state participation models.  Only one regression model, 
UNAVEM III, reports more than one independent variable as significant. The 
remaining three models, UNMEE, UNPREDEP and UNAMSIL only report one 
variable as significant. All of the state participation models report findings that are 
in the assumed direction for each variable from the theoretical approaches analysis.  
  
Total Contribution Model Results (b) 
The total contributions stepwise regression models (b), analyze every 
member state and their contribution levels, included those states that contributed 
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zero troops during the peacekeeping operation. This allows for the independent 
variables to contribute to a deeper understanding of motivations for all states, 
contributors or not. The results for the 11 stepwise regression models report a wide 
range of values, resembling the results from the state participation models (a). As 
mentioned previously the adjusted R² values are lower in these models than the 
state participation models(a). The reported adjusted R² values for the total 
contributions models (b) range from .032 (UNIKOM) to .742 (UNAVEM III). 
Comparing these values to the state contributions models (a), .158 to .952, the total 
contributions models are considerably underspecified. Six of the regression models 
report significant findings for the independent variables in the total contribution 
models. 
 The independent variable CONGUITY is significant in four of the eleven 
models (36%). INTMEMBERSHIPS is significant in two of the eleven models 
(18%) while FREEDOM, MILITARYGDP, and TRADE are significant in one of 
the eleven models (9%). UNAVEM III reported the highest adjusted R² value at 
.742. UNAVEM III and UNPROFOR are the only models that report more than 
one independent variable as significant in the model. UNAVEM III reports 
CONTIGUITY, MILITARYGDP and FREEDOM as significant and UNPROFOR 
reports INTMEMBERSHIPS and TRADE. The remaining All of the independent 
variables are in the assumed direction except TRADE. TRADE reports a negative 
coefficient value and the predicted relationship was positive.  
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Table and Graphical Analysis 
Examining the frequency of contributions and the total number of troops 
during the 1991-2007 time period provides an opportunity to survey the states that 
provide peacekeeping troops and measure commonalities and/or differences exist 
between states with higher incidences and more contributions versus states with 
lower incidences and fewer contributions.  
Graph 1 includes the frequency of state participation with respect to the 19 
peacekeeping operations from 1991-2007. The frequencies of contributions provide 
an excellent starting point to examine how often a state provides troops to a 
peacekeeping operation and will assist in creating a dichotomy of states that 
contribute to more than 50% of the peacekeeping operations during this time period 
versus states under the 50% value.  
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Graph 1 – Frequency of State Participation: 1991-2007 
 
 
Graph 1 displays a visual representation of the incidence level of 
participation for individual states. Table 7 provides the number of operations of the 
19 that each state contributed troops and the resulting percentages. The states 
included are those states that contributed troops at higher incidence than 50%. This 
dichotomy is valuable as it distinguished the states that contribute more frequently 
versus those states less frequently. While there are some minor differences in the 
frequency patterns of contributing states close to the 50% value, in some cases only 
one case difference, the line is drawn to represent states who contributed in more 
than half of the peacekeeping operations, versus those states that contributed in less 
than half. 
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Table 7 – Incidence of Peacekeeping Participation – State Values 
 
 Number of Contributions Percentage of 
Participation 
Pakistan 18 94.74 
Bangladesh 17 89.47 
Canada 15 78.95 
Egypt 14 73.68 
Ghana 14 73.68 
Jordan 14 73.68 
Nigeria 14 73.68 
Russian Federation 14 73.68 
United States 13 68.42 
India 12 63.16 
Kenya 12 63.16 
Malaysia 12 63.16 
Nepal 12 63.16 
Argentina 11 57.89 
Austria 11 57.89 
Ireland 11 57.89 
New Zealand 11 57.89 
Sweden 11 57.89 
Uruguay 11 57.89 
Australia 10 52.63 
Indonesia 10 52.63 
Netherlands 10 52.63 
Norway 10 52.63 
Senegal 10 52.63 
 
Of the entire UN membership, only 24 states contributed troops to more 
than half of the peacekeeping operations. There are several important items of note 
upon initial examination. Only two of the permanent five members of the Security 
Council contributed more than 50% of the time, the United States at 68.42% 
percent and the Russian Federation at 73.68%. There is representation from every 
major continent. Pakistan contributed to 18 of the 19 peacekeeping operations with 
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a value of 94.74% with Bangladesh as the second most frequent contributor, 
participating in 17 of the 19 peacekeeping operations for a value of 89.47%. 
These examinations serves as a starting point to produce a more informative 
dichotomous picture of states that are contributing troops more frequently versus 
those states with lower incidence rates with respect to the independent variables of 
interest. To compare the two groups, percent differences can be calculated for each 
independent variable for the states that contributed over 50% versus those states 
under 50%.  
Table 8 - Frequency of Peacekeeping Operations Percent Difference of 
Independent Variables 
 
 
 Table 8 shows significant differences between the states based on their 
incidence of participation, particularly for three independent variables: GDP, 
INTMEMBERSHIPS and TOTALMILITARY.  States that contribute to over 50% 
of the peacekeeping operations represented a percent difference of over 104% for 
GDP to those states that contributed to fewer than 50% of the peacekeeping 
operations. This represents a significant difference in GDP of those states that are 
giving troops more frequently than those that are less frequent in their 
contributions.  
 FREEDOM GDP INTMEMBERSHIPS MILITARYGDP HUMANRIGHTS TOTALMILITARY UNMEMBERSHIP 
Incidence 
Greater 
than 50% 
2.817 532750.1 2371.91 2.096 9.413 .01517 54.79 
 
Incidence 
Lower than 
50% 
3.375 167170.4 1423.99 2.154 9.377 .00572 45.23 
Percent 
Difference 
18.0% 104.5% 49.9% -2.7% 0.3% 90.5% 19.1% 
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 Military capabilities, TOTALMILITARY, reports over 90% difference for 
states that contribute above the 50% threshold. TOTALMILITARY measures the 
total material capabilities of a state. States with larger material capabilities 
contribute more frequently than those with smaller material capabilities. 
INTMEMBERSHIPS reports approximately a 50% difference for states that 
maintain more international organizational memberships. States with higher 
incidences of participation maintain a greater number of international memberships, 
almost 50% more than those under the 50% incidence of participation levels. 
UNMEMBERSHIP reports a 19% difference while FREEDOM reports an 18% 
difference. HUMANRIGHTS reports the lowest positive difference at .3% and 
MILITARYGDP reports a -2.7% difference.  
Graph 2 – Overall Troop Contributions by Member State: 1991-2007 
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Graph 2 displays a visual representation of the total troop contribution for 
individual states. Table 9 provides the total number of troop contributions that each 
state contributed and the corresponding. The states included are those states that 
contributed troops above 6,500 for the 1991-2007 included peacekeeping 
operations. The dichotomy of states that contributed over and under 6,500 troops 
was the mean of the contributions for all states. The total number of troops 
contributed during this time and the resulting mean provided the appropriate value 
to create dichotomous groups that represent states that contributed more troops 
during this time period, versus states that contributed fewer troops during this time 
period.  
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Table 9 – Total Contributions to Peacekeeping Participation – 1991-2007 
 
Country Total Contributions 
Pakistan 84508 
Bangladesh 72592 
India 54849 
France 35758 
Jordan 35010 
Ghana 31339 
Nepal 29655 
Nigeria 27390 
United Kingdom 27244 
Uruguay 19417 
Poland 18797 
Kenya 17201 
Canada 16906 
United States of America 16129 
Argentina 13889 
Ethiopia 13642 
Ukraine 11825 
Austria 11564 
Ireland 10661 
Italy 10602 
Russia 10531 
Norway 10284 
Senegal 10282 
Finland 10079 
Malaysia 10048 
Morocco 9996 
Zambia 9409 
Egypt 9359 
Spain 9182 
Netherlands 9041 
Fiji 8832 
South Africa 8411 
Brazil 8055 
Sweden 7905 
Denmark 7161 
China 7148 
Germany 6978 
Belgium 6669 
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39 states contributed more than 6,500 troops during this time period. The 
list of states that contributed more troops is closely related to the states that 
contributed over 50%. 20 states contributed to more than 50% of the possible 
peacekeeping operations and more than 6,500 troops during the 1991-2007 time 
period. Yet there are a few key differences from the incidence group compared to 
the total contributions list. Of the 24 states that contributed to over 50% of the 
peacekeeping only four states did not contribute over 6,500 troops during this time 
period: New Zealand, Sweden, Australia and Indonesia. This result is to be 
expected as the more frequently a state contributed troops the more likely the 
number of troop contributions would rise. All permanent members of the Security 
Council contributed more than 6,500 troops; The United Kingdom, the Russian 
Federation, The United States of America, France and China Pakistan, Bangladesh 
and India all contributed over 50,000 troops while Poland, Ukraine, Italy, Ethiopia 
and Finland all contributed over 6,500 troops but contributed in less than 50% of 
the operations examined. The dichotomy based on the total number of contributions 
will look at those states that have contributed over 6,500 troops during the 1991-
2007 time period versus those states that have contributed under the 6,500 troop 
threshold.  Each independent variable will again be included to measure the percent 
differences between the states above/under the 6,500 dichotomy. 
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Table 10 - Total Troop Contribution 1991-2007  
Percent Difference of Independent Variables 
 
 FREEDOM GDP INTMEMBERSHIP MILITARYGDP HUMANRIGHTS TOTALMILITARY UNMEMBERSHIP 
Total 
Contribution  
over 6,500 
 
2.802 549574.7 2737.18 2.163 9.760 .01776 54.24 
Total 
Contribution  
under  
6,500 
 
3.412 89846.7 1053.22 2.187 9.032 .00271 42.86 
Percent 
Difference 
 
19.6% 143% 88.9% 1.1% 7.7% 147% 23.4% 
 
 Table 10 shows significant percent differences with three of the 
independent variables. The three independent variables, GDP, 
INTMEMBERSHIPS and TOTALMILITARY are the identical independent 
variables that reported significant differences in the level of incidence analysis. 
States that contributed over 6,500 troops during this time period had a percent 
difference of over 143% with respect to GDP. This represents a significant 
difference in the GDP of states that gave more troops during this time period. 
Military capabilities or TOTALMILITARY, represents a 147% difference for states 
that contributed more than 6,500 troops compared to those below this mark. The 
percent difference for states on the higher end of contributions concerning the 
international organizations variable, INTMEMBERSHIP, shows a 89% difference 
in favor or higher contributing countries. FREEDOM reports a 20% difference 
while UNMEMBERSHIP reports a 23% difference. HUMANRIGHTS and 
MILITARYGDP report the lowest percent difference values at 7.7% and 1.% 
respectively. 
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UN and State Troop Contributions Over Time 
 
The incidence of participation and the total number of contributions over 
time to peacekeeping operations allows for an important and valuable examination 
that provides distinct analysis of those states that contribute more often and in 
greater number to peacekeeping operations. Related to this analysis is the change 
over time that a state may experience with respect to the total number of troops that 
are being contributed on a yearly basis. Change over time allows for further depth 
and understanding of individual state contributions and understanding if particular 
trends emerge. Graphing each state and their contribution levels in comparison to 
the total number of troops active in peacekeeping operations and in comparison to 
other states will help inform a more thorough understanding to peacekeeping 
contributions over time. 
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Graph 3 – Total Uniformed Personnel in UN  
Peacekeeping 1991-2006115 
 
 
 
 
 
 The uniformed personnel in peacekeeping table provides the total number 
of troops that were serving in UN peacekeeping operations from 1991-2006. The 
variations in troop contributions are apparent with significant growth in 
contributions from 1991 to 1995. From this point forward peacekeeping personnel 
experienced a significant drop off until 2000. From 2000 to 2006 peacekeeping 
personnel maintained slow and steady growth, with a dip in 2004, to reach the 
largest number of active peacekeepers since the inception of peacekeeping 
operations. 
                                                 
115 This graph is reproduced from the United Nations website at www.un.org/Depts/dpko/chart.pdf 
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 As overall peacekeeping contributions have experienced significant 
variations in total number, it is important to examine individual states that have 
contributed troops during this time, as troop contributions are the primary driving 
force behind the variations. Military observors and police personnel had remained 
constant during the same time period.  The following tables display individual state 
contributions from the same time period with respect to troop contributions. Graphs 
4 through 8 represent the permanenet 5 members of the security council, France, 
Russia, The United Kingdom, The United States and China. The next 26 graphs 
examine those states with contributions over 6,500 from 1991-2007 in descending 
order of total contributions. 
 
Graph 4 – Total French Contributions 
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Graph 5 – Total British Contributions 
 
 
 
 
Graph 6 – Total United States Contributions 
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Graph 7 – Total Russian -Contributions 
 
 
 
 
Graph 8 – Total Chinese Contributions 
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Graph 9 – Total Pakistani Contributions 
 
 
 
 
Graph 10 – Total Bangladeshi Contributions 
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Graph 11 – Total Indian Contributions 
 
 
 
 
Graph 12 – Total Jordanian Contributions 
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Graph 13 – Total Ghanaian Contributions 
 
 
 
 
Graph 14 – Total Nepalese Contributions 
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Graph 15 – Total Nigerian Contributions 
 
 
 
 
Graph 16 – Total Uruguayan Contributions 
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Graph 17 – Total Polish Contributions 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 18 – Total Kenyan Contributions 
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Graph 19 – Total Canadian Contributions 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 20 – Total Ethiopian Contributions 
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Graph 21 – Total Argentinian Contributions 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 22 – Total Ukranian Contributions 
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Graph 23 – Total Austrian Contributions 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 24 – Total Irish Contributions  
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Graph 25 – Total Italian Contributions 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 26 – Total Norwegian Contributions 
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Graph 27 – Total Senegalese Contributions 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 28 – Total Finnish Contributions 
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Graph 29 – Total Malaysian Contributions 
 
 
 
 
 The contribution graphs of the permanent members of the Security Council 
offer important initial insights when comparing each to the total number of 
contributions during the same time period. From 1991-1996, the trends of 4 of the 5 
permanent members, France, Great Britain, The United States and Russia show an 
increase of contributions in the early 90’s with a significant reduction after 1996 
moving forward. Each of these four Security Council members contributes early in 
the time period, but decrease contributions significantly after 1996. Only France 
reports a significant increased after the 1996 year. China is the only permanent 
member whose contribution levels gradually increase, eventually achieving the 
highest level of contributions in its history in 2007.  Yet their total contribution 
total and frequency are below the levels of the other 4 Security Council members. 
The contribution trends are clear; four of the permanent five members, once 
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significant contributors to peacekeeping operations, diminish their contribution 
levels significantly, with other states emerging as the key contributors as the 
number raises beginning in 2000. 
 An examination of the other states contributing more than 6,500 troops also 
provides valuable analysis. Several other states display similar trends as the four 
Security Council members. Malaysia, Norway, Austria, Canada, Poland, Finland, 
Argentina and Italy all maintain their highest level of contributions during the 
1991-1996 time period, never returning to those levels during the next decade. 
Only Italy displays a significant contribution change over the 1997-2007 time 
period, with an increase during 2006 and 2007. 
 Senegal’s contributions match closest to China’s contribution level of a 
gradual increase over the time period. The remaining states have contribution levels 
that represent trends from the overall contributions levels from 1991-2007. While 
Ukraine, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Kenya and Uruguay present contributions level that are 
related to the levels over the 1991-2007 time period, Nepal, Ghana, Jordan, India, 
Bangladesh, Pakistan and India represent contributions level that look to be the 
backbone of the overall contribution levels, driving the peaks of the overall graph. 
This is particularly accurate when looking at the contributions levels of Pakistan, 
Bangladesh and India. These three states have the most consistent contribution 
patterns with respect to the number of troops being contributed to peacekeeping 
operations. The pattern of individual years from these states also matches very 
closely to the overall yearly pattern for the overall contribution model. 
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 The regression analysis, table and graphical results reported in this chapter 
will be used to confirm or reject the theoretical approaches and their assumptions. 
The different methods used in a collaborative manner can provide a layered 
examination of each hypothetical claim and will enable the research to arrive at the 
most appropriate and viable conclusions.  Each method provides distinct results and 
using multiple methodological approaches helps to ensure that results from the 
analysis are not over or under stated. 
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Chapter 4 – Theoretical Approaches and Implications 
 
 The results from the regression models, tables and graphical analysis 
provide significant data to examine the validity of the previously provided 
hypotheses. Individually, the regression analysis provides some noteworthy results 
which provide insights but falls short of producing a full picture of state’s motives 
and characteristics. Aligning the results from the regression analysis with the table 
and graphical data provide a much deeper understanding of the potential 
motivations for state’s with respect to peacekeeping contributions. This 
combination of results provides substantive evidence which can inform our 
understanding of state’s actions and motivations and how they fit into the 
theoretical framework. 
 The previously provided hypotheses were narrowed into three primary 
theoretical frameworks; realism, liberalism and constructivism:    
 
REALISM – UN member states that contribute to peacekeeping operations 
 would  maintain a geographic interest in the peacekeeping operation, states 
 would  sustain a stronger commitment to military expenditures and 
 capabilities, and states would possess larger economies that would enable 
 more consistent and greater contributions.    
LIBERALISM - UN member states that contribute to peacekeeping 
operations will maintain a larger number of international associations, have 
similar government systems (primarily democracies) and possess larger 
amounts of bi-lateral trade between the host state and contributors. 
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 CONSTRUCTIVISM - UN member states that contribute to peacekeeping 
 operations will have longer tenured membership in the United Nations, 
 would  maintain smaller economic and military capabilities and would 
 experience significant change over time of their individual peacekeeping 
 commitments. 
The verification or rejection or the provided hypothesis is not an easily achievable 
endeavor. The most important aspects of this process is that a) model results are not 
assumed to represent more significant results than they provide and b) that 
consistency of results will provide a greater theoretical understanding over time and 
state’s contributions. 
 
Overall Regression Model 
 The overall regression model measures troop contributions as a percent of 
total military personnel from 1991-2007. This regression model provided no 
significant findings for any independent variable. Thus, the application of any 
theoretical approaches and verification or rejection of hypotheses using this model 
cannot be confirmed. As this model was intended to measure contributions over 
time and the independent variables interacting effects on troop contributions, the 
overarching application of international relations approaches over time will be 
limited.  
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State Participation Models 
 The state participation regression models examine only the states that 
contributed troops to each peacekeeping operation while the total contribution 
models examine all states that were current members of the UN at the inception of 
the peacekeeping operation, contributions or not. Theoretically this difference is 
key in looking at the overall assumptions that can be made. 
 The state participation models are examining the actions and motivations 
between the states that have contributed, while the total contribution models are 
examining the actions and motivations of all member states that have, and have not 
contributed. The total contributions model will provide the most valuable results 
and assumptions as all states are examined. To make overarching assumptions 
concerning the theoretical motivations of state’s and their contributions then every 
UN member state must be examined. Yet the state participation models can provide 
additional analysis to see motivations for states that are consistent providers of 
troops. 
 The eleven state participation models report varied results. In four of the 
nice state participation models, CONTIGUITY  is reported as significant. 
FREEDOM and MILITARYGDP are  reported significant in one of the nine 
regression models. These variables are only present in the UNAVEM III model.  
The remaining variables do not report significant findings in any of the regression 
models. CONTIGUITY in the state participation model is the only variable that 
reports significant findings in more than one peacekeeping operations.  The graphs 
 146 
 
for the four CONTIGUITY, one FREEDOM and one MILITARYGDP models are 
included: 
Graph 30 – UNAVEM III – Contiguity versus Troop Index 
 
         
Graph 31 – UNMEE – Contiguity versus Troop Index 
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Graph 32 – UNAMSIL – Contiguity versus Troop Index 
 
Graph 33 – UNPREDEP – Contiguity versus Troop Index 
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Graph 34 – UNAVEM III – Freedom versus Troop Index 
 
                     Graph 35 – UNAVEM III – Military GDP versus Troop Index 
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CONTIGUITY represents location of a state with respect to the host 
peacekeeping state can be assumed to have a negative impact on the number of 
troops that are contributed. From a geographical perspective, for states the 
contribute to peacekeeping operations, as the distance increases between the 
contributing state and the host state, the number of contributions decreases. This 
finding cannot be applied with significant confidence. This data merely suggests 
that a relationship exists, it is not consistent over all of the peacekeeping operations 
and cannot be applied as an overarching result. 
FREEDOM and MILITARYGDP report significant findings in one model, 
the same model UNAVEM III. The data suggests that FREEDOM and 
MILITARYGDP have a statisitical relationship with the troop index variable but 
only in this peackeeping operation. These variables cannot be deemed as 
possessing powerful explanatory findings due to the absence of any significant 
findings in the other ten regressions models. 
Collectively, the independent variables that reported significance in the 
state participation model are of important to note, but can not be applied 
theoretically to all peacekeeping operations. The results and analysis provided 
gives the research some idea of the differences that exist among states that are 
contributors. This analysis does not compare and include states that did not provide 
troop contributions for each peacekeeping operation. Yet  understanding the 
differences in states that are providing troops provides valuable information into 
what independent variables influence the states that contribute. From this analysis, 
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it can be reported that among states that are contributors, location is the only 
variable that maintains any significant interactive effect with peacekeeping troop 
contributions.. The further a state is geographically from the host peacekeeping 
state and the longer a state’s tenure in the UN, the greater likelihood that a states 
contributions decrease. 
 
Total Contribution Models 
The eleven total contribution regression models report results significantly 
different from the results of the state contribution regression models. The total 
contribution models examine every UN member state at the inception of the 
peacekeeping operation. These models are intended to look primarily at what 
separates contributers versus non-contributors whereas the state participation 
models are measuring characteristics of only contributors. This distinction is vital 
to the theoretical application of actions and motivation’s of states. Five of the 
independent variables are reported as significant in the total contributions models 
with two variables, CONTIGUITY and INTMEMBERSHIPS reporting multiple 
significant values. CONTIGUITY reported significant results in four of the eleven 
total contribution regression models and INTMEMBERSHIPS reported significant 
results in two of the eleven models. MILITARYGDP, FREEDOM and TRADE 
each reported significance in one of the eleven models. The following graphs are 
the CONTIGUITY, INTMEMBERSHIPS, MILITARYGDP, TRADE AND 
FREEDOM graphical results. 
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Graph 36 – UNAVEM III – Contiguity versus Troop Index 
 
Graph 37 – UNIKOM – Contiguity versus Troop Index 
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Graph 38 – UNMEE – Contiguity versus Troop Index 
 
Graph 39 – UNAMSIL – Contiguity versus Troop Index 
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Graph 40 – UNPREDEP – International Memberships versus Troop Index 
 
Graph 41- UNPROFOR – International Memberships versus Troop Index 
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Graph 42- UNAVEM III – Military GDP versus Troop Index 
 
Graph 43- UNAVEM III – Freedom versus Troop Index 
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Graph 44 - UNPROFOR – Trade versus Troop Index 
 
CONTIGUITY is reported as significant in four of the total contribution 
results. It was also reported significant in four of the state participation models. 
CONTIGUITY is clearly the independent variable that represents the most 
consistent and useable findings across both the state and total contribution models. 
Two other variables report significant findings in more than once instance. 
FREEDOM is reported significant in one of the eleven state participation models 
and one of the eleven total contribution models. INTMEMBERSHIPS reports 
significant findings in two of the eleven total contribution models but is not 
reported as significant in any of the state participation models. CONTIGUITY is 
significant in two of the models, one less than the state participation regression 
model results.  
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CONTIGUITY is the only variable that reports significance in multiple 
peacekeeping operations for both the state participation models and the total 
contributions models.The distance from a contributing state to the host state has a 
negative relationship with the number of troops that a state contributes. For all UN 
member states, if a state maintains a greater distance from the host state, the 
individual state is less likely to contribute troops to peacekeeping operations. The 
data suggests for states that move further away from the host peacekeeping state, a 
negative relationship with troop contributions exists. 
The results for the CONTIGUITY variable represent significant findings 
but a caveat must be added. Upon examination of each of the four CONTIGUITY 
graphs there are noticeable outliers in the data. The exclusion of any states from the 
model may reduce the theoretical application of any findings, particularly 
CONTIGUITY as the theoretical premise is that states closest to the operation 
would have the most interest in mitigating violence and reducing conflict. Yet it is 
important to see if these cases are driving the model. In each CONTIGUITY case 
the outliers were removed from the analysis. 
In UNAVEM III(a), Namibia and Zambia were removed from the equation. 
The adjusted R² value decreased to .838 and the CONTIGUITY variable dropped 
out of the equation. It is clear the Namibia and Zambia were affecting the 
regression model, but it is important to note that both states border Angola, the hot 
peacekeeping state. In the case of UNAVEM III(b) when Namibia and Zambia 
were removed the adjusted R² value dropped from to .742 to .230 but 
 157 
 
CONTIGUITY was still reported as significant in the model. In UNIKOM(b), 
Bahrain was removed from the model and the variable CONTIGUITY dropped out 
of the model. Again, it is important to note that Bahrain is geographically located 
next to Kuwait, the host peacekeeping state in UNIKOM. 
In the peacekeeping operation UNMEE, Kenya was removed from both the 
state participation(a) and total contribution model(b) and the result was identical - 
CONTIGUITY dropped out of the equation. Again it is important to note that 
Kenya borders Ethiopia, one of the host peacekeeping states. UNAMSIL offers a 
unique case in comparison to the other results after outlier removal. Ghana and 
Zambia were removed from both UNAMSIL models and the results was that 
CONTIGUITY remained significant and the adjusted R² values increased. For 
UNAMSIL(a) it rose from .158 to .405 and for UNAMSIL (b) it rose from .127 to 
.272. UNPREDEP(a) maintained four outliers; Finland, Norway, Sweden and 
Denmark. These four states were removed from the model and CONTIGUITY 
dropped out of the regression. While these countries do not border Macedonia, the 
host peacekeeping state, they are all regionally located together. It is not a reach to 
say that the these Nordic countries may have had a collective interest as the the four 
primary outliers among all of the contributors. 
Removing these outliers does diminish some of the statistical findings of the 
state participation and total contribution models. Yet the outliers consist primarily 
of states that are regionally located along the borders of the host peacekeeping 
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state. This characteristic is valuable in understanding the overall explanatory goal 
of the CONTIGUITY variable. 
   
Regression, Table and Graphical Results  
Combining the table and graphical results with the state participation and 
total contribution regression results provides another layer for the theoretical 
analysis. When we examine Tables 8 and 10 and all of the included variables the 
results report some significant dichotomies that produce valuable characteristics of 
states that contribute more frequently and in greater numbers than states with lower 
participation rates and fewer troop contributions.  
Tables 8 and 10 report significant differences in the same independent 
variables. Table 8 reports a 105% difference in GDP for states that contributed to 
more than 50% of the peacekeeping operations versus those that contributed to less 
than 50%. Table 10 reports a 143% difference in GDP for states that contributed 
more than 6,500 troops during the 1991-2007 time period versus those states that 
contribute fewer than 6,500. While these differences are stark, GDP reporting no 
significant findings in any of the regression models, these values can only serve as 
descriptors. It can be determined that states that contribute troops more frequently 
and in greater number have larger economies, but it cannot be suggested that this 
has a positive or negative effect on a state’s peacekeeping troop contributions. 
The number of international memberships, or INTMEMBERSHIPS, reports 
significant differences in Tables 8 and 10. For states that contribute more 
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frequently there is a positive 49.9% difference in the number of international 
organizational memberships a state is a member. For states that contributed more 
than 6,500 troops there is a 88.9% difference in international organizational 
memberships versus those that contributed under 6,500.00. INTMEMBERSHIPS 
does report significant findings in two of the total contribution models. These 
results suggest that there may exist a relationship between international 
organizational memberships and troop contributions by states but this relationship 
can not be confirmed to have a strong, definitive effect. 
Tables 8 and 10 also report strong differences in the TOTALMILITARY 
measurement between states that contributed to over 50% of the peacekeeping 
operations or over 6,500 total troops. States that contributed to over 50% of the 
peacekeeping operations reported a 90.5% difference in TOTALMILITARY versus 
those states that contributed to less than 50% of the peacekeeping operations. States 
that contributed more than 6,500 troops versus those states that contributed less 
than 6,500 troops reported a 147% difference with respect to TOTALMILITARY. 
Yet TOTALMILITARY was absent from all of the state participation and total 
contribution models. It can be reported that states the contribute more frequently 
and in greater number maintain greater military capabilities, but this variable does 
not possess a positive or negative relationship with peacekeeping contributions.  
 HUMANRIGHTS reports minimal differences in Tables 8 and 10, with a 
percent difference of .3% in Table 8 and 7.7% in Table 10. HUMANRIGHTS was 
removed from both the state participation and total contribution model. There are 
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no significant positive or negative relationships with the HUMANRIGHTS variable 
and peacekeeping contributions. 
FREEDOM was reported as significant twice, once in the state participation 
model and once in the total contribution model. The percent differences for the 
FREEDOM variable in Tables 8 and 10 are reported as a 18.0% and 19.6% for 
states that contributed to over 50% of the peacekeeping operations and over 6,500 
troops. These findings in combination cannot verify a significant positive or 
negative relationship with the FREEDOM variable and a state’s contribution 
patterns.     
Tables 8 and 10 report minimal differences with respect to the 
MILITARYGDP variable. For states that contributed to more than 50% of the 
peacekeeping operations, Table 8 reported a negative -2.7% difference versus states 
that contributed to less than 50% of the peacekeeping operations. For states that 
contributed more than 6,500 troops, a 1.1% difference was reported versus those 
states that contributed fewer than 6,500 troops in Table 10. MILITARYGDP 
reported significant findings in one state participation model and one total 
contribution model. These findings provide results that do not verify any positive or 
negative relationship with MILITARYGDP and a states commitment of troops to 
peacekeeping operations. 
UNMEMBERSHIPS is not reported as significant in any of the regression 
models and Tables 8 and 10 provide minimal percent differences for the two 
dichotomies of states. States that contributed to over 50% of the peacekeeping 
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operations reported a 19.1% difference versus states that contributed to less than 
50%. States that contributed more than 6,500 troops reported a 23.4% difference 
versus states that contributed less than 6,500. The absence of any regression results 
and the lower percent difference values from Table 8 and 10 cannot confirm a 
positive or negative relationship with UNMEMBERSHIP and state peacekeeping 
troop contributions. 
Due to the nature of their measurements, CONTIGUITY and TRADE were 
not included in Tables 8 and 10. CONTIGUITY is reported significant in four of 
the state participation models and four of the total contribution models and is the 
only independent variable that reports multiple significant results in both models. 
Location of a state vis-à-vis the host peacekeeping state suggests a negative 
relationship with a state’s contribution levels. The further a state moves from the 
host peacekeeping state, the fewer troops as a percentage of their total military a 
state will contribute. Those states that are closest in proximity to the host 
peacekeeping state are more likely to contribute troops than those states that 
maintain a further distance geographically. 
 TRADE is reported as significant for the total contribution model 
UNPROFOR.  UNPROFOR is the only regression model where TRADE is 
reported as significant. This finding cannot verify a positive or negative 
relationship with TRADE and peacekeeping troop contributions for UN member 
states. 
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Total UN Personnel versus Total Contributions Over Time  
 Graphs 4 through 29 examine the pattern of giving for the permanent 
members of the Security Council and states that contributed  over 6,500 troops 
from the selected timeline. Examining if significant change exists over time with 
respect to the levels of total contributions compared to individual state 
contributions over this same time should provide results conerning change in 
contribution behavior. The overall number of peacekeeping troops for the UN, 
Graph 3, provides the baseline for state comparisons. 
 Comparing the total UN personnel graph to the provided graphs for other 
states allows the research to see which states are “driving” the contribution levels. 
By examining the overall time period there are three states that contributed troops 
during this time that are very similar to the overall model – Pakistan, India and 
Bangladesh. While there is change over time for these states and their 
contributions, the change over time reflects the changes over time for all UN 
peacekeeping personnel. While not as pronounced, Jordan, Ghana, Nepal, Nigeria, 
Uruguay, Kenya and Ethiopia also report contributions that follow the same general 
pattern as the overall personnel graph. This change does not necessarily reflect a 
change in the individual state behavior, but in the overall peacekeeping priorities 
and missions. By examining these states it can not be confirmed that a state has 
changed patterns of giving. 
   Investigating the patterns of the permanent five members of the Security 
Council reports different results. By looking at graphs 4 – 9 and comparing the 
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patterns of troop contributions, it is apparent a significant change occurs for France, 
Great Britain, The United States, Russia and China. From 1991 – 1997 the 
contributions of France, Great Britain, The United States and Russia rise during the 
same time period as the total personnel graph. China maintains a relatively flat 
pattern, reflecting a minimal contribution of troops during this time period. After 
1997 the contributions for France, Great Britain, The United States and Russia drop 
significantly, mirroring the drop in overall peacekeeping personnel. Yet unlike 
Pakistan, Bangladesh and India, the patterns of giving for the four Security Council 
members does not increase during the peacekeeping personnel surge beginning in 
2000. By examining all five members of the Security Council, only China reports a 
general increase to arrive at the largest contribution levels it has experienced during 
this time period. After matching the patterns of giving for the first half of the time 
period, France, Great Britain, The United States, and Russia give a significantly 
reduced percentage of troops, even as peacekeeping personnel arrive at their 
highest levels in UN history. Poland, Canada, Austria, Norway and Malaysia report 
similar results. China reports a change as well, although in the opposite direction, 
ending at their highest level of contributions during the time period in 2007. After 
examining the top contributors of troops during this time period, there are 10 states 
that do not follow the pattern of the overall personnel graph, five of which are 
permanent Security Council members and four of the remaining five are close 
Western allies of three of the permanent members. Malaysia is the primary outlier 
of this group. 
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 Considering that the five security council members make up half of the 
states that have changed their patterns of giving in relation to overall UN personnel 
it can be confirmed that changes over time exist with respect to peacekeeping 
contributions. The change cannot be said to be widespread. It is limited to a small 
number of states that contribute troops frequently and in greater numbers. The 
presence of Canada also creates an interesting result as Canada and their leadership 
are considered to be one of the most vital states with respect to peacekeeping 
development and support. This finding suggest that patterns of troop contributions 
have changed over time as a percent of total UN personnel committed to 
peacekeeping operations. 
Table 11 – Regression, Table and Graphical Results 
 
 Overall 
Model 
  
Significance in 
State 
Participation 
Models 
Significance in Total 
Contribution 
Models 
Percent 
Difference (%) 
  
Realism 
 Contiguity 
  CONTIGUITY* 
 Military Strength 
  GDPMILITARY 
  TOTALMILITARY
 Economic Strength 
  GDP 
 
 
Insignificant 
 
Insignificant 
Insignificant 
 
Insignificant 
 
 
4 
 
1 
0 
 
0 
 
 
4 
 
1 
0 
 
0 
 
 
 
 
-2.7, 1.1 
90.5, 147 
 
104.5, 143 
Liberalism 
 International Memberships 
  INTMEMBERSHIPS 
 Like Governments 
  FREEDOM 
  HUMANRIGHTS 
 Bi-Lateral Trade 
  TRADE** 
 
 
Insignificant 
 
Insignificant 
Insignificant 
 
Insignificant 
 
 
0 
 
1 
0 
 
0 
 
 
2 
 
1 
0 
 
1 
 
 
49.9, 88.9 
 
18.0, 19.6 
.3, 7.7 
 
 
Constructivism*** 
 UN Tenure 
  UNMEMBERSHIP 
 Military Strength (Low) 
  GDPMILITARY 
  TOTALMILITARY 
 Economic Strength (Low) 
  GDP 
 
 
Insignificant 
 
Insignificant 
Insignificant 
 
Insignificant 
 
 
0 
 
1 
0 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
1 
0 
 
0 
 
 
19.1, 23.4 
 
-2.7, 1.1 
90.5, 147 
 
104.5, 143 
*CONTIGUITY could not be measured as a collective term due to the host peacekeeping state changing for each 
peacekeeping operation. 
**TRADE could not be measured as a collective average as the host peacekeeping state’s trade values change for each 
peacekeeping operation. 
***Change over time was measured from Graph 3, Total UN Peacekeeping personnel, and compared to graphs 4-29 
to analyze change.  
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Hypothesis Confirmation and Rejection 
Confirming or rejecting the hypothesis must be consistent with the data that 
is provided from the regression models, tables and graphs. The collective results 
offer the most appropriate method to examine if the hypotheses can be confirmed 
or rejected. The most significant challenge with interpreting the results from the 
analysis is ensuring that the previously presented results are not over or under 
confirmed. For this reason there will be three categories provided for the 
confirmation or rejection of the hypothesis – strong confirm, moderate confirm and 
reject. The moderate confirm category is for those results that represent some 
confirmation of their influence on troop contributions, but more analysis may be 
needed to associate a strong positive or negative relationship on contributions. 
The realist hypothesis is concerned with the results from CONTIGUITY, 
GDPMILITARY, TOTAL MILITARY and GDP. CONTIGUITY reports 
significance in four of the state contribution models and four of the total 
contribution models. The results for CONTIGUITY confirm the assumed 
directional value and this independent variable is the only variable present in 
multiple cases for both regression models. The challenge for strongly confirming 
CONTIGUITY relates to its absence from the overall model, as there is no 
collective average term to measure as peacekeeping operations are located in 
various locales in the world. This also prevents a percent difference from being 
calculated. The results from the state participation and total contribution models 
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does suggest that the further a state is geographically from a host peacekeeping 
state, the fewer troops that state will contribute to the peacekeeping operation. 
MILITARYGDP, TOTALMILITARY and GDP produce minimal, 
insignificant results. These variables cannot be confirmed as possessing a positive 
association with a state’s troop contributions of peacekeeping troops. Thus the 
Realist hypotheses that states there are positive relationships between 
MILITARYGDP, TOTALMILITARY and GDP on state’s peacekeeping 
contributions must be rejected. CONTIGUITY is the only component associated 
with the Realist approach that provides results that suggest a relationship exists 
between geographic distance and state contributions. 
The results from MILITARYGDP, TOTALMILITARY and GDP are 
related to several tenants of the constructivist hypothesis. The constructivist 
hypothesis was the inverse of the realist hypothesis with respect to these three 
variables. Through the absence of these variables producing significant positive or 
negative associations with the state’s peacekeeping contributions, the constructivist 
hypotheses must be rejected. 
The liberal hypothesis is tested through INTMEMBERSHIPS, FREEDOM, 
HUMANRIGHTS and TRADE. INTEMEMBERSHIPS reports some significant 
findings in the total contribution regression models but not at an incidence level to 
confirm a positive or negative relationship. FREEDOM, HUMANRIGHTS and 
TRADE report minimal findings in the regression models and in Tables 8 and 10. 
Thus the liberal hypotheses that posit that international organizational 
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memberships, liberal government and increased trade will increase a state’s 
contributions levels to peacekeeping operations is rejected. 
The constructivist hypothesis is concerned with GDPMILITARY, 
TOTALMILITARY, UNMEMBERSHIP and change in contributions over time. 
GDPMILITARY and TOTALMILITARY results were previously included for 
analysis. UNMEMBERSHIP is not reported significant in the overall, state 
participation or total contribution models. Tables 8 and 10 also report minimal 
differences among states that contribute more frequently and in greater number 
with respect to UNMEMBERSHIP versus states that contribute less frequently and 
in fewer numbers. As the regression and table results are concerned with all UN 
member states, the hypothesis that longer tenured UN membership has a positive 
effect on troop contributions is rejected. 
Measuring individual state contributions versus the overall UN troop 
contributions provided limited, but valuable results concerning change over time in 
contribution patterns.  After an examination of the top contributors during the 
1991-2007 time period it is clear that a change in giving patterns were apparent, but 
only for a small number of states, half of those permanent Security Council 
members in the UN.  The data suggest change over time thus the constructivist 
hypothesis that states could change their giving patterns over time can be 
moderately confirmed but for a limited number of UN member states.  
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Table 12 – Hypothesis Confirmation 
 
 
 Strong Confirm Moderate Confirm Reject 
Realism 
 Contiguity 
 Military Strength (High) 
 Economic Strength (High) 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
X 
X 
Liberalism 
 International Memberships 
 Like Governments 
 Bi-Lateral Trade 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
X 
X 
Constructivism 
 UN Tenure 
 Change Over Time 
 Military Strength (Low) 
 Economic Strength (Low) 
  
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
X 
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Chapter 5 –Application, State Motives and Future Research 
 
 The confirmation and rejection of the provided hypotheses aims to provide 
a better theoretical understanding of UN peacekeeping from an individual state 
prospective. The results and data move this endeavor forward and deliver potential 
new explanations while also supporting previously posited theoretical assumptions. 
The results do not deliver an all-encompassing answer to the primacy of any 
particular approach, yet can strengthen claims of international relations concerning 
the three primary approaches. The results from the realist, liberal and constructivist 
hypotheses permit generalization concerning the characteristics and motivations of 
individual states. Yet before this application is pursued, an examination of each 
theoretical statement that was strongly or moderately confirmed should be 
included. The confirmed hypotheses include the following:  
1. The results suggest there is a negative relationship on a state’s troop 
contributions and the distance a contributing state maintains 
geographically from the host peacekeeping state.  
2. Change does exist in a state’s contribution patterns, but this is limited to 
a number of states that possess significant influence in the UN system. 
These overarching statements, which constitute the basis for theoretical application, 
report findings that are related to tenants from two of the three theoretical 
paradigms. This creates significant difficulty in championing a particular approach 
as possessing more explanatory power than others.  While limited in the overall 
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description and definition of one approach, the results do provide the opportunity to 
emphasize the key points of discovery and their theoretical application.     
 Previous theoretical research and approaches concerning peacekeeping and 
international institutions and state motivations were provided by a limited number 
of authors and are important to re-examine before moving forward. Abbot and 
Snidal concluded there existed three theoretical frameworks that describe state 
interests and participation in international institutions; realist, constructivist and 
rational regime (liberal leaning).116 Finnemore argued that state’s interests are 
developed from socialization of international norms, noting that state interests are 
not always clear and determined representing a constructivist explanation.117 Paris 
suggests that participation in peacekeeping is a reflection of both realist and 
constructivist tendencies, recognizing states limit their behavior intentionally and 
learning occurs as states interact in the system and adhere to norms of behavior.118 
The differences that are prevalent in these three research pursuits reflect the 
difficult nature of measuring state actions and motivation and appropriately 
applying these to theoretical frameworks. Each piece confirms differing 
perspectives and ideology. Comparing the results from the previously provided 
research with this current analysis does provide further understanding of the 
                                                 
116 Abbott, Kenneth and Duncan Snidal. 1998. “Why States Act Through Formal International 
Institutions.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution. Vol. 42, No.1. p. 3-32. 
117 Finnemore, Martha. 1996. National Interests in International Society. Cornell University Press, 
New York. 
118 Paris, Roland. 2003. “Peacekeeping and the Constraints of Global Culture.” European Journal of 
International Relations. Vol. 9, 441. 
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notions posited in these research approaches and develops particular aspects even 
further. 
 
Approaches and Applications 
 The most significant result related to the realist approach is contiguity.  The 
geographical location of a state vis-à-vis the host peacekeeping state has a negative 
correlation with individual state troop contributions. The realist statement that as a 
state moves further from a peacekeeping operation, there exists less incentive to 
contribute troops as the threat begins to be removed from their borders reports 
some significance in the findings. A state has less incentive to act if their individual 
borders or security are not threatened.  Individual security is supreme in the realist 
paradigm. If states that are further removed from a peacekeeping operation 
contribute less, then it can be surmised that states are less concerned with 
committing troops to international missions that do not threaten their security. In 
this instance, why a state would participate in peacekeeping operation is related to 
the geographic threat that a conflict maintains in relation to its own borders. 
 Despite the premises of constructivism reporting minimal, verifiable claims, 
the change in contributions over time for the permanent members of the Security 
Council provides one of the more intriguing results for examination and represents 
the strongest claim of the constructivist arguments. States with significant influence 
and power have the ability to use the international system and an anarchic 
international environment as they see fit. States with limited power and influence in 
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the system could be developing their role within the international community per 
their own desires as long as it fits in the framework of powerful states. Thus states 
that have the ability to formulate their own path can do so, while states with 
minimal influence and power must choose a path amenable to powerful states.  
Change in behavior is central to the constructivist argument. This tenant is 
particularly interesting if a state committed to an action or endeavor and then 
discontinued or removed their support after years of support. Why would a state 
contribute to peacekeeping operations – they determine that this may increase their 
international capacity and influence, but determine the right to change if they have 
the power to do so. 
  
State Motives 
When examining the outcomes from the methodological examination and 
the theoretical applications it may seem to be a challenging pursuit to try and 
deliver any consistent statements concerning state motives for contributing troops 
to peacekeeping operations. These findings are expected to some degree. With 
respect to international relations, the existence of significant theoretical debate 
concerning state behavior is prevalent as there are no concise answers. The 
development of research paradigms concerning international relations and state 
actions in the international system verify there exists current debate among many 
scholars as to the application of approaches and the usefulness of each in describing 
state behavior. The review of the literature with respect to international relations 
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represents the multitude of perspectives that have been historically presented. 
Nevertheless the theoretical application from this research provides direction to 
guide a more complete understanding of states motives concerning troop 
contributions to UN peacekeeping operations. 
What then can we make of the aforementioned assumptions – is theoretical 
application according to the “eye of the beholder” with no significant winner as 
Abbot and Snidal believe? Perhaps Finnemore’s assertion that states may not even 
know what they desire through their individual involvement in international 
institutions is relevant – consistency is not present. Does Paris provide the most 
appropriate description when positing that states, through their participation or 
absence, contribute the most to peacekeeping operations success or that norms and 
culture restrict or promote state participation? More recent studies suggest that 
states that commit troops to peacekeeping operations are more likely to have 
foreign and defense policies that are assimilated.119  
Applying the theoretical assumptions from the hypotheses that were 
confirmed and rejected to individual state behavior and motives must start with the 
first assumption of the all the theoretical paradigms. All three theoretical paradigms 
agree that the international environment is anarchic and there is no overarching 
authority that guarantees rights, security and force of law. The main actors in the 
system do vary but the environment is absent of overarching authority. States 
                                                 
119 Velazquez, Arturo. 2010. “Why Some States Participate in UN Peace Missions While Other Do 
Not: An Analysis of Civil-Military Relations and Its Effects on Latin America’s Contributions to 
Peacekeeping Operations. Security Studies. Vol. 19. p. 160-195. 
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contribute troops to peacekeeping operations – this much is clear. The why is much 
more difficult to discover through theoretical lenses. 
For realism, the anarchic environment allows states to pursue commitments 
that increase their power relative to other states and secure their interests. In the 
absence of a global institution to enforce behavior or acquiescence to preferred 
policies, states that have the power to operate in their own self-interested manner 
have the ability to do so with little fear of reprisal.  
The motive for a state to contribute to peacekeeping operations where the 
geographical location of the operation maintains an immediate threat to the 
livelihood of the potential donor state is apparent in the realist tradition. The realist 
tradition concerns itself with security first, and conflict and instability directly 
contiguous to a state border creates an immense threat for a state to maintain safety 
and security. As the distance increases from the host state to the donor state, the 
incentive to participate decreases. Distance from a host peacekeeping state to a 
donor state has a negative impact on a state’s contributions. As the threat is 
minimized, the motivations to contribute troops to peacekeeping operations 
minimize as well. 
The findings also suggest that the overall economic and military strength of 
a state does not influence, positively or negatively, a state’s contributions to 
peacekeeping operations. These variables that represented states with material 
power, important tenants of the realist approach, do not promote the idea that states 
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with less to lose economically and militarily will support peacekeeping operations 
in greater number or frequency. 
The number of international organizations a state maintains membership in 
does not effectively predict troop contributions to peacekeeping operations. States 
that maintain more international memberships do not contribute more frequently 
and in greater number so integration into the international community does not 
create motivation for states to contribute. These organizations may promote shared 
values of transparency and norms of behavior, but a positive or negative 
relationship with peacekeeping troop contributions is not reported in this analysis. 
Regime type is not a significant predictor of state contributions, so there is 
not a type of government, democratic included, which serves as an effective 
descriptor of states that contribute to UN peacekeeping contributions.  Andersson 
looked at peacekeeping operations from 1990 to 1996 and noted that strong 
democracies represent the most consistent contributors to peacekeeping 
operations.120 Daniel and Caraher reported democracy as an important 
characteristic of contributors as well.121 The data provided here shows little to no 
significant correlation between regime type and contributions. One of the 
challenges of this statement is that as the 1990s concluded and into the 2000s, a 
vast majority of states in the international system were democratic or pursuing 
democratic government. Thus states that contribute may be more democratic, but 
                                                 
120 Andersson, Andreas. 2000. “Democracies and UN Peacekeeping Operations, 1990-1996.” 
International Peacekeeping. Vol. 7, No. 2. p. 1-22. 
121 Daniel, DCF and Leigh Caraher. 2006. “Characteristics of Troop Contributors to Peace 
Operations and Implications for Global Capacity.” International Peacekeeping. Vo. 13, No. 3. p. 
297-315. 
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there is little to no relationship with this type of government and peacekeeping 
troop contributions. States cannot said to be significantly motivated to contribute 
troops to peacekeeping operations due to democratic ideals and norms. 
Bi-lateral trade does not report significant findings concerning a positive 
association with increased trade and higher troop contributions. The absence of this 
economic incentive providing motivation for states to contribute troops to 
peacekeeping operations is counter to a foundational principle of the liberal 
tradition. Economic interests should encourage states to pursue efforts to provide 
stability and development in the international community, eliminating threats to 
trade and commerce. The absence of these two primary tenants of the liberal 
tradition creates immense difficulty in applying this approach with respect to state 
motivations for contributing troops. While integration into the international 
community is apparent, states that contribute to UN peacekeeping operations 
cannot be described as being motivated by a shared understanding and commitment 
to a set of norms and ideals that have been developed through international 
institutions. 
  The change in behavior of a few powerful states provides meaningful 
opportunity to examine one piece of the constructivist hypothesis. Tenure of a UN 
member state does not display a positive association with peacekeeping troop 
contributions. States with underdeveloped economies and militaries do not 
contribute more frequently or in greater number. If states are learning behavior in 
the international system concerning peacekeeping operations, only a few distinct 
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states have changed their patterns of peacekeeping troop contributions. The largest 
contributors, India, Bangladesh and Pakistan have maintained consistent 
contributions from 1991-2007 with respect to total UN troop personnel. 
Krishnamasy describes India and Pakistan’s role in peacekeeping as one of support 
operationally, but very limited in higher decision making policy and developmental 
matters.122 All five permanent members of the UN Security Council changed their 
patterns of contributions during this time period as a share of contributions. Perhaps 
only those states that maintain primacy in the UN and have the power to choose 
when to change have the ability to do so. Alexander Wendt’s statement that 
“Anarchy is What States Make of It” should be updated to “Anarchy is What States 
with Power Make of It”.  State motivations can change over time with renewed 
understanding and interaction in the international system. However the states that 
can manage this change more effectively are the states with power.  
 Historically China has been a minimal supporter of peacekeeping operations 
while the United States, Great Britain, and France have supported operations 
consistently. During the 1990’s the United States, Great Britain and France 
experienced significant growth and influence in the international community with 
the fall of the Soviet Union. In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War 
peacekeeping may have been perceived to be an excellent extension of foreign 
policy across the international community to build good will and favor. As time 
continued and this need diminished, the motivations of the powerful Security 
                                                 
122 Krishnamasy, Kabilan. 2001. “ ‘Recognition’ for Third World Peacekeepers: India and 
Pakistan.” International Peacekeeping. Vol. 8, No. 4. p. 56-76. 
 178 
 
Council members may have waned. Now, as China’s strength and global reach has 
increased, the number of peacekeeping troops China contributes has risen. While 
this is only an estimation of potential motivations, it is clear that these few 
powerful nations have the ability to change their contributions with little fear of 
diminished power within the UN system. 
 The motives for a UN member state to contribute troops to peacekeeping 
operations are thus suggested to relate to two theoretical premises from the Realist 
and Constructivist approaches. This may also help verify the contextual nature of 
peacekeeping and international relations and the appropriateness of developing 
overarching explanations that intend to explain state behavior in this endeavor.  
 
Policy Prescriptions 
 For the theoretical implications to have value and inform international 
relations approaches there must be some application of these findings to UN 
peacekeeping and policy. Recognizing why and which states are contributing helps 
achieve consistent and long term success for UN peacekeeping operations. While 
the analysis does not provide significant overarching themes, there is potential to 
inform policy from these findings. Understanding which independent variables 
explained the most variance in behavior and the theoretical claims could allow 
peacekeeping policy makers to develop operations that are more effective and more 
reflective or what states consider viable operations and policies.  This could 
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increase overall effectiveness of peacekeeping operations and contribute to greater 
participation from the international community.  
The first and most apparent finding that can inform policy is the absence of 
consistent, overarching results from the included variables for analysis. The lack of 
findings hints at the contextual nature of peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping 
policy should recognize two things from these results: More analysis of the broad 
themes of peacekeeping are needed and the interacting variables for each 
peacekeeping operation may be so disparate that grand policy solutions may be 
challenging to develop and implement. Yet recognizing the role contiguity of states 
may play and the change in patterns of giving over time can provide some 
assistance to some policy development. Three areas stand out for potential areas of 
improvement that could be informed from the findings in this analysis: 
1. Troop allocation   
2. Training  
3. Peacekeeping Expansion 
 Developing balanced approaches to troop allocation and disbursement are 
vital to the long term success of peacekeeping operations. If states contribute troops 
more frequently and in greater number to their immediate geographic surrounding, 
then developing relationships with states that can continue to be significant 
contributors to particular regions in the world could be vital to sustaining long term 
peace. If a state has already developed a history of contributing troops and the 
conflict or violence is located geographically close to the state, then obtaining the 
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necessary troop commitments could be procured in a much more efficient manner. 
This includes not only developing support in the international community, but 
through the domestic environments of contributing and noncontributing states. As 
security issues continue to develop as cross border threats, collaboration and 
support is mandatory for success. States must take more ownership concerning 
peacekeeping operations in and around their borders to ensure success.  
 Current UN practice does encourage troop commitments from surrounding 
states but a more overt approach to developing state(s) as regional centers of 
peacekeeping support could reduce the time to effectively respond to peacekeeping 
needs and perhaps reduce casualties and destruction from violence that requires a 
collective international response. 
 Training peacekeeping troops and personnel is perhaps the most important 
aspect of peacekeeping operations to ensure success. Effective boots on the ground 
are the greatest mitigating factor in reducing violence and conflict. Again, states 
that can serve as regional training centers or locations can help to develop 
consistency of skills concerning troops who can be then dispersed to support the 
UN with respect to conflicts that are geographically close to the contributing state. 
These states must maintain support and assist with developing training programs 
and regimens that ensure the abilities of peacekeepers are sufficient for the task at 
hand. States with strong military capacities could serve as the basis for troop 
development and training to ensure that peacekeeping troops have the latest 
methods and practices available. 
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As the international environment continues to change, recognizing the 
motivations of states to contribute is vital to the continued development of new 
peacekeeping operations or the contraction of the practice in the international 
community. Peacekeeping operations have expanded significantly since 1991 and 
have developed to their highest levels in the 2000’s. To ensure the success of 
peacekeeping operations and their ability to mitigate and reduce violence and 
conflict, consistent support over time will be paramount. If over time states have 
become more supportive/less supportive of operations, or there is an 
increase/decrease of state participation over multiple types of peacekeeping 
operations than developing operations to deal with current and potential threats to 
global security may need to be addressed. Discovering the trends that exist in the 
international community, such as change in contribution behavior, are important to 
recognizing the needs of peacekeeping operations.  
 
Future Research and Implications 
 It would be impossible to tell the complete story of the theoretical 
implications for states and their motivations to contribute to UN peacekeeping 
operations in this single endeavor. The results from this research add a deeper 
understanding to these motivations theoretically but cannot provide a complete and 
overarching analysis. Further questions and answers to the future of state support 
for peacekeeping and the continued attempts of theoretical prescription remain. 
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 There are several additional research paths that could provide additional 
data to further our theoretical understanding of peacekeeping and state’s 
motivations. The first method would to perform case studies for each peacekeeping 
operation that was included in this analysis. The results from this analysis provide 
significant variation across each of the included peacekeeping models. While 
aggregating these operations to examine general theoretical assumptions is 
valuable, each operation is unique in its scope, capacity, stakeholders and 
dimensions.  The uniqueness of each operation offers an opportunity to examine 
these operations in full detail for comparative purposes. Developing methodology 
that permits measurement of each individual peacekeeping operation through the 
international relations approaches could support the already rich literature that 
exists that details peacekeeping operations from a logistical and historical 
perspective. 
 For each theoretical approach, a further examination of the independent 
variables that reported moderate results should be examined in more detail. A 
deeper look into CONTIGUITY and change over time should be pursued as the 
data for these variables did not permit their presence in the overall regression 
model or the percent difference tables. Additional data could strengthen the 
understanding of the influence location and trade maintain with respect to 
peacekeeping operations. Investigating change of contributions over time could 
also provide a better understanding how the international environment and events 
could influence contributions over time. Domestic and international events could 
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have an influence on the actions and motivations on individual states and their 
desire to contribute troops to UN peacekeeping. Recognizing the root causes for 
change in behavior could aid help determine what instances would influence a state 
change contribution patterns. 
 The individual states that demonstrate a willingness to contribute troops at a 
higher frequency and greater number should also be examined individually through 
additional methods to dig deeper into their own individual claims and actions 
concerning UN peacekeeping support. Analyzing states that do not contribute 
frequently or in large numbers would be relevant as well. One method to consider 
is a content analysis of state department communications, media outlets and elected 
or appointed officials could provide an additional layer of data that could provide 
further understanding of a state’s position on UN peacekeeping. How a state 
messages the public with respect to UN peacekeeping, both domestically and 
internationally, could provide an analysis of perception versus action. Particular 
states may be very clear with their individual intentions to contribute or not to 
contribute troops for peacekeeping operations.     
 These approaches are a few of the additional steps that could be pursued to 
enhance the current understanding of peacekeeping operations and individual state 
support. Currently the practice of peacekeeping is a prominent apparatus to attempt 
to stabilize the international community and solve international crises. Continuing 
to examine peacekeeping operations and how states perceive these operations, and 
how they support these operations, is paramount to developing effective practices 
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and long term viability. Understanding the place that UN peacekeeping maintains 
theoretically in the international community allows the field of international 
relations and scholars an opportunity to apply our historical understanding of state 
behavior to new phenomena. The importance of continued application of 
approaches to current world events cannot be overestimated. 
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Appendix A – States Removed from Each Regression Model 
 
UNIKOM – Afghanistan, Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Cape Verde, 
Comoros, Cuba, Dominica, Estonia, Grenada, Iraq, Liechenstein, Laos, Latvia, 
Libya, Lithuania, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Qatar, Samoa, St. Vincent, St. Kitts 
and Nevi, Sao Tome Principe, Somalia, Solomon Islands, St. Lucia, Suriname, 
Ukraine and Vanuatu 
 
UNPROFOR - Afghanistan, Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Bosnia & 
Herzegovina, Cape Verde, Comoros, Cuba, Dominica, Grenada, Iraq, Liechenstein, 
Libya, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Qatar, Samoa, San Marino, St. 
Vincent, St. Kitts and Nevi, Sao Tome Principe, Somalia, Solomon Islands, St. 
Lucia, Suriname, and Vanuatu 
 
ONUMOZ - Afghanistan, Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Bosnia & 
Herzegovina, Cape Verde, Comoros, Cuba, Dominica, Grenada, Iraq, Liechenstein, 
Libya, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Qatar, Samoa, San Marino, St. 
Vincent, St. Kitts and Nevi, Sao Tome Principe, Somalia, Solomon Islands, St. 
Lucia, Suriname, and Vanuatu 
 
UNOSOM II - Afghanistan, Andorra, Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, 
Bosnia & Herzegovina, Comoros, Cuba, Dominica, Grenada, Iraq, Liechenstein, 
Libya, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Monaco, Qatar, Samoa, San 
Marino, St. Vincent, St. Kitts and Nevi, Sao Tome Principe, Somalia, Solomon 
Islands, St. Lucia, Suriname, and Vanuatu 
 
UNAVEM III - Afghanistan, Andorra, Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, 
Bosnia & Herzegovina, Comoros, Cuba, Dominica, Grenada, Iraq, Kiribati, 
Liberia, Liechenstein, Libya, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Monaco, 
Nauru, Palua, Qatar, Samoa, San Marino, St. Vincent, St. Kitts and Nevi, Sao 
Tome Principe, Somalia, Solomon Islands, St. Lucia, Suriname, Vanuatu and 
Yugoslavia 
 
UNPREDEP - Afghanistan, Andorra, Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, 
Bosnia & Herzegovina, Comoros, Cuba, Dominica, Grenada, Iraq, Kiribati, 
Liberia, Liechenstein, Libya, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Monaco, 
Nauru, Palau, Qatar, Samoa, San Marino, St. Vincent, St. Kitts and Nevi, Sao 
Tome Principe, Somalia, Solomon Islands, St. Lucia, Suriname, Vanuatu and 
Yugoslavia 
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UNAMSIL - Afghanistan, Andorra, Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, 
Bosnia & Herzegovina, Comoros, Cuba, Dominica, Grenada, Kiribati, 
Liechenstein, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Monaco, Nauru, Palau, 
Qatar, Samoa, San Marino, St. Vincent, St. Kitts and Nevi, Sao Tome Principe, 
Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Solomon Islands, St. Lucia, Suriname, Tonga, 
Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Yugoslavia 
 
UNTAET - Afghanistan, Andorra, Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, 
Bosnia & Herzegovina, Comoros, Cuba, Dominica, Grenada, Kiribati, 
Liechenstein, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Monaco, Nauru, Palau, 
Qatar, Samoa, San Marino, St. Vincent, St. Kitts and Nevi, Sao Tome Principe, 
Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Solomon Islands, St. Lucia, Suriname, Tonga, 
Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Yugoslavia 
 
UNMEE - Afghanistan, Andorra, Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, 
Comoros, Cuba, Dominica, Grenada, Kiribati, Liechenstein, Maldives, Marshall 
Islands, Micronesia, Monaco, Nauru, Palau, Qatar, Samoa, San Marino, St. 
Vincent, St. Kitts and Nevi, Sao Tome Principe, Seychelles, Somalia, Solomon 
Islands, St. Lucia, Suriname, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Yugoslavia 
 
UNMISET - Afghanistan, Andorra, Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, 
Comoros, Cuba, Dominica, Grenada, Kiribati, Liechenstein, Maldives, Marshall 
Islands, Micronesia, Monaco, Nauru, Palau, Qatar, Samoa, San Marino, St. 
Vincent, St. Kitts and Nevi, Sao Tome Principe, Seychelles, Somalia, Solomon 
Islands, St. Lucia, Suriname, Tonga, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and 
Yugoslavia 
 
ONUB - Afghanistan, Andorra, Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Cuba, 
Dominica, Grenada, Kiribati, Liechenstein, Marshall Islands, Monaco, Myanmar, 
Nauru, Palau, Qatar, San Marino, St. Kitts and Nevi, Sao Tome Principe, Somalia, 
Tonga, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Yugoslavia 
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Appendix B 
 
Overall Model  
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Troopindex .008453182022 .023275871601 117 
Gdp 245695.2744 9.68673E5 117 
Intmemberships 1654.9231 1403.28178 117 
 Militarygdp 2.2047 1.47445 117 
Totalmilitary .00773583 .021339657 117 
UNmemberships 47.44 14.938 117 
Humanrights 9.4029 3.35328 117 
Freedom 3.2523 1.67426 117 
 
 
Pearson Correlations (Independent Variables) 
  Gdp Intmemberships Militarygdp Totalmilitary Unmemberships Humanrights Freedom 
 
Gdp  1.000 .414 .052 .730 .127 .188 -.225 
Intmemberships  .414 1.000 -.081 .339 .308 .486 -.627 
Militarygdp  .052 -.081 1.000 .098 .056 -.476 .367 
Totalmilitary  .730 .339 .098 1.000 .207 -.086 -.006 
UNmemberships  .127 .308 .056 .207 1.000 .031 -.073 
Humanrights  .188 .486 -.476 -.086 .031 1.000 -.901 
Freedom  -.225 -.627 .367 -.006 -.073 -.901 1.000 
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ONUMOZ(a) 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Troopindex 4.14315579731 16.3687476756059 29 
Militarygdp 3.110 3.2990 29 
Intmemberships 1525.86 1291.586 29 
Gdp 327742.34 845977.325 29 
Trade 18.9648 52.70204 29 
Freedom 2.62 1.656 29 
Humanrights 9.72 3.918 29 
Totalmilitary .01098359 .016620502 29 
UNmembership 36.24 13.450 29 
Contiguity 6.62 1.147 29 
 
Pearson Correlations (Independent Variables) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Militarygdp Intmemberships Gdp Trade Freedom Humanrights Totalmilitary UNmembership Contiguity 
 Militarygdp 
1.000 -.140 -.159 -.084 .248 -.331 -.186 -.152 .045 
Intmemberships 
-.140 1.000 .475 .224 -.552 .506 .494 .339 .141 
Gdp 
-.159 .475 1.000 .188 -.328 .306 .696 .011 .108 
Trade 
-.084 .224 .188 1.000 .139 -.025 .154 .184 -.869 
Freedom 
.248 -.552 -.328 .139 1.000 -.754 -.269 -.037 -.417 
Humanrights 
-.331 .506 .306 -.025 -.754 1.000 .191 -.084 .206 
Totalmilitary 
-.186 .494 .696 .154 -.269 .191 1.000 .211 .138 
UNmembership 
-.152 .339 .011 .184 -.037 -.084 .211 1.000 -.022 
Contiguity 
.045 .141 .108 -.869 -.417 .206 .138 -.022 1.000 
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ONUMOZ(b) 
Descriptive Statistics: 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Troopindex 1.01823320442 8.20551690931 118 
Militarygdp 3.077 3.6200 118 
Intmemberships 1194.89 1095.858 118 
Gdp 141842.93 456825.623 118 
Trade 9.5372 30.07187 118 
Freedom 3.59 2.089 118 
Humanrights 8.81 4.123 118 
Totalmilitary .00680445 .015208874 118 
UNmembership 34.09 14.152 118 
Contiguity 6.43 1.435 118 
 
Pearson Correlations (Independent Variables): 
 
 
 
 
 
  Militarygdp 
 
Intmemberships 
 
Gdp 
 
Trade 
 
Freedom Humanrights Totalmilitary UNmembership Contiguity 
 Militarygdp 
1.000 -.116 -.071 -.047 .190 -.334 -.001 -.038 .078 
Intmemberships 
-.116 1.000 .488 .382 -.580 .465 .330 .442 .182 
Gdp 
-.071 .488 1.000 .310 -.269 .218 .536 .101 .111 
Trade 
-.047 .382 .310 1.000 -.106 .092 .246 .153 -.290 
Freedom 
.190 -.580 -.269 -.106 1.000 -.808 -.060 -.155 -.280 
Humanrights 
-.334 .465 .218 .092 -.808 1.000 -.090 .026 .179 
Totalmilitary 
-.001 .330 .536 .246 -.060 -.090 1.000 .210 .133 
UNmembership 
-.038 .442 .101 .153 -.155 .026 .210 1.000 .160 
Contiguity 
.078 .182 .111 -.290 -.280 .179 .133 .160 1.000 
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UNAVEM III(a) 
Description Statistics: 
 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Troopindex .002487494020 .006159575250 30 
Militarygdp 2.887 3.2466 30 
Intmemberships 1618.50 1186.388 30 
Gdp 125104.97 234844.917 30 
Trade 37.0410 115.24619 30 
Freedom 2.90 1.807 30 
Humanrights 9.37 3.935 30 
Totalmilitary .00916570 .015905551 30 
UNmembership 38.40 13.607 30 
Contiguity 6.33 1.516 30 
 
Pearson Correlations (Independent Variables): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Militarygdp Intmemberships Gdp Trade Freedom Humanrights Totalmilitary UNmembership Contiguity 
 Militarygdp 
1.000 -.065 -.036 -.009 .221 -.152 .036 -.169 .039 
Intmemberships 
-.065 1.000 .730 .614 -.425 .401 .232 .567 .346 
Gdp 
-.036 .730 1.000 .712 -.292 .239 .500 .401 .225 
Trade 
-.009 .614 .712 1.000 -.310 .284 .121 .177 .141 
Freedom 
.221 -.425 -.292 -.310 1.000 -.839 .035 -.154 -.138 
Humanrights 
-.152 .401 .239 .284 -.839 1.000 -.148 -.072 -.004 
Totalmilitary 
.036 .232 .500 .121 .035 -.148 1.000 .394 .224 
UNmembership 
-.169 .567 .401 .177 -.154 -.072 .394 1.000 .493 
Contiguity 
.039 .346 .225 .141 -.138 -.004 .224 .493 1.000 
 202 
 
Coefficients: 
 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
 (Constant) .028 .001  23.185 .000 
Contiguity -.004 .000 -.970 -23.563 .000 
Militarygdp .001 .000 .273 6.532 .000 
Freedom -.001 .000 -.212 -5.026 .000 
 
Excluded Independent Variables: 
 
 
Beta In t Sig. 
Partial 
Correlation 
 Intmemberships -.002c -.041 .967 -.008 
Gdp -.016c -.363 .719 -.072 
Trade .021c .478 .637 .095 
Humanrights .015c .189 .851 .038 
Totalmilitary .017c .403 .690 .080 
UNmembership -.032c -.660 .515 -.131 
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UNAVEM III(b) 
Descriptive Statistics: 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Troopindex .0005922604809 .003151764094492 126 
Militarygdp 2.771 3.0940 126 
Intmemberships 1212.72 1171.035 126 
Gdp 142348.52 462753.874 126 
Trade 20.9461 70.64856 126 
Freedom 3.58 2.118 126 
Humanrights 8.88 3.963 126 
Totalmilitary .00635159 .015798695 126 
UNmembership 35.07 15.457 126 
Contiguity 6.67 .839 126 
 
Pearson Correlations (Independent Variables): 
 
Militarygdp Intmemberships Gdp Trade Freedom Humanrights Totalmilitary UNmembership Contiguity 
 Militarygdp 
1.000 -.127 -.077 -.047 .294 -.346 -.036 -.162 .007 
Intmemberships 
-.127 1.000 .489 .591 -.547 .409 .301 .480 .196 
Gdp 
-.077 .489 1.000 .400 -.245 .194 .546 .130 .117 
Trade 
-.047 .591 .400 1.000 -.273 .205 .341 .111 .113 
Freedom 
.294 -.547 -.245 -.273 1.000 -.799 .005 -.209 -.102 
Humanrights 
-.346 .409 .194 .205 -.799 1.000 -.105 .144 .053 
Totalmilitary 
-.036 .301 .546 .341 .005 -.105 1.000 .199 .133 
UNmembership 
-.162 .480 .130 .111 -.209 .144 .199 1.000 .169 
Contiguity 
.007 .196 .117 .113 -.102 .053 .133 .169 1.000 
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Coefficients: 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
 (Constant) .023 .001  18.917 .000 
Contiguity -.003 .000 -.859 -18.802 .000 
Freedom .000 .000 -.203 -4.245 .000 
Militarygdp .000 .000 .162 3.412 .001 
 
Excluded Independent Variables: 
 
 
Beta In t Sig. 
Partial 
Correlation 
 Intmemberships .032c .585 .560 .053 
Gdp .016c .329 .743 .030 
Trade .057c 1.198 .233 .108 
Totalmilitary .065c 1.431 .155 .129 
UNmembership -.039c -.817 .415 -.074 
Humanrights .080c 1.035 .303 .094 
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UNIKOM(a) 
Descriptive Statistics: 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Troopindex .003989361188 .019176802374 26 
Militarygdp 3.986 3.9609 26 
Intmemberships 1503.85 1200.281 26 
Gdp 473899.69 1397760.781 26 
Freedom 3.73 2.359 26 
Humanrights 8.27 4.846 26 
Totalmilitary .01372542 .028526470 26 
Trade 119.5815 248.08475 26 
UNmembership 33.81 12.192 26 
Contiguity 6.31 1.408 26 
 
Pearson Correlations (Independent Variables): 
 
 
Militarygdp Intmemberships Gdp Freedom Humanrights Totalmilitary Trade UNmembership Contiguity 
 Militarygdp 
1.000 -.134 .009 .102 -.261 .004 .203 -.007 -.452 
Intmemberships 
-.134 1.000 .487 -.835 .691 .491 .444 .268 .291 
Gdp 
.009 .487 1.000 -.373 .334 .921 .844 .180 .132 
Freedom 
.102 -.835 -.373 1.000 -.763 -.376 -.238 -.274 -.372 
Humanrights 
-.261 .691 .334 -.763 1.000 .281 .133 .444 .544 
Totalmilitary 
.004 .491 .921 -.376 .281 1.000 .862 .221 .033 
Trade 
.203 .444 .844 -.238 .133 .862 1.000 .273 -.283 
UNmembership 
-.007 .268 .180 -.274 .444 .221 .273 1.000 -.167 
Contiguity 
-.452 .291 .132 -.372 .544 .033 -.283 -.167 1.000 
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UNIKOM(b) 
Descriptive Statistics: 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Troopindex .000978522555 .009514919675 106 
Militarygdp 3.005 2.6521 106 
Intmemberships 1235.07 1023.936 106 
Gdp 220455.72 819857.608 106 
Freedom 3.48 2.179 106 
Humanrights 9.10 4.280 106 
Totalmilitary .00853811 .020951801 106 
Trade 43.7606 143.50076 106 
UNmembership 35.25 11.554 106 
Contiguity 6.67 .801 106 
 
Pearson Correlations (Independent Variables): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Militarygdp Intmemberships Gdp Freedom Humanrights Totalmilitary Trade UNmembership Contiguity 
 Militarygdp 
1.000 -.120 .002 .206 -.328 .052 .180 -.080 -.453 
Intmemberships 
-.120 1.000 .417 -.610 .510 .334 .380 .408 .161 
Gdp 
.002 .417 1.000 -.244 .213 .723 .870 .117 .000 
Freedom 
.206 -.610 -.244 1.000 -.804 -.097 -.147 -.253 -.274 
Humanrights 
-.328 .510 .213 -.804 1.000 -.047 .087 .211 .421 
Totalmilitary 
.052 .334 .723 -.097 -.047 1.000 .652 .203 -.147 
Trade 
.180 .380 .870 -.147 .087 .652 1.000 .137 -.333 
UNmembership 
-.080 .408 .117 -.253 .211 .203 .137 1.000 -.051 
Contiguity 
-.453 .161 .000 -.274 .421 -.147 -.333 -.051 1.000 
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Coefficients: 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
 (Constant) .017 .008  2.227 .028 
Contiguity -.002 .001 -.203 -2.114 .037 
 
Excluded Variables: 
 
 
Beta In t Sig. 
Partial 
Correlation 
 Militarygdp -.019a -.177 .860 -.017 
Intmemberships -.060a -.614 .541 -.060 
Gdp -.027a -.279 .781 -.027 
Freedom .067a .668 .505 .066 
Humanrights -.012a -.116 .908 -.011 
 Totalmilitary -.070a -.719 .474 -.071 
Trade -.111a -1.091 .278 -.107 
UNmembership -.142a -1.488 .140 -.145 
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UNMEE(a) 
Descriptive Statistics: 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Troopindex .001231882452 .0038101097354 42 
Militarygdp 2.020 1.1555 42 
Intmemberships 2590.31 1690.218 42 
Gdp 202920.12 327636.297 42 
Freedom 2.69 1.944 42 
Humanrights 9.60 3.768 42 
Totalmilitary .01059102 .026224555 42 
Trade 16.6319 34.00743 42 
UNmembership 43.50 13.897 42 
Contiguity 6.62 .987 42 
 
Pearson Correlations (Independent Variables): 
 
 
Militarygdp Intmembership Gdp Freedom Humanrights Totalmilitary Trade UNmembership Contiguity 
 Militarygdp 
1.000 -.101 -.009 .186 -.329 .118 .096 -.029 .182 
Intmemberships 
-.101 1.000 .655 -.621 .614 .089 .477 .383 .297 
Gdp 
-.009 .655 1.000 -.151 .169 .614 .778 .347 .218 
Freedom 
.186 -.621 -.151 1.000 -.837 .298 -.035 -.070 -.406 
Humanrights 
-.329 .614 .169 -.837 1.000 -.371 .033 .153 .351 
Totalmilitary 
.118 .089 .614 .298 -.371 1.000 .515 .255 .129 
Trade 
.096 .477 .778 -.035 .033 .515 1.000 .232 .067 
UNmembership 
-.029 .383 .347 -.070 .153 .255 .232 1.000 .167 
Contiguity 
.182 .297 .218 -.406 .351 .129 .067 .167 1.000 
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Coefficients: 
 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
 (Constant) .023 .002  10.546 .000 
Contiguity -.003 .000 -.847 -10.087 .000 
 
Excluded Variables: 
 
 
Beta In t Sig. 
Partial 
Correlation 
 Militarygdp .142a 1.704 .096 .263 
Intmemberships .040a .453 .653 .072 
Gdp .023a .259 .797 .041 
Freedom -.002a -.026 .979 -.004 
Humanrights -.057a -.626 .535 -.100 
Totalmilitary .006a .069 .945 .011 
Trade .046a .544 .590 .087 
UNmembership -.049a -.571 .571 -.091 
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UNMEE(b) 
Descriptive Statistics: 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Troopindex .000391962598 .002207985248 132 
Militarygdp 2.668 3.3056 132 
Intmemberships 1683.02 1545.583 132 
Gdp 158220.29 491510.202 132 
Freedom 3.47 2.174 132 
Humanrights 8.95 4.020 132 
Totalmilitary .00594437 .016359017 132 
Trade 11.8214 34.99126 132 
UNmembership 39.86 15.807 132 
Contiguity 6.58 .950 132 
 
Pearson Correlations (Independent Variables): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Militarygdp Intmemberships Gdp Freedom Humanrights Totalmilitary Trade UNmembership Contiguity 
 Militarygdp 
1.000 -.166 -.075 .339 -.330 -.015 .023 -.184 -.051 
Intmemberships 
-.166 1.000 .516 -.586 .470 .289 .433 .362 .235 
Gdp 
-.075 .516 1.000 -.234 .197 .545 .599 .139 .124 
Freedom 
.339 -.586 -.234 1.000 -.830 .025 -.109 -.144 -.335 
Humanrights 
-.330 .470 .197 -.830 1.000 -.117 -.010 .183 .388 
Totalmilitary 
-.015 .289 .545 .025 -.117 1.000 .447 .199 .107 
Trade 
.023 .433 .599 -.109 -.010 .447 1.000 .164 -.228 
UNmembership 
-.184 .362 .139 -.144 .183 .199 .164 1.000 -.013 
Contiguity 
-.051 .235 .124 -.335 .388 .107 -.228 -.013 1.000 
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Coefficient: 
 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
 (Constant) .008 .001  6.287 .000 
contiguity -.001 .000 -.467 -6.021 .000 
 
Excluded Variables: 
 
 
Beta In t Sig. 
Partial 
Correlation 
 Militarygdp -.062a -.798 .427 -.070 
Intmemberships .093a 1.162 .247 .102 
Gdp .015a .196 .845 .017 
Freedom -.062a -.757 .450 -.066 
Humanrights .040a .477 .634 .042 
 Totalmilitary .011a .144 .886 .013 
Trade -.092a -1.158 .249 -.101 
UNmembership -.055a -.706 .481 -.062 
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UNMISET(a) 
Descriptive Statistics: 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Troopindex .002023890833 .008723156304 35 
Militarygdp 2.140 1.2386 35 
Intmemberships 2455.14 1518.775 35 
Gdp 361860.11 838493.344 35 
Freedom 2.94 1.814 35 
Humanrights 9.51 3.951 35 
Totalmilitary .01312820 .029536307 35 
Trade 1630.6074 3550.05745 35 
UNmembership 46.63 13.410 35 
Contiguity 6.54 .561 35 
 
Pearson Correlations (Independent Variables): 
 
 
Militarygdp Intmemberships Gdp Freedom Humanrights Totalmilitary Trade UNmembership Contiguity 
 Militarygdp 
1.000 -.171 -.156 .539 -.549 .069 -.072 -.083 -.350 
Intmemberships 
-.171 1.000 .445 -.498 .432 .339 .288 .465 .070 
Gdp 
-.156 .445 1.000 -.213 .205 .492 .897 .102 -.174 
Freedom 
.539 -.498 -.213 1.000 -.915 .327 -.056 -.277 -.287 
Humanrights 
-.549 .432 .205 -.915 1.000 -.319 .021 .283 .322 
Totalmilitary 
.069 .339 .492 .327 -.319 1.000 .554 .176 -.275 
Trade 
-.072 .288 .897 -.056 .021 .554 1.000 -.038 -.420 
UNmembership 
-.083 .465 .102 -.277 .283 .176 -.038 1.000 -.058 
Contiguity 
-.350 .070 -.174 -.287 .322 -.275 -.420 -.058 1.000 
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UNMISET(b) 
Descriptive Statistics: 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Troopindex .000524712438 .004483280357 135 
Militarygdp 2.468 2.4964 135 
Intmemberships 1750.19 1561.697 135 
Gdp 163885.86 495606.456 135 
Freedom 3.37 2.058 135 
Humanrights 8.75 3.897 135 
Totalmilitary .00596534 .016945743 135 
Trade 572.8881 1944.46638 135 
UNmembership 41.76 16.100 135 
Contiguity 6.70 .670 135 
 
Pearson Correlations (Independent Variables): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Militarygdp Intmemberships Gdp Freedom Humanrights Totalmilitary Trade UNmembership Contiguity 
 Militarygdp 
1.000 -.157 -.073 .368 -.461 .003 -.028 -.113 -.156 
Intmemberships 
-.157 1.000 .518 -.585 .472 .360 .331 .310 .049 
Gdp 
-.073 .518 1.000 -.232 .199 .544 .864 .133 -.096 
Freedom 
.368 -.585 -.232 1.000 -.865 .046 -.102 -.119 -.180 
Humanrights 
-.461 .472 .199 -.865 1.000 -.119 .061 .156 .297 
Totalmilitary 
.003 .360 .544 .046 -.119 1.000 .591 .189 -.219 
Trade 
-.028 .331 .864 -.102 .061 .591 1.000 .073 -.214 
UNmembership 
-.113 .310 .133 -.119 .156 .189 .073 1.000 -.044 
Contiguity 
-.156 .049 -.096 -.180 .297 -.219 -.214 -.044 1.000 
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UNAMSIL(a) 
Descriptive Statistics: 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Troopindex .009225650177 .022206257703 36 
Militarygdp 2.236 1.2109 36 
Intmemberships 2155.39 1716.269 36 
Gdp 182825.39 357955.350 36 
Freedom 3.36 2.031 36 
Humanrights 8.61 3.789 36 
Totalmilitary .01141503 .027505279 36 
Trade 3.5997 12.70764 36 
UNmembership 41.56 15.419 36 
Contiguity 6.56 1.054 36 
 
Pearson Correlations (Independent Variables): 
 
 
Militarygdp Intmemberships Gdp Freedom Humanrights Totalmilitary Trade UNmembership Contiguity 
 Militarygdp 
1.000 -.013 .003 .175 -.207 .051 .003 -.080 .165 
Intmemberships 
-.013 1.000 .770 -.563 .504 .125 .578 .369 .308 
Gdp 
.003 .770 1.000 -.210 .132 .532 .658 .373 .206 
Freedom 
.175 -.563 -.210 1.000 -.846 .226 -.185 -.176 -.403 
Humanrights 
-.207 .504 .132 -.846 1.000 -.360 .100 .062 .263 
Totalmilitary 
.051 .125 .532 .226 -.360 1.000 .191 .283 .155 
Trade 
.003 .578 .658 -.185 .100 .191 1.000 .197 .082 
UNmembership 
-.080 .369 .373 -.176 .062 .283 .197 1.000 .077 
Contiguity 
.165 .308 .206 -.403 .263 .155 .082 .077 1.000 
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Coefficients: 
 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
 (Constant) .068 .022  3.139 .003 
Contiguity -.009 .003 -.426 -2.747 .010 
 
Excluded Variables: 
 
 
Beta In t Sig. 
Partial 
Correlation 
 Militarygdp -.289a -1.905 .066 -.315 
Intmemberships -.146a -.894 .378 -.154 
Gdp -.120a -.753 .457 -.130 
Freedom .071a .412 .683 .071 
Humanrights -.015a -.093 .927 -.016 
Totalmilitary -.082a -.519 .607 -.090 
Trade -.050a -.314 .755 -.055 
UNmembership -.051a -.325 .747 -.056 
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UNAMSIL(b) 
Descriptive Statistics: 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Troopindex .002535293178 .012241527681 131 
Militarygdp 2.782 3.6925 131 
Intmemberships 1729.70 1594.200 131 
Gdp 224875.10 939163.530 131 
Freedom 3.47 2.178 131 
Humanrights 9.10 3.936 131 
Totalmilitary .00687363 .019930966 131 
Trade 2.1453 8.88543 131 
UNmembership 39.03 15.860 131 
Contiguity 6.68 .671 131 
 
Pearson Correlations (Independent Variables): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Militarygdp Intmemberships Gdp Freedom Humanrights Totalmilitary Trade UNmembership Contiguity 
 Militarygdp 
1.000 -.159 -.033 .353 -.350 -.017 -.041 -.166 -.077 
Intmemberships 
-.159 1.000 .462 -.584 .476 .356 .537 .390 .270 
Gdp 
-.033 .462 1.000 -.203 .193 .728 .320 .150 .109 
Freedom 
.353 -.584 -.203 1.000 -.853 -.037 -.217 -.185 -.313 
Humanrights 
-.350 .476 .193 -.853 1.000 -.036 .140 .142 .225 
Totalmilitary 
-.017 .356 .728 -.037 -.036 1.000 .277 .229 .129 
Trade 
-.041 .537 .320 -.217 .140 .277 1.000 .190 .085 
UNmembership 
-.166 .390 .150 -.185 .142 .229 .190 1.000 .070 
Contiguity 
-.077 .270 .109 -.313 .225 .129 .085 .070 1.000 
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Coefficients: 
 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
 (Constant) .047 .010  4.691 .000 
Contiguity -.007 .001 -.366 -4.460 .000 
 
Excluded Variables: 
 
 
Beta In t Sig. 
Partial 
Correlation 
 Militarygdp -.116a -1.417 .159 -.124 
Intmemberships .017a .199 .843 .018 
Gdp -.007a -.090 .929 -.008 
Freedom -.021a -.245 .807 -.022 
Humanrights -.003a -.038 .969 -.003 
 Totalmilitary -.004a -.048 .962 -.004 
Trade .007a .081 .936 .007 
UNmembership .019a .233 .816 .021 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 218 
 
UNOSOM II(a) 
Descriptive Statistics: 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Troopindex .004064955857 .005932304426 17 
Militarygdp 2.241 1.3721 17 
Intmemberships 1723.82 1185.449 17 
Gdp 158196.24 238403.848 17 
Trade 4.6012 9.54159 17 
Freedom 3.18 1.811 17 
Humanrights 9.12 3.689 17 
Totalmilitary .01027718 .015085271 17 
UNmembership 35.94 13.493 17 
Contiguity 6.71 .470 17 
 
Pearson Correlations (Independent Variables): 
 
 
Militarygdp Intmemberships Gdp Trade Freedom Humanrights Totalmilitary UNmembership Contiguity 
 Militarygdp 
1.000 .055 .080 .041 .110 -.257 .277 .006 .010 
Intmemberships 
.055 1.000 .790 .616 -.514 .544 .328 .364 .445 
Gdp 
.080 .790 1.000 .836 -.423 .410 .487 .068 .393 
Trade 
.041 .616 .836 1.000 -.481 .463 .230 -.159 .307 
Freedom 
.110 -.514 -.423 -.481 1.000 -.752 .033 .064 -.450 
Humanrights 
-.257 .544 .410 .463 -.752 1.000 -.064 -.005 .166 
Totalmilitary 
.277 .328 .487 .230 .033 -.064 1.000 .142 .351 
UNmembership 
.006 .364 .068 -.159 .064 -.005 .142 1.000 .204 
Contiguity 
.010 .445 .393 .307 -.450 .166 .351 .204 1.000 
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UNOSOM II(b) 
Descriptive Statistics: 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Troopindex .000544127949 .002529790667 127 
Militarygdp 2.974 3.2513 127 
Intmemberships 1221.14 1145.637 127 
Gdp 134207.28 443089.207 127 
Trade 2.5668 11.29927 127 
Freedom 3.63 2.107 127 
Humanrights 9.08 3.661 127 
Totalmilitary .00615360 .014873123 127 
UNmembership 33.85 14.970 127 
Contiguity 6.59 .894 127 
 
Pearson Correlations (Independent Variables): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Militarygdp Intmemberships Gdp Trade Freedom Humanrights Totalmilitary UNmembership Contiguity 
 Militarygdp 
1.000 -.141 -.071 .217 .280 -.370 -.031 -.159 -.100 
Intmemberships 
-.141 1.000 .488 .085 -.540 .462 .325 .459 .212 
Gdp 
-.071 .488 1.000 .101 -.211 .214 .555 .118 .129 
Trade 
.217 .085 .101 1.000 .059 -.150 .072 .100 -.251 
Freedom 
.280 -.540 -.211 .059 1.000 -.780 .009 -.185 -.338 
Humanrights 
-.370 .462 .214 -.150 -.780 1.000 -.105 .086 .245 
Totalmilitary 
-.031 .325 .555 .072 .009 -.105 1.000 .211 .140 
UNmembership 
-.159 .459 .118 .100 -.185 .086 .211 1.000 .040 
Contiguity 
-.100 .212 .129 -.251 -.338 .245 .140 .040 1.000 
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UNPREDEP(a) 
Descriptive Statistics: 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Troopindex .000668594803 .001666532567 22 
Militarygdp 2.214 1.3403 22 
Intmemberships 1927.95 1136.023 22 
Gdp 142209.95 162272.972 22 
Trade 21.2900 42.01312 22 
Freedom 2.59 1.764 22 
Humanrights 9.77 4.140 22 
Totalmilitary .00935027 .013349448 22 
UNmembership 44.86 7.428 22 
Contiguity 6.68 .477 22 
 
Pearson Correlations (Independent Variables): 
 
 
Militarygdp Intmemberships Gdp Trade Freedom Humanrights Totalmilitary UNmembership Contiguity 
 Militarygdp 
1.000 -.219 -.036 .507 .284 -.547 .454 .336 .186 
Intmemberships 
-.219 1.000 .453 -.146 -.627 .690 -.140 .374 -.517 
Gdp 
-.036 .453 1.000 .132 -.224 .265 .420 .451 .117 
Trade 
.507 -.146 .132 1.000 .209 -.267 .829 .346 .029 
Freedom 
.284 -.627 -.224 .209 1.000 -.868 .193 -.103 .517 
Humanrights 
-.547 .690 .265 -.267 -.868 1.000 -.342 .042 -.424 
Totalmilitary 
.454 -.140 .420 .829 .193 -.342 1.000 .331 .204 
UNmembership 
.336 .374 .451 .346 -.103 .042 .331 1.000 -.215 
Contiguity 
.186 -.517 .117 .029 .517 -.424 .204 -.215 1.000 
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Coefficients: 
 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
 (Constant) .013 .004  3.082 .006 
contiguity -.002 .001 -.549 -2.937 .008 
 
Excluded Variables: 
 
 
Beta In t Sig. 
Partial 
Correlation 
 Militarygdp -.022a -.110 .913 -.025 
Intmemberships .216a .990 .335 .222 
 Gdp -.003a -.015 .988 -.003 
Trade -.164a -.871 .395 -.196 
Freedom -.084a -.378 .710 -.086 
Humanrights .204a .985 .337 .220 
Totalmilitary -.121a -.626 .539 -.142 
UNmembership -.104a -.531 .601 -.121 
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UNPREDEP(b) 
Descriptive Statistics: 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Troopindex .000121562691 .000743697345 121 
Militarygdp 2.754 3.1096 121 
Intmemberships 1163.41 1123.347 121 
Gdp 135161.50 464386.080 121 
Trade 19.5207 73.70645 121 
Freedom 3.56 2.029 121 
Humanrights 8.94 3.859 121 
Totalmilitary .00628416 .016050123 121 
UNmembership 35.08 15.767 121 
Contiguity 6.65 .989 121 
 
Pearson Correlations (Independent Variables): 
 
 
Militarygdp Intmemberships Gdp Trade Freedom Humanrights Totalmilitary UNmembership Contiguity 
 Militarygdp 
1.000 -.136 -.071 -.006 .330 -.366 -.032 -.179 .036 
Intmemberships 
-.136 1.000 .469 .332 -.498 .353 .292 .488 -.227 
Gdp 
-.071 .469 1.000 .282 -.220 .167 .540 .123 -.013 
Trade 
-.006 .332 .282 1.000 -.218 .086 .204 -.033 -.410 
Freedom 
.330 -.498 -.220 -.218 1.000 -.766 .029 -.192 .277 
Humanrights 
-.366 .353 .167 .086 -.766 1.000 -.135 .131 -.104 
Totalmilitary 
-.032 .292 .540 .204 .029 -.135 1.000 .193 .041 
UNmembership 
-.179 .488 .123 -.033 -.192 .131 .193 1.000 -.022 
Contiguity 
.036 -.227 -.013 -.410 .277 -.104 .041 -.022 1.000 
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Coefficients: 
 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
 (Constant) -9.987E-5 .000  -1.064 .289 
intorg 1.903E-7 .000 .287 3.274 .001 
 
Excluded Variables: 
 
 
Beta In t Sig. 
Partial 
Correlation 
 Militarygdp -.011a -.119 .906 -.011 
Gdp -.181a -1.842 .068 -.167 
Trade -.148a -1.599 .112 -.146 
Freedom -.071a -.704 .483 -.065 
Humanrights .117a 1.248 .215 .114 
Totalmilitary -.139a -1.520 .131 -.139 
UNmembership -.045a -.449 .654 -.041 
Contiguity -.035a -.391 .697 -.036 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 224 
 
UNPROFOR(a) 
Descriptive Statisics: 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Troopindex .011764103260 .012897285257 33 
Militarygdp 2.383 1.5600 33 
Intmemberships 2022.39 1240.712 33 
Gdp 194569.09 277573.580 33 
Freedom 2.45 1.641 33 
Humanrights 9.79 4.106 33 
Totalmilitary .00941100 .012662286 33 
Trade 203.9630 433.54294 33 
UNmembership 40.61 9.994 33 
Contiguity 6.58 .502 33 
 
Pearson Correlations (Independent Variables): 
 
 
Militarygdp Intmemberships Gdp Freedom Humanrights Totalmilitary Trade UNmembership Contiguity 
 Militarygdp 
1.000 .023 .149 .051 -.254 .364 .376 .315 .118 
Intmemberships 
.023 1.000 .682 -.641 .680 .112 .416 .436 -.619 
Gdp 
.149 .682 1.000 -.389 .327 .511 .583 .339 -.297 
Freedom 
.051 -.641 -.389 1.000 -.783 -.012 -.197 -.179 .621 
Humanrights 
-.254 .680 .327 -.783 1.000 -.222 .121 .117 -.500 
Totalmilitary 
.364 .112 .511 -.012 -.222 1.000 .743 .325 .040 
Trade 
.376 .416 .583 -.197 .121 .743 1.000 .274 -.204 
UNmembership 
.315 .436 .339 -.179 .117 .325 .274 1.000 -.016 
Contiguity 
.118 -.619 -.297 .621 -.500 .040 -.204 -.016 1.000 
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UNPROFOR(b) 
Descriptive Statistics: 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Troopindex .003346684548 .008642991924 116 
Militarygdp 3.010 3.6124 116 
Intmemberships 1213.48 1095.925 116 
Gdp 144424.91 460361.559 116 
Freedom 3.53 2.083 116 
Humanrights 8.84 4.145 116 
Totalmilitary .00690977 .015318858 116 
Trade 201.8666 873.48286 116 
UNmembership 34.61 13.692 116 
Contiguity 6.55 1.189 116 
 
Pearson Correlations (Independent Variables) 
 
 
Militarygdp Intmemberships Gdp Freedom Humanrights Totalmilitary Trade UNmembership Contiguity 
 Militarygdp 
1.000 -.099 -.067 .181 -.320 .007 -.029 .004 .027 
Intmemberships 
-.099 1.000 .488 -.580 .457 .326 .514 .426 -.200 
Gdp 
-.067 .488 1.000 -.266 .216 .535 .393 .094 -.046 
Freedom 
.181 -.580 -.266 1.000 -.802 -.054 -.232 -.142 .280 
Humanrights 
-.320 .457 .216 -.802 1.000 -.096 .191 -.001 -.292 
Totalmilitary 
.007 .326 .535 -.054 -.096 1.000 .281 .204 -.027 
Trade 
-.029 .514 .393 -.232 .191 .281 1.000 -.006 -.260 
UNmembership 
.004 .426 .094 -.142 -.001 .204 -.006 1.000 .079 
Contiguity 
.027 -.200 -.046 .280 -.292 -.027 -.260 .079 1.000 
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Coefficients: 
 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
 (Constant) -.001 .001  -1.003 .318 
Intmemberships 4.158E-6 .000 .527 5.392 .000 
Trade -2.869E-6 .000 -.290 -2.965 .004 
 
Excluded Variables: 
 
 
Beta In t Sig. 
Partial 
Correlation 
 Militarygdp -.012b -.139 .889 -.013 
Gdp -.152b -1.567 .120 -.146 
 Freedom -.088b -.846 .399 -.080 
humanrights -.037b -.392 .696 -.037 
Totalmilitary -.152b -1.714 .089 -.160 
UNmembership -.067b -.691 .491 -.065 
Contiguity .029b .336 .738 .032 
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UNTAET(a) 
Descriptive Statistics: 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Troopindex .005431902544 .014712575706 41 
Militarygdp 2.207 1.2980 41 
Intmemberships 2477.41 1708.811 41 
Gdp 441248.15 1477648.840 41 
Freedom 2.90 1.882 41 
Humanrights 9.76 3.583 41 
Totalmilitary .01397383 .031927193 41 
Trade 1205.2090 2544.82228 41 
UNmembership 44.34 12.864 41 
Contiguity 6.63 .536 41 
 
Pearson Correlations (Independent Variables): 
 
 
Militarygdp Intmemberships Gdp Freedom Humanrights Totalmilitary Trade UNmembership Contiguity 
 Militarygdp 
1.000 -.088 .088 .376 -.393 .095 .231 .035 -.330 
Intmemberships 
-.088 1.000 .501 -.514 .478 .277 .346 .368 .210 
Gdp 
.088 .501 1.000 -.198 .212 .722 .789 .180 .105 
Freedom 
.376 -.514 -.198 1.000 -.894 .154 -.018 -.105 -.234 
Humanrights 
-.393 .478 .212 -.894 1.000 -.186 .007 .116 .343 
Totalmilitary 
.095 .277 .722 .154 -.186 1.000 .732 .218 -.133 
Trade 
.231 .346 .789 -.018 .007 .732 1.000 .014 -.244 
UNmembership 
.035 .368 .180 -.105 .116 .218 .014 1.000 -.018 
Contiguity 
-.330 .210 .105 -.234 .343 -.133 -.244 -.018 1.000 
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UNTAET(b) 
Descriptive Statistics: 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Troopindex .001687181851 .008512395375 132 
Militarygdp 2.782 3.6783 132 
Intmemberships 1732.50 1588.429 132 
Gdp 226744.48 935818.564 132 
Freedom 3.42 2.148 132 
Humanrights 9.11 3.921 132 
Totalmilitary .00701463 .019920728 132 
Trade 602.2887 2019.66877 132 
UNmembership 38.80 16.028 132 
Contiguity 6.70 .676 132 
 
Pearson Correlations (Independent Variables): 
 
 
Militarygdp Intmemberships Gdp Freedom Humanrights Totalmilitary Trade UNmembership Contiguity 
 Militarygdp 
1.000 -.159 -.033 .346 -.350 -.018 -.016 -.164 -.060 
Intmemberships 
-.159 1.000 .463 -.579 .477 .356 .376 .380 .087 
Gdp 
-.033 .463 1.000 -.203 .193 .727 .819 .144 -.008 
Freedom 
.346 -.579 -.203 1.000 -.851 -.037 -.144 -.158 -.200 
Humanrights 
-.350 .477 .193 -.851 1.000 -.034 .120 .137 .366 
Totalmilitary 
-.018 .356 .727 -.037 -.034 1.000 .681 .212 -.154 
Trade 
-.016 .376 .819 -.144 .120 .681 1.000 .096 -.149 
UNmembership 
-.164 .380 .144 -.158 .137 .212 .096 1.000 -.023 
Contiguity 
-.060 .087 -.008 -.200 .366 -.154 -.149 -.023 1.000 
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ONUB(a) 
Descriptive Statistics: 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Troopindex .001629123757 .004603580069 38 
Militarygdp 1.882 1.0915 38 
Intmemberships 1415.29 1090.494 38 
Gdp 115166.71 305090.812 38 
Freedom 3.79 1.663 38 
Humanrights 7.63 3.157 38 
Totalmilitary .01041876 .031594816 38 
Trade .7342 1.85980 38 
UNmembership 48.42 10.171 38 
Contiguity 6.50 .507 38 
 
Pearson Correlations (Independent Variables): 
 
 
Militarygdp Intmemberships Gdp Freedom Humanrights Totalmilitary Trade UNmembership Contiguity 
 Militarygdp 
1.000 .068 .095 .254 -.542 .160 .177 .186 .369 
Intmemberships 
.068 1.000 .560 -.320 .137 .370 .438 .394 .494 
Gdp 
.095 .560 1.000 .144 -.247 .950 .648 .292 .330 
Freedom 
.254 -.320 .144 1.000 -.792 .271 -.018 .018 -.096 
Humanrights 
-.542 .137 -.247 -.792 1.000 -.359 -.050 -.076 -.118 
Totalmilitary 
.160 .370 .950 .271 -.359 1.000 .675 .288 .290 
Trade 
.177 .438 .648 -.018 -.050 .675 1.000 .310 .169 
UNmembership 
.186 .394 .292 .018 -.076 .288 .310 1.000 .556 
Contiguity 
.369 .494 .330 -.096 -.118 .290 .169 .556 1.000 
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ONUB(b) 
Descriptive Statistics: 
 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Troopindex .000445371962 .002492628698 139 
Militarygdp 2.127 1.7368 139 
Intmemberships 1776.40 1604.794 139 
Gdp 170481.58 513621.068 139 
Freedom 3.39 2.097 139 
Humanrights 8.63 3.871 139 
Totalmilitary .00584122 .017695590 139 
Trade 1.3376 4.12807 139 
UNmembership 44.07 15.576 139 
Contiguity 6.59 .946 139 
 
Pearson Correlations (Independent Variables): 
 
 
 
 
Militarygdp Intmemberships Gdp Freedom Humanrights Totalmilitary Trade UNmembership Contiguity 
 Troopindex 
1.000 -.107 -.054 .362 -.459 .032 -.058 -.039 .040 
Militarygdp 
-.107 1.000 .508 -.566 .507 .262 .487 .280 .256 
Intmemberships 
-.054 .508 1.000 -.222 .194 .549 .465 .135 .134 
Gdp 
.362 -.566 -.222 1.000 -.845 .058 -.172 -.070 -.237 
Freedom 
-.459 .507 .194 -.845 1.000 -.131 .118 .090 .210 
Humanrights 
.032 .262 .549 .058 -.131 1.000 .272 .183 .104 
Totalmilitary 
-.058 .487 .465 -.172 .118 .272 1.000 .115 -.213 
Trade 
-.039 .280 .135 -.070 .090 .183 .115 1.000 .052 
UNmembership 
.040 .256 .134 -.237 .210 .104 -.213 .052 1.000 
